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                                CHAPTER ONE 
                                     INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
According to North (1991), institutions are the humanly devised constraints that 
structure and control political, economic and social interactions amongst various 
economic agents. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, 
customs, traditions and codes of conduct); and formal rules (constitutions, laws, 
property rights). They are a set of economic, political and social factors, rules, 
beliefs, values and organizations that jointly motivate regularity in individual and 
social behaviour (Greif, 2006). They are of three types viz; economic, political 
and social. Economic institutions are essential for economic growth in any 
country due to their influence in shaping incentives for various economic actors in 
a society. They do not only determine the level of economic growth potential of a 
country, they also determine the distribution of resources and economic gains in 
the country. Political institutions, on the other hand, deal with the way the 
political structure in a country influences the behaviour of agents especially with 
regards to the distribution of political power - de jure and de facto (North, 1991; 
Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008; IMF, 2005). Institutions have been crafted by 
man to create a peaceful habitation and reduce uncertainty in the exchange of 
values. It is also believed that they play key roles in the management of 
economies in recent years. This is due to the fact that, it is becoming increasingly 
clear that those involved in economic transactions are not only influenced by 
economic variables (especially price) but also by a host of other factors that can 
be classified as institutions (Natal, 2001). 
 
Economic growth is a sustained expansion of production possibilities measured as 
the increase in real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) over a given period of time 
(Parkin, Powell and Matthews, 2008). The role of trade in economic growth and 
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development is significant. The Classical and Neo-classical economists attached 
so much importance to international trade in a country’s development that they 
regarded it as an ‘engine of growth’. International trade increases savings and 
investment, reduces unemployment and under-employment, enhances greater 
backward and forward linkages in the economy and ensures a larger inflow of 
factor inputs into the economy and outflow of goods and services. Trade 
liberalization, has been defined as a move towards freer trade through the 
reduction of tariff and other barriers and is generally perceived as the major 
driving force behind globalization (Wacziarg and Welch, 2008).  
 
The Neo-classical economists believed that the economic growth of a country 
depends on the level of investment (Solow, 1956). Other scholars brought the 
concept of endogenous growth into the debate (Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1986). This 
was made more popular in the work of Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) that 
made human capital relevant to economic growth. Both the classical economists 
and the endogenous growth theorists seem to assume the institutions in countries 
affect economic activities. However, the insufficient benefits that accrue to 
developing countries from the global world suggest that there is more to economic 
growth and trade than implied by the neo-classical economists (Ige, 2007; Umo, 
2001; Garba, 2003).      
 
The issue of whether trade and increased openness of trade would lead to higher 
rates of economic growth is an age-old debate between pro-traders and anti-
traders over the years. Pro-traders of free trade have lauded the gains from trade 
through the specialization of countries in the production of goods in which they 
have comparative advantage and engage in trade and exchange to meet their other 
needs. But the anti-traders see free trade to be the main cause of dumping of 
goods that have affected the developing countries adversely. New development 
theorists contend that openness to trade stimulates technological change by 
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increasing domestic rivalry and competition, leading to increased innovation; and 
that trade liberalization by allowing new goods to flow freely across national 
borders increases the stock of knowledge for technological innovations which 
spur growth (Ahmed and Sattar, 2004). 
 
Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have implemented a series of economic 
reforms, including trade liberalization, with the aim of enhancing economic 
growth. The theoretical basis for these reforms is that trade liberalization is 
expected to increase trade, thereby increasing investment which in turn raises the 
rate of economic growth. However, the empirical evidence from the large and 
growing literature on trade and growth remains mixed. Edwards (1998), 
Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) suggest that trade liberalization is not associated 
with growth; while Baliamoune (2002) and Yanikaya (2003) conclude that trade 
openness may even retard growth. For instance, while Sachs and Warner (1997) 
argued that trade openness increases the speed of convergence; the evidence from 
the study by Baliamoune (2002) suggested that increased openness to trade has 
led to income divergence rather than convergence in SSA countries. In fact, 
Rodrik (2001) argues that regarding trade openness and growth, “the only 
systematic relationship is that countries dismantle trade restrictions as they get 
richer”. 
 
There is a vast body of literature (North, 1991; Dollar and Kraay, 2003; 
Baliamoune-Lutz and Ndikumana, 2007; Flaig and Rottman, 2007; Kagochi, 
Tackie and Thompson, 2007; Siba, 2008; Mwaba, 2000; Gamberoni, von Uexkull 
and Weber, 2010; Bhattacharyya, 2011) which shows that trade and institutions 
have both positive and negative contributions to economic growth. Institutions 
can reduce or increase transaction costs because they determine the nature of 
exchange. They form a link for connecting the past with the present and the future 
- a kind of path dependency. Institutions provide the incentive structure of any 
Page | 4  
 
economy because they create the structure that shapes the direction of economic 
change towards economic growth, stagnation, or decline. Therefore, trade 
liberalization and institutions enable exchange of goods to take place and results 
in economic growth. On the contrary, economic growth can also lead to trade 
openness and good institutional framework from the fact that when a country is 
experiencing growth, this growth would result in increased domestic and foreign 
rivalry and competition as well as increased institutional innovation. 
 
It has been observed empirically that one of the causes of the limited growth 
effects of trade liberalization is the weakness of institutions. Indeed, one strand of 
the literature on growth has argued for the predominance of institutions in 
economic growth (Easterly and Levine, 1997; Dollar and Kraay, 2003; Rodrik, 
Subramanian and Trebbi, 2004). Findings from empirical studies have concluded 
that institutions are crucial for the success of economic reforms in developing 
countries (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2003; Dollar and Kraay, 2003; 
Addison and Baliamoune-Lutz, 2006). The evidence suggests that the failure of 
trade reforms to promote trade and growth in SSA countries is attributable to the 
poor quality of institutions. In a study by Addison and Baliamoune-Lutz (2006) 
on North African countries, the results of the study show that the growth effects 
of economic reforms depend to a large extent on the quality of institutions. 
 
It is in the light of the above, that this study examines how the institutions in the 
selected SSA countries can contribute meaningfully so that trade liberalization 
can have a noticeable impact on economic growth and increase the rate of 
investment that will boost the growth of aggregate output. 
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1.2 STATEMENT OF RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Temple (1999) stressed the importance of an economic environment that is 
consistent with the development and efficient use of resources. These include 
monetary and price stability, secure property rights and openness to international 
exchange that exert independent impacts on economic growth. Weak economic, 
political and cultural institutions as well as inappropriate trade policies can cause 
growth to be sub-optimal. For instance, good governance, which is a measure of 
quality of political institutions, has usually been considered as one of the key 
variables that enhance economic growth of any society. Economists have tried to 
look at the link between sound institutions embedded in good governance and 
economic growth; and have concluded that they are positively related. In any 
case, the level of economic growth depends, to a large extent on the strength of 
the institutions in place. For instance, in a study by Parsons and Robinson (2006), 
it was observed that Botswana experienced better growth than Zambia on account 
of having better institutions. There is a general discourse that the quality of 
institutions differs across countries because of belief and ideological differences. 
Since this is true for institutions, the study deduced that trade among countries can 
also be influenced by cultural beliefs and ideologies which would make a country 
to determine which country to trade with and which not to trade with (Siba, 2008). 
 
Though the effects of trade on economic growth have been in the limelight since 
the existence of trade. It has been observed from literature that there are other 
factors that can affect the growth of a country; one of such factors is the quality of 
institutions prevalent in the country. Strong economic, political and cultural 
institutions have positive effect on the level of economic growth. For instance, 
Lavallee (2005) used the gravity model to examine the influence of proximity and 
quality of institutions on trade in one hundred and forty-five (145) countries for 
data spanning from 1984 to 2002, and governance indicators from International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG). He found out that institutional proximity tends to 
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increase trade, and concluded that corruption in both importing and exporting 
countries acts as a barrier to bilateral exports, which is harmful to trade and 
economic growth.  
 
It has also been observed that a country can enhance its economic growth by 
freeing up its international trade but the presence of significant institutional issues 
on the side of imports hinders this from being achieved. Most countries can 
increase imports quite quickly once trade liberalization occurs, given suitable 
payment arrangements and an increase in the effective demand for imports. To 
maintain an acceptable or manageable trade balance, exports must also increase, 
and this is where many countries encounter some serious practical difficulties and 
barriers (Hare, 2006). On the contrary, Dollar and Kraay (2003) used the rule of 
law as a measure of institution and ratio of trade to GDP on cross-country level of 
one hundred and sixty-eight (168) for the average of the time frame of 2000-2001. 
The authors found out that changes in trade and changes in institutional quality 
had a substantial positive effect of trade on growth suggesting that trade and 
institutions jointly affect growth.  
 
Siba (2008) in his study on the determinants of institutional quality in SSA 
countries found that ethnic fractionalization has an insignificant but positive effect 
on institutional quality. Most of these studies have only been carried out using the 
Asian, Americas and European countries (as case studies). The SSA countries 
have not been in the limelight at least not to the researcher’s knowledge. 
However, it has been observed from these SSA countries that there have been 
incessant crises occasioned by religious, ethnic and cultural disagreements 
amongst the people, as well as political and economic instability which have 
resulted in the slow pace of growth in these countries (Du, 2010). This has 
become a serious issue of concern as these countries have not been able to 
compete with the developed countries of the world.     
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The studies carried out on SSA (Fajana, 1979; Easterly and Levine, 1997; 
Edwards, 1998; Gerrishon et. al., 2004; Du, 2010) focused on the effect of trade 
on economic growth and the role of institutions in the growth process of these 
SSA countries. But not much emphasis has been placed on the quality of 
institutions, that is, whether these SSA countries have weak or strong institutions 
that can affect the performance of trade to affect economic growth. In addition, 
these studies did not decompose these SSA countries into the sub-regions of 
Africa and did not also look at the interaction effect of trade liberalization and 
institutions on economic growth (this means that under which type of institutions 
would trade liberalization have a better impact on growth).        
 
Therefore, this study attempts to fill the gap identified in the literature which is 
that, first, other studies did not carry out panel unit root tests on the data used. 
This study carried out panel unit root tests on the variables to see if the variables 
are stationary or non-stationary. This is done so as not to have spurious or 
nonsense results. Second, other studies did not categorize the SSA countries into 
the various sub-regions of Africa and the impact of the interaction effect between 
trade liberalization and each type of institution was not examined on economic 
growth. Third, this study also examined the interaction effects between trade 
liberalization and economic, political and cultural institutions on economic 
growth to see which type of institution has to be strong for trade liberalization to 
affect economic growth. The study also decomposed the selected SSA countries 
into sub-regions to see which sub-region had a better influence of trade 
liberalization and institutions on economic growth. By extension, this study was 
able to find out if strong institutions determine the extent of the impact of trade 
liberalization on economic growth. The study used different methods of 
estimation from other similar studies (the combination of LSDV and GMM 
techniques). The study also examined the relevance of institutions as it affects 
trade liberalization and hence economic growth in the selected SSA countries. 
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1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The research questions that this study addresses include the following: 
i. How does trade liberalization affect economic growth in the selected sub-
Saharan African (SSA) countries? 
ii. How do economic, political and cultural institutions affect economic 
growth in the selected SSA countries? 
iii. How does the interaction effect of trade liberalization and institutions 
affect economic growth in the selected SSA countries? and 
iv. What role does the quality of institutions play in influencing economic 
growth in the sub-regions of SSA? 
 
1.4 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The main aim of this study is to investigate the impact of trade liberalization and 
institutions on economic growth in selected sub-Saharan African countries. 
However, the specific objectives of the study include the following: 
i) To examine the impact of trade liberalization on economic growth in 
selected SSA countries; 
ii) To assess the impact of economic, political and cultural institutions on 
economic growth in selected SSA countries; 
iii)  To evaluate the interaction effect of trade liberalization and institutions on 
economic growth in selected SSA countries; and 
iv)  To investigate the role of the quality of institutions in influencing 
economic growth in the sub-regions of SSA. 
1.5 HYPOTHESES OF THE STUDY 
The essence of formulating these hypotheses is to either validate or refute the 
findings of this study. However, based on the objectives of this study, the 
following hypotheses (stated in the null forms) are formulated: 
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1. H0: There is no significant relationship between trade liberalization and 
economic growth in the selected SSA countries.      
2. H0: There is no significant relationship between economic, political and 
cultural institutions and economic growth in the selected SSA countries. 
3. H0: There is no significant relationship between the interaction effect of 
trade liberalization and institutions on economic growth in the selected 
SSA countries. 
4. H0: There is no significant influence of the quality of institutions on 
economic growth in the sub-regions of SSA. 
 
1.6 SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
This study employed the use of secondary data. It examines the impact of trade 
liberalization and institutions on economic growth in selected SSA countries. 
There are various types of institutions but this study focused on three which are 
on economic, political and cultural institutions. The thirty (30) selected SSA 
countries are: Angola, Benin Republic, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape 
Verde, Chad, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, 
Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Uganda and Zambia. These thirty (30) countries were selected based on the World 
Bank’s (2007) classification of countries into ‘moderately outward-oriented’, 
‘moderately inward-oriented’ and ‘strongly inward-oriented countries’. In 
addition, they are all developing countries and belong to sub-Saharan Africa and 
the African continent. These countries had also embarked on trade liberalization 
policies from the 1980s till date. The time frame for the data covers 1985 to 2012. 
The choice of the time frame is informed by the fact that this era witnessed the 
introduction of trade policy regimes and economic reforms such as the 
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introduction of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) in most SSA countries 
(Ajakaiye and Oyejide, 2005; Akinkugbe, 2008). See the classification of the 
countries in Appendix A1.3. 
 
 
1.7 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
Taking into consideration the fact that institutions create the choice pattern that 
affects not only transactions and production costs but also the likelihood of 
engaging in economic activities which lead to economic growth (Ike, 1977, 1984; 
Williamson, 2000; Rodrik, 2008b), they can reduce or increase transaction costs 
because they determine the nature of exchange. The discourse from literature is 
that the impact of trade liberalization and institutions on economic growth does 
not have a defined pattern; the effect is either positive or negative. This study 
examines the impact of institutions on economic growth in selected SSA 
countries; this is because efficient institutions guarantee a transparent policy-
making process that promotes economic growth. Coupled with this is the fact that 
conducive economic environments such as secured property rights, price stability, 
government effectiveness, the effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policies that 
are in agreement with the efficient utilization of resources have been found to 
exert some level of impact on economic growth. In this regards, trade policies and 
institutional quality in a country can determine such country’s growth (Temple, 
1999). This means that when a country has weak institutions, it can lead to the 
occurrence of sub-optimal economic outcomes. Therefore, institutions matter in 
the growth process of any country. Hence, this study would help highlight the 
vital significance of institutions.    
Moreover, this study also examined the impact of trade liberalization on economic 
growth in selected SSA countries. This helped us to assess the benefits of 
international trade, to see if there has been noticeable growth in the selected SSA 
countries, or that international trade have driven some firms out of existence 
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because they cannot compete with the foreign products in the local market thereby 
reducing domestic output and hence growth, on the one hand or have helped to 
increase aggregate output on the other hand. This is clear from the high rate of 
imported goods in SSA. This is based on the assumption that a country can only 
gain from international trade when she is economically stable. It is pertinent to 
note that no country would want to trade with another country that will not be 
able to pay for the goods and services imported from other countries, and this will 
have an adverse effect on the country in question. Thus, this study would serve as 
an eye opener to governments of these selected SSA countries in particular to 
embark on and implement policies that will boost growth so as to boost trade 
liberalization. Aside this, taking into account the fact that culture plays a very 
important role in any economy in that it helps in dictating the ways of life of the 
citizens of the country and determines their interactive abilities; this study 
examined the impact of cultural institutions on economic growth. 
In addition, this study also examined the trade liberalization – institutions – 
economic growth nexus on sub-regional classification. The selected thirty SSA 
countries were classified into Central, East/Southern and West Africa sub-regions. 
This enabled the author to examine the impact of trade liberalization and 
institutions on economic growth on sub-regional basis in order to know which of 
the sub-region fared better than the others. Due to these classifications, this study 
is different from other previous studies on trade liberalization and institutions.  
Furthermore, this study made use of a different technique (the LSDV and GMM 
techniques), a methodological departure from other similar studies to examine the 
role of trade liberalization and institutions on economic growth in selected SSA 
countries. Therefore, this study unfolded the relevance of growth in a country. 
This is because when a country experiences economic growth, aggregate 
investment and savings increase, output level increases and poverty reduces. The 
study would also contribute to existing views on the trade liberalization – 
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institutions – economic growth nexus. It would give persons both inside and 
outside an insight into the importance and significance of trade liberalization and 
institutions in affecting the economy’s growth. Thus, it would help to enhance the 
interest of persons on the academic platform seeking to carry out further study on 
similar topics. 
Also, the recommendations from this study would be useful to policy makers in 
the appropriate government parastatals on how to improve on their institutions. 
The study would equally serve as a medium through which awareness is created 
to the government and society to know the measures to be taken in order to 
improve the economic activities that will boost economic growth which in turn 
will lead to the overall development of the economy. It would be useful to the 
government in the sense that it would enhance processes involved in taking 
decisions and making conclusions on how to encourage and promote the 
industrial sector so as to reduce importation of goods and services. Finally, it 
would serve as a platform for further research in related areas like the impact of 
trade and institutions on output and employment growths. 
 
 
1.8 OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS 
This study is made up of six (6) chapters. The introductory part of the study is 
contained in chapter one. The chapter discussed the background of study, the 
statement of research problem, objectives, significance, research questions, 
research hypotheses, scope and methodology of the study. It also contains the data 
sources as well as the outline of chapters. Chapter Two is the literature review. In 
this chapter, a critique of previous works, research and other materials related to 
the subject of study were carried out. Chapter three contained some stylized facts 
about economic and political institutions in the SSA region.  It also provided 
background information on issues that relate to institutions and economic 
performance in SSA. The conceptual framework and research methodology are 
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contained in chapter four. In this chapter, the study examined the conceptual 
framework; described the variables and method of analysis used in the study. 
Chapter five dealt with the data analyses and interpretations. In this chapter, the 
data collected from secondary sources were analyzed and the results interpreted. 
Chapter six is the concluding part of the study. It contained the summary of major 
findings, policy implications of findings, recommendations and conclusion of the 
study as well as the limitations of the study and suggestions for further studies. 
 
1.9 DEFINITION OF TERMS 
Contract: A contract is a legally enforceable agreement. It involves a formal, 
legal obligation to which each party gives express approval and to which a 
particular body of law applies, (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008). 
 
Cultural Institutions: These are the rules, beliefs and norms that a given society 
will usually hold, that shape collective actions of the constituting human agents, 
(North, 1991). 
 
de facto and de jure: de facto is a Latin word that means ‘by the fact’. In law, it 
means ‘in practice but not necessarily ordained by law’. De jure, on the other 
hand, means ‘concerning the law’ especially when referring to legal matters, 
standards and governance. Specifically, in legal parlance, de facto defines action 
of what happens in practice while de jure describes what the law states in letters. 
In this study, both would be included in the conceptual framework, (North, 1991).   
 
Economic Institutions: These are economic arrangements that a country is 
involved in, which can be domestic and international. They are essential for 
economic growth in a country due to their influence in shaping incentives for 
various economic actors in a society, (North, 1991). 
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Exports: These are goods or services that are sold to other countries by a 
domestic country, (Todaro and Smith, 2011). 
 
Imports: These are goods or services that are bought by a domestic country from 
other countries, (Todaro and Smith, 2011). 
 
Institutions: Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure 
political, economic and social interaction. They consist of both informal 
constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions and codes of conduct) and 
formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights), (North, 1991). 
 
New Institutional Economics (NIE): This incorporates a theory of institutions 
into economics by building on and extending neo-classical theory. NIE has 
developed as a movement within the social sciences, especially economic and 
political science, which brings theoretical and empirical research to examine the 
role of institutions in economic growth, (North, 1991) . 
 
Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs): These are trade barriers that restrict imports but are 
not in the usual form of tariffs. They also mean a number of agreements that deal 
with various bureaucratic or legal issues that could involve hindrances to trade 
such as health and safety requirements or technical barriers, (IMF, 2005). 
 
Political Institutions: These are defined by the nature of political leadership 
structure or governance structure that is persistent in the country. Examples of 
political institutions include the form of government in a country (democracy or 
dictatorship), civil liberties and the extent of constraint of political rights, (North, 
1991). 
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Property Rights: They are divided into economic and legal property rights. The 
economic property rights of an individual over a commodity/an asset are the 
individual’s ability to consume the good or the services of the asset directly or to 
consume it indirectly through exchange. Examples of economic property rights 
are: the right to earn income from an asset, the right to use an asset and contract 
over the terms with other individuals, while the legal property rights are the 
property rights that are recognized and enforced by the government, (North, 
1991).   
 
Tariff: This is a kind of tax imposed on goods when they are moved across a 
national political boundary. It is also a schedule of duties imposed by a 
government on imported or in some countries exported goods, (Todaro and Smith, 
2005).  
 
Tradable and Non-Tradable: A tradable good is a good or service that can be 
sold in another location distant from where it was produced. The opposite is the 
Non-Tradable. Different goods have differing levels of Tradability, usually the 
higher the cost of transportation and the shorter the shelf life, the less tradable a 
good is (IMF, 2005). 
 
Trade: This is the exchange of goods and services within a country (domestic or 
home trade) or between countries (international or foreign trade).  
Trade Liberalization: This is defined as a move towards freer trade through the 
reduction of tariff and other barriers and is generally perceived as the major 
driving force behind globalization. 
 
Transaction Costs: These are costs used for the creation, maintenance, use and 
change of institutions and organizations. They include the costs of information, 
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negotiation and enforcement, costs of defining and measuring claims, costs of 
using and enforcing the rights specified, (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008). 
 
Moderately outward-oriented countries: These are countries where the overall 
incentive structure is moderately biased towards the production of goods for the 
home market rather than for export, and favours the purchase of domestic goods.  
 
Moderately inward-oriented countries: These are countries that have a more 
definite bias against exports and in favour of import substitution.  
 
Strongly inward oriented countries: These are countries where trade controls 
and the incentive structures strongly favour production for the domestic market 
and discriminate strongly against imports.                                           
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                                     CHAPTER TWO 
                                     LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, a review of relevant literature on definitional issues as regards 
trade liberalization, institutions and economic growth are carried out. Also 
contained in this chapter are sub-sections that explained the reasons for trade 
liberalization, benefits of trade liberalization and the link between trade 
liberalization, institutions and economic growth. It also contains a review of 
theoretical and empirical studies similar to this study already carried out.  
 
2.2 REVIEW OF DEFINITIONAL ISSUES 
2.2.1 The Concept of Trade Liberalization 
Liberalization creates interdependencies among people and organizations around 
the world. The phrase “economic liberalization” covers both stabilization and 
structural adjustment measures. It includes liberalization of both domestic and 
external sectors. Stabilization deals with controlling the fiscal balance, the balance 
of payments and external payment deficits and maintaining a low rate of inflation. 
External sector liberalization includes foreign trade, investment and exchange rate 
liberalization and depends upon various factors like the dependence of the 
economy on foreign trade, financial sector liberalization on external account e.t.c. 
It expects trade to act as an engine of growth. If a country’s dependency on 
foreign trade is limited, internal liberalization has a greater importance in 
influencing the growth of the economy. 
 
Trade Liberalization generally refers to reductions in trade barriers, liberalized 
external capital flows, diffusion of technology and international migration of 
labour. It covers decontrol – the elimination of non-tariff measures – as well as 
policies that shift the trade regime toward neutrality – a reduction in the bias 
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toward a particular activity, especially the production of import substitutes. 
Neutrality is defined as a situation in which the effective exchange rate for a 
country’s exports – nominal exchange rate adjusted for export taxes and export 
subsidies and tax credits is equal to the effective exchange rate for imports – 
nominal exchange rate adjusted for duties and premiums resulting from 
quantitative restrictions (Bhagwati, 1988). Trade liberalization is an important 
component of economic liberalization and includes the removal of trade barriers, 
such as tariffs and non-tariff barriers, as well as internal restrictions, such as 
directed credit and preferential purchasing.  
 
Trade liberalization measures the extent of export promotion that is, shifting 
resources from import substitution to export activities, increase in the degree of 
openness, increase in the share of export and import in national income and 
marketisation as well as changing the structure of incentives and institutions 
(Mwaba, 2000). Trade liberalization is a wide concept and includes the impact of 
some specific liberalization policies, such as, foreign capital inflow, tariff 
reduction among others. Chaudhuri, Yabuuchi and Mukhopadhayay (2006) made 
an attempt to analyze the effects of liberalized trade and investment policies on 
welfare and open unemployment in a developing economy in terms of a three 
sector Harris-Todaro type general equilibrium model. The study assumed that 
there is wage rigidity in urban sectors, which leads to the simultaneous existence 
of open unemployment and an urban informal sector in the migration equilibrium.  
 
The issue of trade liberalization has generated three different schools of thought. 
The first school, being the proponent of trade liberalization (pro-trade 
liberalization), believes that it is the best thing that could happen to the world. 
They believe it has brought about a lot of benefits to the entire world. These 
benefits include, access to modern technologies that are not available 
domestically, exchange of fruitful ideas, access to goods and services at relatively 
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cheaper rates compared to the domestic economy, it encourages specialization and 
competitiveness, enhances modernization, access to latest information and frontier 
of knowledge. The school argues that all these put together would enhance the 
economic activities in any country and thereby accelerate economic growth and 
development.  
 
The second school of thought (anti-trade liberalization) believes that the advent of 
trade liberalization has really brought more havoc than good to many economies. 
The school argues that trade liberalization encourages dumping of goods and 
services in countries that are not competitive, especially those, in the developing 
world. It is also observed that it discourages local production of goods and 
services, given that the goods produced in less developed countries cannot 
compete favourably with those of the advanced countries. Then domestic 
industries would be forced to go out of business, thereby leading to massive 
retrenchment and thus, increased unemployment level in the country.  
 
The third school of thought opines that trade liberalization can have positive or 
negative effect depending on the way each country approaches it. Their argument 
is based on the fact that while some countries have gained others have not. For 
instance, the Asian Tigers gained due to their approach to trade. But, in the 
developing countries, the reverse is the case as most of their domestic industries 
are not protected and thereby wind up due to international competition which in 
turn leads to reduced growth (Mwaba, 2000; Chaudhuri, Yabuuchi and 
Mukhopadhayay, 2006). 
 
The liberalized trade paradigm has been cited in the literature as the major reasons 
for the increase in the growth of the economy. The popular argument is that a 
competitive economy and an uncertain environment due to trade liberalization 
lead entrepreneurs to embrace higher capital-intensive productions that affect the 
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growth of manufacturing sector in two ways: first, for mostly labour-abundant 
developing countries, moving away from labour-intensive production is a 
harbinger of unemployment, which people can ill-afford and subsequently seek 
employment in the informal sector. Secondly, in a bid to reduce costs to sustain 
competitive pressure, entrepreneurs are keen to sub-contract few or all the stages 
of their production process to informal units, whereby they can curtail their costs 
of training and maintenance of the labour force and vary their production with 
demand fluctuations. There are also cases where the hitherto protected industries, 
which get exposed to foreign competition, fail to sustain themselves and are 
compelled to lay off workers or, in extreme cases, shut down operations. These 
retrenched workers largely prefer informal sector employment to remaining 
unemployed (Rodrik, 1998). 
 
According to Krueger (1999), a major problem faced by developing countries in 
the trade liberalization process is that a country may be able to control how fast to 
liberalize its imports and thus increase the inflow of products but cannot 
determine by itself how fast its exports grow. Export performance partly depends 
on the prices of the existing exported products and developing countries have 
suffered serious declines in the prices of their commodity exports and their terms 
of trade and also on having or developing the infrastructure, human and enterprise 
capacity for new exports. Thus, trade liberalization can (and often does) cause 
imports to surge without a corresponding surge in exports. This can cause the 
widening of trade deficits, deterioration in the balance of payment and 
employment and the continuation or worsening of external debt, which act to 
constrain growth prospects and often result in persistent stagnation or recession 
(Krueger, 1999). 
 
Trade policy in many SSA countries has been dominated by significant 
restrictions. SSA countries’ protectionist trade policies were initially influenced 
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by the perceived need to stimulate local industrial development, under the banner 
of import substitution and infant industry protection. In many SSA countries, 
tariffs and quantitative restrictions have constituted the most important form of 
trade restriction. A large proportion of imports into Africa were either subjected 
to outright prohibition or high tariffs or some sort of import ban or licensing 
mechanism. Usually an industry can be protected from imports by either applying 
a quantitative restriction or imposing a tariff. Trade barriers in SSA were 
however, excessive in that countries applied quantitative restrictions, tariffs, 
inappropriate use of import and export licences, undue government interventions, 
indiscriminate use of import bans and foreign exchange regulations to control the 
flow of imports and exports (Aigbokhan and Ailemen, 2006; Iyoha and Oriakhi, 
2002). Protectionist policies were actually instituted to totally block imports into 
the countries, except those deemed as priorities by the government and obtainable 
through elaborate licensing arrangements. 
 
In SSA and other developing regions, trade plays a very important role, because it 
has given these countries the opportunity to be able to import the goods they 
cannot produce and export the goods they produce. It has been discovered that the 
larger a country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the smaller its trade ratios. 
Most SSA countries have high ratios of external trade to Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), which makes trade policy vital to the functioning and prospects of their 
economies. In Nigeria, for example, the percentage contribution of foreign trade 
to Gross Domestic Product rose from 35 percent in 1960 to over 60 percent in the 
1980s, over 75 percent in the 1990s and 78 percent in 2009. Other SSA countries 
depict similar characteristics – for example in 1997, the trade to GDP ratio for 
Botswana was 88 percent and that for Zambia 66 percent. The comparative ratios 
for the developed countries were United Kingdom 28 percent, the United States of 
America 11 percent and Japan 9 percent (World Development Indicators, 1996; 
1997). 
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2.2.2 Determinants of Trade Liberalization 
There are economic differences between the developed and developing countries 
that lead to a different behaviour among them which contributes to the 
determination of bilateral trade flows. The following are the determinants of trade 
liberalization:  
a) Country heterogeneity issue – countries of the world differ in their 
geographical locations, what they produce, factor and natural endowments 
among others which makes them specialize in the production of a good or 
service in which they have comparative advantage hence the need to trade 
with one another. 
b) Sector heterogeneity issue – differences in the goods and services 
produced by countries of the world also account for why countries trade 
with one another. 
c) Trade costs – differences in tariff and transport costs. Depending on the 
continent, transport costs differ from one another. 
d) Geography and the role of Distance - distance is much more than 
geography; it is history, culture, language, social relations. Factors such as 
informational costs, tastes and preferences as well as unfamiliarity have 
been included in the distance factor (Siba, 2008). 
e) Technological innovation difference is another determinant of trade 
liberalization. This explains the international competitiveness of countries 
which brings about specialization. 
f) Language and Colonial ties – there are also differences in the languages 
spoken in countries of the world which hinders free trade from taking 
place. Closely linked to this is the fact that these SSA countries have 
different colonial masters that colonized them before they got 
independence, and some of them are still tied to the apron strings of their 
former colonial masters to the extent that they determine the activities in 
these SSA countries (Siba, 2008). 
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2.2.3 Why Liberalize Trade? 
According to Ghosh and Paul (2008), trade liberalization aims to promote an 
economy’s exports to the world, creating employment opportunities to growth. 
Contrary to this argument, it has been seen in the developing countries, including 
Nigeria that trade liberalization has exposed all the industrial units to the inherent 
risk of free market economy. They tend to compete with the advanced countries in 
the international market. For doing so, some of the consequences include:  
1) Modern capital intensive technology replaces the labour intensive technology. 
So, there is large number of employment loss in the formal sector. The retrenched 
workers from the formal sector are getting absorbed in the informal sector due to 
its easy entry.  
2) A large number of workers are informally employed in the formal sector since 
they are under-employed.  
3) There may be a change in the organization of production in the formal sector. 
A significant amount of sub-contracting still takes place. By giving contract to the 
informal sector to produce semi-finished products, formal sector is reducing their 
cost of production. The output of the informal sector is used as a raw material of 
the formal sector. 
 
The major impact of trade liberalization is typically on the manufacturing and 
other organized sectors of the economy, while the urban informal sector and 
subsistence agriculture are largely the producers of non-tradables, the labour 
market and employment are affected indirectly by trade liberalization through 
changes in relative prices and in the probability of obtaining employment in the 
organized sector. Moreover, there exists substantial heterogeneity in the 
employment profiles of individuals and households within these sectors that vary 
largely in terms of their skills and endowments of assets. This implies that the 
impact of trade liberalization on employment also varies significantly according 
to these differences in initial conditions (Schneider and Enste, 2000). 
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The dispute over trade liberalization affecting economic growth has wide 
ramifications for the future path of the global economy and its governance. A 
basic issue is that of the implications of trade liberalization for economic 
development and the reduction of inequality between advanced and developing 
countries. If trade liberalization is, as the critics claim, detrimental to economic 
growth in developing countries then the current path of the global economy will 
lead to growing inequalities between advanced and developing countries rather 
than an eventual convergence. Moreover, if, as claimed, trade liberalization also 
harms the poor in developing countries it will thwart a basic common objective of 
the international community, that of the reduction in global poverty (Hasan, Mitra 
and Ramaswamy, 2003). Apart from this, what is also at stake is the viability of 
the current governance structure of the global economy. If the effects of trade 
liberalization are those depicted by its critics then the value of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and the multilateral trading system it promotes and upholds 
is put in serious doubt. Similarly, in the eyes of its critics, the role of the Bretton-
Woods institutions is also compromised by their strong support for trade 
liberalization in their policy conditionality at the country level and for continued 
multilateral trade liberalization. 
 
However, a major problem faced by developing countries in the trade 
liberalization process is that a country may be able to control how fast to 
liberalize its imports (and thus increase the inflow of products but cannot 
determine by itself how fast its exports grow. Export performance partly depends 
on the prices of the existing exported products and also on having or developing 
the infrastructure, human and enterprise capacity for new exports (Khor, 2005). 
Export performance in developing countries also depends on whether there is 
market access for the country's potential exports especially in developed 
countries. Therefore, developing countries have suffered serious declines in the 
prices of their commodity exports and their terms of trade. Herein lies a major 
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problem beyond the control of the developing countries, for as is well known, 
there are many tariff and non-tariff barriers in the advanced countries to the 
potential exports of developing countries. Unless the barriers are removed, the 
south's export potential will not be realized and this will affect employment 
negatively.  
 
As Trade and Development Report puts it: "developing countries have been 
striving hard, often at considerable cost, to integrate more closely into the world 
economy”. But protectionism in the developed countries has prevented them from 
fully exploiting their existing or potential competitive advantage. Thus, trade 
liberalization can (and often does) cause imports to surge without a corresponding 
surge in exports. This can cause the widening of trade deficits, deterioration in the 
balance of payment and employment and the continuation or worsening of 
external debt, which act to constrain growth prospects and often result in 
persistent stagnation or recession (Khor, 2005). 
 
2.2.4  Institutions in Relation to Trade Liberalization  
Without doubt there is enough theoretical foundation that supports the fact that 
trade liberalization does influence institutions. North (1981) emphasized the role 
of market size and technology in engendering institutional change over time. It is 
widely accepted that both market size and technology are influenced by trade. 
Hence, trade liberalization can bring about institutional change. Rogowski (1989) 
showed that trade liberalization affects domestic political alignments through 
changes in factor prices. Acemoglu et al. (2005) opined that trade induces 
institutional change by strengthening commercial interests. Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2006) showed that trade induces institutional change through the 
transfer of skill-based technology which increases the income share of the middle 
class. The ‘critical juncture’ results are also related to Hasan et al. (2003), LaPorta 
et al. (1999), Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002), Rodrik et al. (2004), and many others 
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who find evidence in favour of the historical origin of institutional divergence 
across countries. 
The origin of trade in the early forms of economies was conceived of as local 
exchange within a small community. Trade usually expands beyond this kind of 
community scene to the region and longer distances and eventually to the rest of 
the world. At each developmental stage, economies have elements of increasing 
specialization, division of labour and more efficient technological usage. This 
story of gradual evolution from local autarky to specialization and division of 
labour was derived from the German historical school of thought (Glitz, 2012). 
Specialization is elementary whereby self-reliance is one of the key features of 
most individuals. Limited level of community trade exists within a given social 
network of informalities, which determines the local exchange of goods and 
services (North, 1991). Thus, the transaction costs that associate this context are 
low because people have somewhat intimacy with one another due to repeated 
transaction. 
As trade continues to expand more and more, the likelihood for conflicts over the 
exchange of values becomes a source of concern- an issue that has to be 
considered before engaging in trade. The size of the market increased and 
transaction costs also increased markedly due to the multifaceted social networks 
that exist. In this case, more resources have to be employed in order to enforce 
rules and orders for effective trade to take place. In the absence of a state that can 
enforce contracts; religious and cultural beliefs can also exert some measure of 
standards for the conduct of those involved in the process. However, their 
effectiveness in lowering the costs of transaction depends on the degree to which 
the laid down guidelines were adhered to. With time, some economies of scale 
and specialization would emerge as a major characteristic of the trade relation. 
This has been noted in early Britain where overseas ventures were pursued 
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through trade expansion and joint stock corporations (Gonzalez de lara, Greif and 
Jha, 2008). 
The growth of long distance trade usually poses two distinct transaction cost 
problems namely; the traditional problem of agency – the costliest of measuring 
performance where the influence of kingship determines the outcome of such 
agreements (or contracts). As the size and volume of trade expands, the problems 
of ‘agencification’ would become a significant constraint to trade. The second 
problem consists of contract negotiation and enforcement where there is no 
readily accessible way to achieve agreements and ensure contract enforcements. 
Negotiation and enforcement with other parts of the world involve the 
development of standardized weights and measures, units of account, a medium 
of exchange, merchant law courts and enclaves of foreign merchants, among 
others (North, 1994; Williamson, 2000).        
The expansion of the market normally entails more specialized producers. 
Economies of scale would result in the hierarchy of organizations with workers 
working either in a central workplace or in a sequential production process. 
Occupational distribution of the population at this stage would reflect a 
considerable increase in the proportion of the labour force that is engaged in 
manufacturing and services, though the predominance in agriculture still exists. 
These evolving stages also reflect a significant shift towards societal urbanization. 
These kinds of societies would need effective, impersonal contract enforcement 
due to personal attachments. Isolations are no longer effective as more complex 
and impersonal modes of exchange occur. 
To establish a realistic commitment to property rights (the rights individuals 
appropriate as a result of the ownership of labour or goods and services they 
possess) protection over time would require either a leader that exercises 
forbearance and restraint in using coercion, or the restraint on the ability to avert 
illogical seizure of assets. For instance, it has been found that in countries where 
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political institutions have considerable discretionary powers in the allocation of 
resources relative to market institutions considerable efforts would be used in 
capturing political powers such that the dissipation of financial, physical and 
intellectual resources would leave very diminutive resources needed to create 
suitable conditions for development (Adewole and Osabuohien, 2007). 
In the last stage where specialization has increased, agricultural activities require 
a small percentage of the labour force. Economies of scale here apply to large-
scale organization, not only in manufacturing but also in agriculture. Thus, 
individuals live by taking part in a specialized function and relying on a network 
of interconnection to provide the large amount of goods and services necessary 
for them. The occupational distribution of the labour force is expected to shift 
progressively from dominance by agriculture to manufacturing and eventually to 
services. In this final stage, specialization requires increasing percentages of the 
resources of the society to be engaged in transaction, so that the transaction sector 
rises to be a large percentage of GDP. This is so because specialization in 
international trade, finance, transport, communication, banking, insurance and so 
on, involves an increasing proportion of the labour force. Therefore, highly 
specialized modes of transaction and organizations will emerge. Specialization 
and division of labour across countries would require institutions and 
organizations to safeguard property rights across different international 
boundaries in order for markets to take with trustworthy obligation of all the 
agents or actors that are involved.           
 
2.3 REVIEW OF THEORETICAL LITERATURE 
This section looks at the literature and some theoretical issues. The trade 
liberalization - institutions - economic growth nexus in SSA has received 
attention since about two decades ago, whether from a theoretical or an empirical 
point of view. One probable reason why this is so could be because the 
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relationship cannot be defined with precision and it is quite unpredictable because 
even in some developed countries, employment has decreased when it opened up 
the economy, particularly the trade regime. Studies by Revenga (1992); Feenstra 
and Hanson (1996) concluded that increase in import competition or outsourcing 
has significant effect in terms of decrease in growth in United States of America 
(USA).  
 
A basic proposition in international trade theory states that free trade is superior to 
protection because it allows a country to fully exploit its comparative advantage. 
All countries gain from trade through specializing in the production and export of 
goods in which they are relatively most efficient and importing the rest of their 
requirements from other countries that can produce them at a relatively lower 
cost. The result is that a given level of output can be produced more cheaply for 
all countries participating in international trade and invariably more employment 
is generated. Two major extensions of this standard proposition, namely the 
Hecksher-Ohlin model and Stolper-Samuelson theorem are used to explain 
comparative advantage. These theories are explained in succession below.  
 
Fitzgerald and Perosino (1995) state that the H-O model unambiguously predicts 
the direction of change of aggregate and sectoral employment and factor prices. 
Output increases in the exportable sector and decreases in the importable sector as 
instantaneous adjustment takes place along the production possibilities frontier. 
As the exportable sector is more labour intensive than the importable sector, the 
change in the composition of employment increases the aggregate demand for 
labour and reduces demand for capital. Based on this, the equilibrium real wage 
rises and capital rental falls. Aggregate employment does not increase because 
supply is rigid, but the increase in wages encourages producers to adopt more 
capital intensive techniques in both sectors. According to Claustre, Timoh and 
Kim (2008), many analysts interpret the H-O model more realistically to include 
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labour market rigidities and unemployment. This means that an increase in 
manufactured trade between developing (labour surplus) and developed (labour 
scarce) countries is likely to result in an increase in employment in the former.  
 
The basis for international trade arises not because of inherent technological 
differences in labour productivity for different products between different 
countries, but because countries are endowed with different factor supplies. 
Relative factor prices differ because of differences in factor endowments, for 
example, labour is relatively cheap in labour-abundant countries, and this makes 
them have a relative cost and price advantage over countries with relatively 
expensive labour in products that make intensive use of labour (this explains why 
the developing countries specialize in the production of primary/agricultural 
products). Conversely, countries well endowed with capital will have a relative 
cost and price advantage, that is, capital is relatively cheap, there will be capital 
abundance, and they will specialize in the production of capital-intensive products 
like aircraft, automobiles, computers among others - the case of the developed 
countries (Todaro and Smith, 2004). The relevance of this to the developing 
countries is that they can specialize in the production of their labour- and land- 
intensive agricultural produce for exports and generate revenue thereby benefiting 
from free trade. Besides, the generated revenue can be invested on projects that 
will aid economic growth. On the contrary, the capital-intensive products these 
developing countries cannot produce will be imported from the developed 
countries that produce them.   
 
However, this is somewhat distant from reality, predominantly in developing 
countries, where market imperfection is pervasive, industrial production is 
characterized by economies of scale and market failures are common. It has also 
been assumed in the standard trade theory that resources are fully employed and 
trade is always balanced. But in these developing countries, characterized by high 
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unemployment levels, trade liberalization can impinge heavy adjustment costs in 
the form of reduction in output and aggravating trade deficits and unemployment. 
In these developing countries, trade liberalization predominantly fosters import 
liberalization that mainly involves lowering tariffs in unskilled labour-intensive 
protected sectors. In accordance with the Stolper-Samuelson (SS) theory this has 
the immediate effect of decline in factor reward to unskilled labour, widening the 
wage gap between skilled and unskilled labour and also loss of jobs for many 
unskilled workers. 
 
As regards institutions, the New Institutional Economics (NIE) theory is a new 
development in economic thought based on institutional economics and some of 
the principles of Neo-classical economics (Natal, 2001). It has been applied in 
varying contexts. For instance, it can be engaged as non-technologically 
determined controls that can influence social interactions by providing the 
incentives to maintain regularity in human behaviour in historical comparative 
institutional analysis, (Greif, 1998). The NIE theory posits that economic 
activities that individuals engage in can be influenced by some social and legal 
relationships that exist among them. Hence, NIE embraces other areas outside the 
immediate domain of economics like politics, science and sociology as well as the 
interaction they can exert on economic outcomes. This is what makes institutions 
to be an area of economics that has made economics more closely in touch with 
other social science disciplines as they can be subjected to economic analysis. 
 
The basic assumptions of New Institutional Economics (NIE) that relates to trade 
are three folds assumptions on individuals, assumptions on how and why 
individuals engage in contract; and assumptions on how individuals govern 
collective actions (Natal, 2001). In all the assumptions, the bottom line is that 
there should be some mechanism that regulates the participants’ behaviour, as 
individuals can be opportunistic at times that could result to moral hazards 
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(Akerlof, 1970). Though some of the assumptions of NIE have been critiqued 
especially with regards to institutional change and predictability; it is still very 
relevant when assessing the roles institutions play in economic relations in 
particular and human relations in general. 
 
LaPorta et al. (1999) developed the theories of institutional development which 
centre on factors that can lead to the formation and persistence of a given 
institutional framework in a society. The theories of institutional development can 
be classified into three based on their structural composition namely: economic, 
political and cultural institutional theories. The economic theory of institutional 
framework believes that institutions are essentially crafted when it is efficient to 
create them. The connotation of this is that institutions are mostly created by 
economic actors when the perceived social benefits of such creation significantly 
exceed the perceived transaction costs that are associated with their creation. 
The political theory of institutional development, on the other hand, hinges 
fundamentally on redistribution of societal resources much more than economic 
efficiency. The basic maxim of the political institutional development is that 
institutions are fashioned by those that have political powers in such a way that 
they can stay in power with a view to extracting economic rents. This is very 
ubiquitous in a multi-ethnic society where there is the existence of conflict of 
interests between voters of different groups and their representatives in the 
parliament. The conflict of interests is with regards to skirmish of policy 
preferences, which can result to a number of inefficient public policies that are 
based on political logrolling and compensation of political allegiances instead of 
efficiency (Persson, et al. 2003; Adewole and Osabuohien, 2007). The third 
category of institutional development theory is the cultural theory of institutional 
development which postulates that a given society will usually hold beliefs that 
can shape collective actions of the constituting human agents. 
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The trade theories are not totally practicable in real life situations because, asking 
countries to specialize in the production of a product or service in which a country 
has comparative advantage would in the real sense of it favour the developed 
capital-intensive countries more because they will have more goods to produce 
than the developing labour-intensive countries. These developed countries are 
gradually taking over the goods produced by the developing countries. The 
implication of this is that the growth of these labour-intensive countries will be at 
a slow pace than the developed countries. 
 
Moreover, several similar studies carried out on trade liberalization using 
different methodologies have come out with varying views on the impact of trade 
on a country’s economic growth (Meyer et al. 2009; Ogunkola et al. 2006; 
Lavallee, 2005; Segura-Cayuela, 2006; Flaig and Rottmann, 2007; Kagochi et al., 
2007; Dollar and Kraay, 2003; Alonso and Garcimartin, 2009). These studies 
found out that the level of growth in the current year does have a bearing with the 
level of growth in the previous year, and that there are varying impacts of trade 
and institutions on economic growth. For some of these studies, there was a 
positive impact, while for others a negative impact. 
 
 
2.4 REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
This section looks at some empirical studies and the respective methodological 
approaches adopted in previous related studies on the impact of trade 
liberalization and institutions on economic growth in selected Latin America, 
Europe, Asia and SSA countries. The results show varied growth effects. The 
choice of the selected countries in this study stems from the fact that they have 
some peculiar economic similarities and they are all less developed countries.  
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The Gap in the Literature 
In terms of methodology, some of the studies reviewed used elementary 
techniques in their analysis of data, for instance, Oyejide (1995), Mwaba (2000), 
Analogbei (2011), Tussie and Aggio (2010) and Chandra, Lontoh and Margawati 
used descriptive data. Some other studies also used the Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) technique in analyzing their model, for example, Dollar and Kraay (2003), 
Flaig and Rottman (2007) and Ogunkola et al. (2006). These methodologies are 
inadequate and elementary when serious econometric analyses are needed to be 
carried out. Thus, there is a need to carry out the econometric analysis with more 
sophisticated econometric techniques which this study provided. Aside this, some 
of these studies had examined the impact of labour market institutions on 
employment, on the labour intensity of output growth, the impact of tariff reform 
and currency devaluation on rural poverty and inequality in Nigeria (see Flaig and 
Rottman, 2007; Gamberoni et al., 2010; Omoke, 2006). These studies did not 
examine the effects of economic, political and cultural institutions on growth 
which is the focus of this study.     
 
The discourse in literature is that political violence, an indicator of weak political 
institutions, has a negative effect on economic growth with estimated overall 
effect being significantly larger than the direct capital reduction effects. Another 
discovery from literature is that most of the studies focused on trade liberalization 
and economic growth, with few emphasizing on institutions and how they affect 
economic growth. To the knowledge of the researcher, the studies that have been 
carried out had not examined the impact of the combination of trade liberalization 
and institutions on economic growth in SSA countries; most of the studies have 
focused on Asian, European and Latin American countries. The findings of these 
studies have revealed that institutions can have either positive or negative impact 
on economic growth; and that countries can have weak or strong institutions.  
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This study is quite different from other studies reviewed in the following ways; 
first, the other studies reviewed did not carry out panel unit root tests (for those 
that used pooled data). This study deemed it fit to carry out panel unit root tests 
on the variables used in order to test if they are stationary or non-stationary. This 
is important so as not to have spurious or nonsense results at the end of the data 
analyses. The Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) unit root test was used because it 
combines information based on individual unit root tests and allow for a 
heterogeneous alternative hypothesis where the probability values can vary across 
countries. Second, the other distinct factor is the fact that the selected SSA 
countries in this study are quite distinct from countries used in previous studies.  
 
Therefore, having carried out a critique of the studies reviewed, this study found 
out gaps in the literature which other studies did not examine, thereby trying to 
fill these gaps. This study categorized the selected SSA countries into Central, 
East/Southern Africa and West African sub-regions and the analysis of each sub-
region was carried out. Furthermore, the selected SSA countries were also 
categorized based on the World Bank’s (2007) classification into moderately 
inward-oriented, strongly inward-oriented and moderately outward-oriented 
countries and each were analysed separately. In addition, the interaction effect 
between trade liberalization and institutions was also carried out. The reason for 
this is for the study to examine under which type of institutions would trade 
liberalization affect economic growth better. Thus, this study on completion 
would have contributed to existing knowledge on the link between trade 
liberalization, institutions and economic growth in SSA countries. 
The review of these studies is presented in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1: Summary of Review of Empirical Literature 
Author  Objective Theory Data Set Methodology Result Critique 
Baliamoune-Lutz 
and Ndikumana 
(2007). 
The study examined 
the growth effects 
of openness to trade 
and the role of 
institutions in 39 
African countries 
between 1975 and 
2001. 
Growth 
Theory. 
Panel Data. Arellano-Bond 
GMM. 
The result 
showed that at 
high levels of 
trade, the quality 
of institutions 
plays a key role 
in the 
transmission of 
trade gains into 
growth. 
Aside institutions, 
the under-
development of 
African financial 
systems, which are 
characterized by 
pervasive 
inefficiencies in 
financial 
intermediation 
may also explain 
weak transmission 
from trade 
liberalization to 
growth, the study 
did not consider 
this. 
Gamberoni et al. 
(2010). 
The study examined 
the role of openness 
and labour market 
institutions for 
employment 
dynamics during 
economic crises. 
Dynamic 
model of 
employment 
growth. 
Panel Data. GMM. They found out 
that domestic 
debt and 
banking crises 
had more severe 
impact on 
employment 
than the global 
economic 
downturns and 
high 
unemployment 
benefits had a 
strong reduction 
on employment 
growth. 
The study 
concentrated on 
trade openness and 
labour market 
institutions as it 
affects employment 
but this is not the 
only reason that 
accounts for low 
employment rates in 
countries. 
Dollar and Kraay 
(2003). 
It examined the 
importance of trade 
and institutions in 
driving growth. 
Growth theory Panel Data Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS).  
They found out 
that rapid 
growth, high 
levels of trade 
and good 
institutions go 
together. 
The study did not 
focus on the decadal 
changes in the 
measures of 
institutional quality 
which can also 
affect trade in the 
long-run. 
Kagochi et al. 
(2007). 
It looked at the 
impact of economic 
and political 
freedoms on 
economic growth in 
Nigeria. 
Neo-classical 
growth model 
Time series Error 
Correction 
Model (ECM). 
They found out 
that economic 
freedom does 
not have a 
significant 
impact on 
growth while 
political 
freedom has a 
significant 
impact on the 
growth of 
Nigeria. 
This study focused 
only on economic 
and political 
freedoms but there 
are other important 
aspects of 
institutions such as 
legal and cultural 
that affects 
economic growth as 
well. 
Source: The Researcher’s Compilation, 2012. 
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Author  Objective Theory Data Set Methodology Result Critique 
Flaig and Rottman 
(2007). 
It examined 
the effects of 
labour 
market 
institutions 
on the labour 
intensity of 
output 
growth in 17 
OECD 
countries. 
The concept 
of 
employment 
threshold. 
Panel Data Ordinary 
Least Square 
(OLS) 
They found out 
that the 
employment 
threshold is not 
only a possibly 
time-varying 
parameter 
but also 
depends on 
labour market 
institutions. 
The selected countries in 
this study are the more 
developed European and 
Asian OECD countries than 
African countries. The 
concept of employment 
threshold which is the 
growth rate of production 
which is necessary for 
keeping employment 
constant is another 
criticism; the study did not 
mention the consequence of 
not attaining this 
employment threshold to a 
country. 
Mwaba, (2000). It looked at 
the impact of 
trade 
liberalization 
on economic 
growth in 
Africa. 
Solow 
growth 
model. 
Descriptive 
data. 
Descriptive 
Analysis. 
It found out 
that Africa has 
maintained the 
highest import 
barriers through 
tariffs and 
quantitative 
restrictions 
among the 
developing 
countries. Thus, 
measures 
should be 
embarked on to 
increase the 
competitiveness 
of their 
products.  
This study is not so in-
depth as expected because 
it is descriptive in nature, it 
made use of tables, charts 
and graphs as illustrations, 
without any statistical or 
econometric computation 
Source: The Researcher’s Compilation, 2012. 
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Omoke, 
(2006).  
The study 
examined the 
impact of 
tariff reform 
and currency 
devaluation 
on rural 
poverty and 
inequality in 
Nigeria. 
Endogenous 
growth 
theory. 
Time series 
data. 
Computable 
General 
equilibrium 
Framework. 
The study 
observed that 
trade 
liberalization 
reduces rural 
real wage and 
rural income 
leading to 
higher labour 
demand with 
worsening 
inequality. 
The focus of this study is mainly on 
reducing rural poverty, what 
happens to the urban areas 
considering the fact that the major 
proportion of the population in 
Nigeria live in the urban areas. 
Analogbei, 
(2011) 
The study 
examined the 
impact of 
trade policies 
on 
productivity 
in Nigeria. 
N/A N/A Descriptive 
Analysis. 
It found out 
that the 
productive 
sectors 
initially 
responded 
positively to 
the SAP 
policies, but 
encountered 
constraints 
such as decay 
of 
infrastructural 
facilities and 
low 
technological 
capability as 
the years 
progressed. 
This study is not an in-depth one 
because it is descriptive in nature 
without any statistical or 
econometric computations.  
Chandra, 
Lontoh and 
Margawati, 
(2010).  
The study 
examined the 
gender 
implications 
of trade 
liberalization 
in Southeast 
Asia. 
N/A Descriptive 
Data 
Descriptive 
Analysis. 
The study 
revealed that 
trade 
liberalization 
has had 
profound 
positive and 
negative 
effects on the 
wellbeing of 
women in 
Southeast 
Asia. 
We cannot use this study as a 
yardstick for conclusion because 
Southeast Asia is quite different 
from Africa, moreover, the study 
focused on women only.   
Source: The Researcher’s Compilation, 2012. 
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Meyer et al, 
(2009). 
It examined the 
impact of  
market-
supporting 
institutions on 
business  
strategies by 
analyzing the 
entry strategies 
of foreign 
investors 
entering 
emerging 
economies. 
N/A Primary 
Data. 
Multinomial 
logit (M-
Logit) 
regression 
model. 
The study found 
out that the 
stronger the 
institutional 
framework; the 
more likely 
investors would 
invest in these 
economies and 
the larger the 
market would 
be. 
 
The study only focused 
on market-supporting 
institutions as the only 
determinant of foreign 
investment but there are 
some other institutions 
such as economic, 
political and legal that 
can also affect the 
presence of foreign 
investment in a country.   
Tussie and 
Aggio, 
(2010). 
It examined the 
economic and 
social impacts 
of trade 
liberalization 
in eight 
developing 
countries. 
N/A Descriptive 
data. 
Descriptive 
Analysis. 
The study 
observed that 
reforms in all 
the countries 
used as case 
studies were so 
deep and all 
encompassing 
that it is difficult 
to separate the 
effects of trade 
reforms from the 
other reforms 
and arrive at any 
definite 
conclusions 
about their 
impacts 
economically 
and socially. 
The selected countries 
used in this study are 
entirely different, and it 
is not in-depth because it 
is descriptive in nature.  
Alonso and 
Garcimartin, 
(2009). 
The study 
assessed the 
determinants of 
institutional 
quality. 
Institutional 
Theory. 
Panel data. 2SLS The results of 
the study show 
that 
the main 
determinants of 
the quality of 
the institutions 
of a given 
country are its 
income 
per head and its 
income 
distribution, the 
efficiency of its 
tax system and 
the educational 
level of its 
population. 
This study is streamlined 
only to the determinants 
of the quality of 
institutions; no mention 
is made of trade which is 
an important factor in the 
growth of a country. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page | 40  
 
 
 
 
Author  
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Theory 
 
 
 
Data Set 
 
 
 
Methodology 
 
 
 
Result 
 
 
 
Critique 
Ogunkola et 
al (2006). 
The study 
examined the 
impact of trade 
and investment 
policy reforms 
on some 
macroeconomi
c performance 
variables. 
The New 
growth 
theory.  
Time series 
data. 
Ordinary 
Least square 
(OLS). 
The study found 
out that that 
labour force 
growth is not a 
significant 
determinant of 
aggregate output 
growth, while 
the growth of 
investment, 
import share, 
export share and 
foreign direct 
investment 
ratios are 
major factors 
influencing 
aggregate output 
growth. It also 
found that trade 
and investment 
policy reforms 
do not have 
significant 
impact on 
aggregate output 
growth. 
This is a restricted study 
in that it only focused on 
investment policy 
reforms as they affect 
macroeconomic 
performance leaving out 
institutions that play 
important role in 
determining 
macroeconomic 
performance.  
Lavallee, 
(2005) 
The study 
examined the 
influence of 
proximity and 
quality of 
institutions on 
trade in 145 
countries 
between1984 
and 2002. 
Institutional 
theory. 
Panel data. Gravity 
model. 
The result 
showed that 
institutional 
proximity tends 
to increase trade 
and that 
corruption in 
both importing 
and exporting 
countries acts as 
a barrier to 
bilateral exports, 
which is harmful 
to trade 
especially when 
there is weak 
bureaucratic 
quality. 
The selected countries 
used in this study 
comprise countries in the 
Asian, European and 
American continents and 
not African countries. 
The study did not 
consider bad governance 
as a factor that affects 
trade. 
Source: The Researcher’s Compilation, 2012. 
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Soares, (2005). The study 
assessed   
whether or not 
the trade 
liberalization 
process had any 
effect on both 
the reduction in 
the wage 
differential 
between formal 
and informal 
workers in 
Brazil.  
Hecksher-
Ohlin 
Trade 
Theory. 
Time 
series and 
cross-
sectional 
data. 
Panel data 
analysis. 
The result showed 
that the fall in the 
wage gap between 
formal and 
informal workers 
in the 
manufacturing 
sector was affected 
by trade-related 
variables, 
particularly, by the 
import penetration 
ratio. 
The study’s focus 
was only on Brazil 
which cannot be used 
as a generalized 
result for conclusion.   
Huang and Chen, 
(1999). 
The study 
highlighted the 
effects of trade 
liberalization on 
agriculture in 
China. 
Welfare 
Theory. 
Time 
series and 
cross-
section 
data. 
Partial 
Equilibrium 
Model. 
The result showed 
that rice farmers in 
China gained more 
than the others 
from the process of 
trade liberalization 
due to the fact that 
there was a fall in 
production cost 
and a rise in 
domestic rice price 
as most 
agricultural inputs’ 
prices fell with 
trade 
liberalization.    
The study is a one-
sector, one-country 
(agricultural sector, 
China); hence the 
result is not 
comprehensive 
enough for 
generalization.   
Meon and Sekkat, 
(2008).  
The study 
examined the 
effect of 
institutional 
quality on trade 
in 59 countries 
spanning across 
the American, 
Asian and 
African 
continents 
between 1990 
and 2000. 
Trade 
theory. 
Panel data. Fixed Effects 
Model and 
Instrumental 
Variables. 
The result showed 
that exports of 
manufactured 
products were 
positively affected 
by rule of law, 
government 
effectiveness 
control of 
corruption and 
lack of political 
violence but 
control of 
corruption exerted 
more effects on 
export of 
manufactured 
products  when 
compared to non-
manufacture and 
total exports. 
The study 
decomposed total 
exports into 
manufactured and 
non-manufactured 
exports, this is not 
sufficient as exports 
comprise more than 
these two categories. 
Source: The Researcher’s Compilation, 2012. 
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Oyejide and 
Bankole, 
(2001).  
The study 
examined 
the unilateral 
and 
multilateral 
approaches 
of the 
implications 
of 
liberalization 
of the 
services 
sector in 
Nigeria.  
N/A Descriptive 
data 
Descriptive 
analysis. 
The result of the 
analysis showed 
that Nigeria’s share 
of services trade in 
Africa rose 
unsteadily 
from the late 1980s 
to 1998, but 
indicating greater 
dynamism than 
Africa’s share of 
world services 
trade.  
The study was not in-
depth because of the 
inadequate dis-
aggregation of data 
which is an important 
feature of services 
trade in Nigeria.   
Bhattacharyya, 
(2011). 
The study 
examined 
the impact of 
trade 
liberalization 
on 
institutional 
development 
using  31 
developed 
and 103 
developing 
countries 
with data 
spanning 
1865-1940 
and 1980-
2000 
respectively. 
Theories of 
Trade and 
Institutional 
Development. 
Panel Data. Limited 
Information 
Maximum 
Likelihood 
(LIML) Fuller 
estimation 
method. 
The study found 
that the within 
variation in 
economic 
institutions can be 
explained by trade 
liberalization as 
well as a weak 
evidence in favour 
of the ‘critical 
juncture’ view of 
history as the 
country fixed 
effects are only 
weakly correlated 
with settler 
mortality and 
population density. 
There are several 
channels through 
which trade 
liberalization impacts 
institutions but the 
study did not give a 
detailed understanding 
of the channels 
through which trade 
liberalization impacts 
institutions.  
Bouis, Duval 
and Murtin, 
(2011)  
The study 
examined 
the policy 
and 
institutional 
determinants 
of long-run 
economic 
growth in 
selected 
OECD and 
non-OECD 
countries. 
The Human 
Capital 
Augmented 
Neoclassical 
Growth 
Model. 
Panel data. Pooled mean 
group (PMG). 
estimator. 
The study found out 
that regulatory 
barriers to 
entrepreneurship, 
explicit barriers to 
trade and,  
especially, patent 
rights protection 
appear to be fairly 
robust determinants 
of long-run cross-
country differences 
in technology and 
that some other 
policies and 
institutions such as 
trade liberalization 
speed up 
technology 
convergence. 
The study was 
restricted to  
institutions as they 
affect 
entrepreneurship, and 
the countries cannot be 
used for general 
conclusion.  
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Mesike, Giroh 
and Owie, 
(2008).  
The study 
analyzed the 
effect of 
trade 
liberalization 
policy on the 
Nigerian 
rubber 
industry. 
Descriptive 
Statistics. 
Time series 
data. 
Ordinary 
Least 
Square 
(OLS). 
The result of the 
study  revealed that 
output and 
producers price 
exerted positive 
effects on export 
supply, that is, a 
rise in output and 
producer’s price 
would cause 
exporters to export 
more natural 
rubber, and the 
domestic 
consumption 
quantity and annual 
rainfall were 
disincentives to 
rubber exporters. 
The study has a 
shallow view in that 
trade liberalization is 
better viewed as a 
general consensus, that 
is, its general impact 
on the economy.   
Djeri-wake, 
(2009). 
The study 
examined 
the impact of 
Chinese 
foreign 
direct 
investment 
and bilateral 
trade with 
Nigeria 
economic 
growth. 
Augmented 
Aggregate 
Production 
Function 
(APF) 
Growth 
Model. 
Time series 
and cross-
sectional data. 
Ordinary 
Least 
Square 
method 
(OLS) and 
the 
Granger 
Causality 
Test. 
The OLS short and 
long-run estimation 
of China-Nigeria 
bilateral trade result 
showed positive 
trends while the 
estimated 
coefficient of short-
run are not 
positively 
correlated with 
Nigeria economic 
growth like the 
long-run 
coefficient. While 
the Granger 
causality test result 
revealed that the 
Chinese FDI 
inflows to Nigeria 
is due to the Nigeria 
Labour Force 
dynamism which 
have a positive 
impact on the 
China-Nigeria 
bilateral trade 
growth.   
This study focused 
mainly on the bilateral 
trade between China 
and Nigeria; no 
mention is made of the 
quality of institutions 
in both countries, and 
yet the quality of 
institutions can affect 
trade. 
Source: The Researcher’s Compilation, 2012. 
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Oyejide, 
(1995). 
The study 
ascertained 
the impact of 
trade and 
regional 
integration 
on the 
development 
of Sub-
saharan 
Africa. 
N/A Descriptive 
Data. 
Descriptive 
Analysis. 
The result of the 
study showed 
that import 
restrictions made 
exporters face 
more appreciated 
exchange rates 
than would have 
been the case in 
their absence and 
the lesson for 
Sub-saharan 
Africa is that 
these elements 
combine to 
reduce the 
international 
competitiveness 
of the export 
sectors of the 
African countries 
and subsequently 
reduce exports 
and Gross 
Domestic 
Product (GDP) 
growth. 
The study was not in-
depth enough as it did 
not employ any 
econometric tool of 
analysis.  
Siba, (2008) The study 
ascertained 
the 
determinants 
of 
institutional 
quality in 
Sub-saharan 
African 
countries. 
Aid – 
Institutions 
Paradox. 
Panel Data. 2SLS The empirical 
results have 
shown that 
historical factors 
such as state 
legitimacy  
determine the 
quality of current 
institutions in the 
region, foreign 
aid dependence 
erodes the  
quality of 
governance as 
measured by rule 
of law and the 
variability of aid 
counterbalances 
the destructive 
nature of 
high level of aid 
dependence. 
This study is 
streamlined only to the 
determinants of the 
quality of institutions; 
no mention is made of 
trade which is an 
important factor in the 
growth of the selected 
Sub-saharan countries. 
Source: The Researcher’s Compilation, 2012. 
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Márquez-Ramos 
(2010)  
The study 
examined the 
determinants 
of 
international 
trade in 
African 
countries 
using Ghana 
and South 
Africa as case 
studies. 
N/A Time 
series and 
cross-
sectional 
data. 
Gravity 
model. 
The results 
showed that 
determinants 
of trade have 
a different 
impact in the 
two African 
countries. In 
South Africa, 
geographical 
and social 
factors play a 
key role on 
trade 
relationships. 
Moreover, 
technological 
innovation in 
importer 
countries 
leads to 
higher exports 
from this 
country. 
While in 
Ghana, 
exports are 
higher when 
they are 
addressed to 
countries with 
higher levels 
of economic 
freedom. 
 
 
The study focused on 
Ghana and Nigeria 
only, this cannot be 
used for 
generalization of 
African countries.  
Source: The Researcher’s Compilation, 2012. 
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Heid and Larch, 
(2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The study 
examined the 
effects of 
immigration 
and trade on 
unemployment 
in 24 OECD 
countries. 
Neo-
classical 
trade 
theory. 
Panel 
data. 
GMM The study 
found out that 
there is no 
significant 
aggregate 
effect of 
immigrant 
inflows on 
unemployment 
rates in  
countries that 
engage highly 
in trade 
because 
immigration 
and trade 
exposure of a 
country are 
highly 
correlated and, 
therefore, not 
statistically 
independent.   
The authors subtracted 
return migrants from  
total immigrants and 
assumed that it is only 
the net number of 
migrants which 
influences the 
unemployment rate, this 
is not accurate since 
from a theoretical point 
of view, it is not entirely 
clear whether net or total 
migration flows should 
be used. If labour 
markets 
are characterized by 
search frictions, total 
inflows may be the 
appropriate measure 
especially for 
quantifying the short-run 
impact as every new 
migrant has to search for 
a job. However, in the 
medium- to long-run or 
when labour markets are 
very flexible, net inflows 
net inflows may be more 
appropriate. 
Source: The Researcher’s Compilation, 2012. 
 
 
   2.4.1 Government Policies on Trade Liberalization in SSA   
 The gloomy performance of the Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) policy 
 led to the adoption of outward-oriented development strategy by many sub-
 Saharan African (SSA) countries as part of their structural adjustment and reform 
 programmes from the mid-1980s. The structural adjustment programme (SAP) 
 was adopted with the purpose of liberalizing the economies of these countries 
 particularly the external sector. The main objective of trade liberalization in the 
 mid-1980s was to promote economic growth by capturing the static and dynamic 
 gains from trade through a more efficient allocation of resources; greater 
 competition; an increase in the flow of knowledge and investment and more 
 importantly, obtaining a faster rate of capital accumulation and technical progress. 
 Trade policies in most SSA countries went through major changes within the 
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 context of SAP during this period. Foreign trade was liberalized through the 
 reduction of tariffs and non-tariff barriers and reduction of import duties applied 
 to imports in a large number of SSA countries (Babatunde, 2009).     
         
        In addition, import permits were abolished, and duty rates as part of tariff 
 liberalization  were also lowered in many SSA countries. Currencies were 
 devalued to encourage exporters, with the aim of boosting exports and growth, 
 and fostering the integration of SSA into the global economy. A substantial 
 number of SSA countries virtually eliminated parallel market premiums, with 
 buying and selling of foreign exchange then becoming market-based, while 
 abolishing previous restrictions on currency transactions. Thus, this new policy 
 strategy attempted to promote greater openness in order to boost growth and 
 encourage the competitive integration of the SSA economies into the globalizing 
 world (Babatunde, 2009). 
 
        The failure of the import–substitution strategy and the debt crisis in the early 
 1980s led to a new accord on the importance of trade liberalization and  exports 
 in growth strategies. This new accord was the main focus of the reforms  
 initiated by SSA countries and the developing world in general from the early 
 1980s, within the framework of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP). As 
 a result, the mid 1980s witnessed the formulation and implementation of wide-
 ranging trade liberalization measures such as export promotion measures by most 
 SSA countries with the support of the IMF and the World Bank. 
 
         The aftermath result is that starting from the mid-1980s, and especially in the 
 1990s, most SSA African countries liberalized their trade regime to some extent, 
 with many countries reducing trade barriers significantly more than others 
 (especially restrictions on imports). These reforms were aimed at making it easier 
 to import, by reducing tariffs and non-tariff barriers, and encouraging exports, by 
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 eliminating export taxes and providing export incentives. Tariffs are now the main 
 trade policy instruments of most SSA countries. A wide picture of trade policy 
 reform can be obtained by examining the trends in SSA countries tariffs level. For 
 instance, average tariffs have been reduced significantly, almost halved on 
 average, in SSA over the past 30 years, the average schedule tariff that was 38.5 
 percent between 1980 and 1985 in the West African sub-region stood at 
 14.4percent between 2000 and 2005 period, and 14.1 percent between 2006 and 
 2011 (Morrissey and Mold, 2011). 
 
        The tariff structure has also been simplified to not more than five bands in some 
 SSA countries with the reduction of the number of bands after the adoption of 
 trade liberalization. For example, the number of bands was reduced from 8 to 5 
 (0, 5, 10, 15 and 25 percents) between 1994 and 2011 in Kenya, the reduction was 
 made to four in Zambia (0, 5, 15 and 25 percents) and Tanzania with a simplified 
 five-tier structure with tariff rates of (0, 5, 10, 20 and 25 percents) for the same 
 period. The modal rate, that is, the most common, ranges from 10 percent to 25 
 percent; and applies to between 12 to 33 percent of all tariff lines depending on 
 the country between 1994 and 2011 (Africa Development Indicators, 2011).  
 
         Tariffs in some cases are also based on common external tariff (CET) as a result 
 of the regional integration arrangement among the West African Economic and 
 Monetary Union (WAEMU) countries. For instance, the CET groups custom 
 duties into four major categories in Niger, Mali, Benin and Burkina Faso in the 
 order of essential goods (0 percent); staple goods (5 percent), intermediate goods 
 and inputs (10 percent) and final consumer goods (20 percent). Similarly, duty 
 rates as part of tariff liberalization were significantly lowered in some SSA 
 countries. For example, Mauritius reduced its rates from 250 per cent to 100 per 
 cent; Tanzania from 200 per cent to 60 per cent; Zambia from 150 per cent to 50 
 per cent and in Kenya from 170 per cent to 40 per cent. In Zimbabwe and Ghana 
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 the rates range from 5 per cent to 30 per cent and 10 per cent to 40 per cent 
 respectively (Oyejide, Ndulu and Gunning, 1999). The general pattern is that  
 significant tariff reductions (trade liberalization) can be observed in almost all 
 SSA countries, although the timing and extent of reductions vary across countries 
 (Africa Development Indicators, 2011). 
 
In addition, other measures were also adopted to reduce anti-export bias in most 
of the SSA countries. Export taxes and levies were either significantly reduced or 
totally eliminated in most of the SSA countries. For example, Cameroon removed 
all export taxes while Mali abolished export levies and duties on most exports (the 
only export levies in force are the service provision contribution (SPC) of 3 
percent on the free on board (f.o.b) value of gold, Ghana has no export quotas or 
voluntary export restraints. Similarly, Uganda replaced its export licensing 
requirements by a less restrictive export certification system in 2009 and also 
abolished export taxes. Most exportation in Botswana does not require permits. 
Significant reduction in the effective rates of protection was also achieved in most 
of the SSA countries. Countries such as Kenya, South Africa, Ghana, Mali, 
Malawi, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Cote d’Ivoire witnessed a significant reduction 
in their effective protection rates (Africa Development Indicators, 2011).  
 
The remaining export prohibitions that are still on in some cases apply only to 
sensitive goods because of the need to ensure quality as well as for health and 
environmental reasons. Export processing zones (EPZs) were also established by 
the government in some of the SSA countries. For example, the Free Zones Act 
was enacted in the Gambia. Similarly, Mali also created free trade zones as part of 
the measures adopted to boost export performance. Export Processing Zones 
companies also account for the bulk of manufacturing exports in Mauritius, which 
is dominated by textiles and clothing. Incentives are given which take the form of 
exemptions or reductions in duties and taxes. Free zone enterprises are required to 
Page | 50  
 
export a substantial proportion of their production; the Nigerian government is 
currently using an indicative benchmark of 70 percent.  
 
Exchange rate regimes in most of the SSA countries were also liberalized. A good 
number of SSA countries stopped fixing exchange rates and over-valuing their 
currencies in order to stimulate exports and make the economy more competitive. 
Madagascar, Botswana, Kenya, Uganda, Ghana, Tanzania, Zambia, Nigeria and 
Cote d’Ivoire practically eliminated exchange rate premiums, where buying and 
selling of foreign exchange is now market-based and abolishing previous 
restrictions on current transactions. The system of multiple exchange rates was 
abolished in Burundi. From 1996, Ethiopian currency, the Birr, was allowed to 
float, thereby resulting in the convergence of the official, auction and parallel 
market exchange rates. After liberalizing its external sector in 1990, Benin 
Republic’s currency was devalued and its black market premium averaged only 2 
per cent between 2000 and 2010. We can therefore conclude that most SSA 
countries witnessed a significant relaxation of trade barriers. Import restrictions 
are now lower and export barriers have been significantly reduced (Africa 
Development Indicators, 2011). 
 
2.4.2 Trade and Economic Growth 
Countries are often advised to liberalize their trade with the rest of the world; 
when such advice is given it is usually interpreted to entail simple policy changes, 
such as reducing or eliminating import tariffs (that is, the standard forms of tax on 
imports), removing non-tariff barriers that constrain imports, and if necessary 
removing licensing and other restrictions pertaining to exports. The discourse in 
literature is that wherever possible, countries should liberalize their trade (Hare, 
2006). Foreign or international trade has been regarded as an ‘engine of growth’ 
because a country derives both direct and indirect benefits from it. The direct 
benefits stem from the fact that when a country specializes in the production of 
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commodities which it produces cheaper in exchange for what others can produce 
at a cheaper cost; the country gains from trade and there is increase in national 
income which, in turn, raises the level of output thereby increasing the level of 
employment and reducing poverty rate and hence, enhancing the growth rate of 
the economy. Aside generating employment, foreign trade also increases savings 
and investment, and enhances greater backward and forward linkages with other 
sectors of the economy. For instance; it helps to transform the subsistence sector 
into the monetized sector by providing markets for farm produce thereby raising 
the income and standard of living of the peasantry. The expansion of the market 
leads to a number of internal and external economies, and hence to reduction in 
cost of production.  
 
The indirect benefits of international trade include; fostering of healthy 
competition, checking inefficient exploitative monopolies established on the 
grounds of infant industry protection, importation of foreign capital, technical 
know-how, skills, managerial talents and entrepreneurship. Furthermore, by 
enlarging the size of the market and the scope of specialization, international trade 
makes a greater use of machinery, encourages inventions and innovations, raises 
labour productivity, lowers costs and leads to economic growth (Jhingan, 2007).   
 
But these benefits have been criticized as regards the less developed countries on 
the grounds that international trade has retarded their development. This is 
evidenced from the fact that the developed countries have a large base of 
manufacturing industries with strong spread effects. By exporting their industrial 
products at cheap rates to the less developed countries, they price out the small-
scale industry of the less developed countries. This has converted the less 
developed countries into producers of primary products for exports. They suffer 
from excessive price fluctuations because the demand for primary products in the 
export market is inelastic. 
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Tables 2.2 and 2.3 show the annual average percentage changes for developing 
countries’ export and import volumes between 1973 and 2009, respectively. For 
developing countries as a group the volume of trade increased significantly in the 
latter part of the 1980s. The growth of export volumes increased to an annual 
average of 6 percent in 1987-90, compared with 5 percent in 1983-86 and 
stagnant levels in the 1970s. The impact of liberalization measures and adjustment 
policies is likely to have made an important contribution to this turnaround. The 
growth of exports from Asia since the start of the 1970s has been dramatic; up to 
1988, the newly industrializing economies (NIEs) have had very high growth rate 
of exports, but subsequently this growth has slowed and has been outpaced by the 
growth of exports from other open Southeast Asian countries. The only group that 
experienced an appreciable slowdown in export growth in the recent period was 
the developing countries of Europe, where trade has been disrupted by 
developments in the former USSR and the transition away from regional trading 
arrangements.  
 
With respect to imports, Asian countries had the highest growth in imports in real 
terms among the developing regions at 13 percent per annum in 1987-90, 
reflecting their reliance on imported raw materials and components, the strong 
growth of domestic demand and import liberalization measures. The growth rate 
of import volumes in Western Hemisphere countries has also increased, to 5 
percent, as their economies have opened up and access to financial markets has 
improved. Continued economic problems in SSA have resulted in little respite 
from the declining volume of imports. Imports of the developing countries in 
Europe grew steadily from the 1970s up to the end of the 1980s at 3-4 percent per 
annum, but have fallen sharply in 1990-91.  
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Table 2.2: Developing Countries’ Export Volumes, 1973-2009 (in annual 
average percent changes) 
Year Total 
Developing 
Countries 
Africa    Asia Middle 
East 
Europe1 Western 
Hemisphere 
SSA Four 
Asian 
NIEs2 
1973-
82 
0.2 -2.4   9.2 -5.1 4.3 1.9 -1.0 13.3 
1983-
86 
4.8 4.4               10.5 -1.1 5.1 2.6  1.7 13.4 
1987-
90 
5.9 2.3 11.8  5.4 -4.2 7.2  1.0 11.4 
1991-
94 
5.9 2.7 10.4  5.7 -3.5 7.5  1.3 11.7 
1995-
98 
6.4 2.9 10.2  5.9 -2.4 7.9  1.7 12.0 
1999-
2002 
6.7 3.2 11.1  6.0 1.8 8.3  2.1 12.3 
2002-
05 
8.5 3.5 11.5 6.3 2.1 8.6  2.4 12.6 
2006-
09 
11.9 4.1 11.8 6.8 2.6 9.0  2.8 12.9 
Source: International Monetary Fund (2009b). Note:  
1
Includes Eastern European countries and 
the former Soviet Union. 
2
The four newly industrializing economies (NIEs) are Hong Kong, 
Korea, Singapore and Taiwan Province of China. 
 
Table 2.3: Developing Countries’ Import Volumes, 1973-2009 (in Annual 
Average percent changes) 
Year Total 
Developing 
Countries 
Africa    Asia Middle 
East 
Europe1 Western 
Hemisphere 
SSA Four 
Asian 
NIEs2 
1973-
82 
 4.3  4.7   8.8  13.9 3.1  3.6  0.7 10.1 
1983-
86 
-0.5 -6.5   6.7 -10.4 3.9 -4.8 -3.0   8.1 
1987-
90 
 6.5 1.2 13.1   -0.4 3.6  5.0  0.1 15.7 
1991-
94 
 6.9 1.5 13.2   -0.1 2.7  5.2  0.6 15.9 
1995-
98 
 7.1 1.8 13.6    1.2 2.5  5.4  0.9 16.3 
1999-
2002 
 7.5 2.1 13.9    1.5 2.4  5.8  1.4 16.8 
2002-
05 
 7.9 2.5 14.3   1.9 3.3 6.1  1.8 17.0 
2006-
09 
 8.2 2.9 14.0   2.1 4.1 6.4  2.3 17.2 
Note: Source and information as in Table 2.2. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS 
IN SSA 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter contains a brief history of SSA and examined the role of institutions 
in SSA in comparison with the other regions of the world. The chapter also 
contains the historical development of institutions and trade in SSA which 
highlights a brief history of institutions and trade in the SSA region, the concepts 
of New Institutional Economics (NIE) and institutions, in which the relevance of 
NIE and institutions are enumerated, the determinants of the quality of 
institutions; it also contains some stylized facts about SSA, as well as trade policy 
and economic performance of SSA.   
 
3.2 Brief History of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
The African continent is one of the continents in the world. Sub-Saharan African 
(SSA) countries are geographically referred to as African countries that are in the 
south of the Sahara or those African countries which are fully or partially located 
south of the Sahara. The countries in SSA consist of all African countries with the 
exception of North Africa. SSA has 48 countries with over 13.6 percent of the 
world’s population in 2011 and more than 67.35 percent (33 out of 49) of the 
countries grouped as Least Developed Countries (LDCs). The region contributed 
as little as 1.46 percent of the world’s total output in 2011 (World Population 
Reference Bureau, 2011; WTO, 2011; World Bank Group, 2011). 
The average per capita income for SSA in 2005 was US$572 with an average 
annual growth rate of 2.1 percent between 2000 and 2005, and less than 2 percent 
from 2006 to 2010. (World Bank, 2008; 2010). Also, it has been said that the 
combined GDP of SSA is the same in value as that of Australia as at 2004 (Yang 
and Gupta, 2007). Some factors have been noted to account for the economic 
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performance of the region, which include a weak political culture, corruption, the 
devastating impact of sicknesses and diseases especially malaria and HIV/AIDS, 
weak institutions, inadequate infrastructures, among others (Artadi and Sala-i-
Martin, 2003; Fosu, 2008; Ike, 2009, Osabuohien, 2011). 
Olayiwola and Busari (2008) outlined economic growth episodes of SSA 
countries. The first was post-independence prosperity where some SSA countries 
inherited buoyant economies from the colonial regimes. The second was the 
growth episode that started in the early 1970s where most SSA countries had poor 
economic outcomes characterized by negative growth in real GDP per capita, less 
favourable terms of trade and so on. The last was between the late 1970s and late 
1990s with macroeconomic instabilities in most of the SSA countries. The major 
reason, inter alia, which can be put forward for the reversal was the inefficiency 
of institutions and mismanagement of the various economies (Collier and 
Gunning, 1999; Olayiwola and Busari, 2008). This episode tallies with the period 
in which most of the countries were operating import substitution strategies as 
well as other forms of trade restrictions. This has prompted some reform measures 
in the countries (Busari and Omoke, 2005; Aigbokhan and Ailemen, 2006). 
In terms of foreign trade, SSA countries have performed below expectations. For 
instance, from 2004 to 2007, SSA’s total export share in the world total exports 
stagnated at a low value of 0.04 percent. The values for service exports were even 
lower with the figures revolving at 0.02 percent between 2007 and 2008 (World 
Bank, 2008; World Bank Group, 2010). The scenario is even worse when 
manufactured exports are considered. They have a paltry value of 0.10 percent 
from 1997 to 2003 but increased to 0.02 percent where it has remained since 2004 
up to date. Furthermore, the percentage share of SSA’s exports in the value of 
GDP was far lower than what obtains in other developing regions such as Latin 
America and the Caribbean (LAC); and Middle East and North Africa (MNA). 
For example, the percentage of manufactured exports in relation to GDP in 2008 
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for SSA was 5.85 percent compared to the world average of 17.35 percent. For 
service exports, it was 7.72 percent in SSA, while it was 11.77 percent and 18.95 
percent for world average and MNA in 2008, respectively (World Bank, 2008; 
World Bank Group, 2010). It is obvious from above that international trade in 
SSA have not been impressive. 
Furthermore, SSA performed less than other regions of the world, such as North 
Africa; East Asia-Pacific; Latin America and the Caribbean; Europe and Central 
Asia and the Middle East in terms of the quality of institutions. The performance 
of SSA in international trade was not only less than that of other regions; it is 
equally lower than the world average. On the other hand, the SSA region has low 
values in the various measures of institutional quality. The SSA’s figures on 
institutional quality are both lower than those of other regions aforementioned as 
well as the world average for the period studied. 
 
3.2.1 Historical Development of Institutions and Trade in SSA  
This study used decadal categorization of the development of institutions to make 
the discussion systematic. It started from the 1960s when most of the SSA 
countries had their political independence from their colonial masters. However, 
the policies that were adopted had some overlaps as some spanned from one 
decade to another. 
In the 1960s, most SSA countries embarked on Import Substitution Strategy (ISS) 
with the major aim of correcting balance of payments challenges and trade 
outcomes. The import-substitution options were designed for a country to reduce 
import dependence. The ISS, which has features of foreign trade and economic 
policies, is based on the need for a country (especially a developing one) to lessen 
foreign dependency through domestic production. The ISS has some policy 
instruments that include an active industrial policy of subsidizing and 
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coordinating production of desired substitutes; protective barriers to trade through 
the use of tariff; use of exchange rate to enhance the import of capital goods such 
as machinery that are essential for domestic manufacturing, among others. At any 
rate, the policy mix varies across countries/regions depending on their peculiar 
needs. For example, in Brazil, the ISS process that spanned from 1930 until the 
end of the 1980s entailed currency devaluation as a means of enhancing exports 
and discouraging imports, which promoted the consumption of domestic products, 
as well as the introduction of differential exchange rates for importing capital 
goods and consumer goods (Werner, 1972; UNCTAD, 2005). However, the 
inability of most SSA economies to diversify their productive base as well as low 
level of technological advancement militated against the effectiveness of the ISS 
(Bhowon, Boodhoo and Chellapermal, 2004). In Kenya (just like Mauritius), ISS 
was pursued as a means of promoting industrialization after her independence. 
The main objectives of the ISS include the pursuance of rapid industrial growth; 
reduction of deficit balance of payment challenges and reduction of 
unemployment though job creation. The major policy instruments used were an 
overvalued exchange rate, high tariff barriers, import licensing, foreign exchange 
controls and quantitative restrictions to protect local industries (Gerrishon, Olewe-
Nyunya and Odhiambo, 2004).  
The 1970s witnessed trade policy regimes that can be generally classified as 
Export Promotion Strategy (EPS). The EPS was essentially prompted by an 
increasing recognition of the economic realities facing most of the countries in 
SSA. To this end, most of their governments made some attempts to change the 
industrial strategy from import substitution to export-led industrialization as 
reflected in their various Development Plans of the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
For instance, in Kenya, the Fourth Development Plan (1979-1984), advocated a 
more open strategy for the industrial sector in order to promote exports. It was 
designed to create a conducive environment for industries, through reforms in 
trade and industrial regimes. An example was the gradual replacement of 
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quantitative restrictions with equivalent tariffs. Another measure was the 
introduction of a more liberal exchange rate policy and the strengthening export 
promotion schemes (Foroutan, 1993; Gerrishon et al., 2004). At that time, several 
SSA countries had agriculture as the major component of their export baskets. 
Given the fact that most of their economies were not technologically equipped, 
they had challenges in processing and storing their products, which hampered 
their export competitiveness. The aftermath of this was the low performance of 
the countries in foreign trade. To curb the problem, marketing boards were 
established in most SSA countries with the aim of buying products from farmers 
and prepare such products for exports. However, the activities of the Marketing 
Boards were flawed by corruption, ineffective control, among others. 
In the 1980s, most SSA countries were to some extent influenced by the Bretton-
Woods Institutions – notably the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). This resulted from the fact that most of the SSA countries were 
indebted to them and to qualify for loan reschedule or additional loans, they were 
made to embark on economic restructuring. This led to the introduction of the 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) in most SSA countries (Ajakaiye and 
Oyejide, 2005; Akinkugbe, 2008). Trade policies and institutions like other 
macroeconomic instruments were influenced by SAP. During this period, some 
institutional and market-oriented initiatives were also embarked on with a view to 
re-orienting the economy. Some of the initiatives such as export compensation 
scheme, import duty and value added tax (VAT) remission schemes had some 
elements of changing ISS to EPS. This was based on the fact that they were 
crafted in order to improve export competitiveness. For instance, Zambia in 1983 
started the measures towards an export-led policy in its SAP, which include trade 
liberalization, exchange rate management as well as export incentives (Bhowon et 
al., 2004). Nigeria had similar measures, which started in 1986 (Ogunrinola and 
Osabuohien, 2010).                  
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After the 1980s that witnessed the SAP era, the 1990s did not totally jettison the 
programme but it was improved by what may be described as a mixed policy 
regime. Export-led industrialization was equally pursued in the 1990s, which was 
characterized by the establishment of Export Processing Zones (EPZs) in most 
SSA countries. For instance, the law for the establishment of the EPZs’ systems in 
Nigeria was the Nigerian Export Processing Zones Authority Decree No. 63 of 
1992. The decree empowered the Nigerian Export Processing Zones Authority 
(NEPZA) to control the Nigerian EPZs programme and also to grant licences to 
operators in EPZs (Onlinenigeria.com, 2010; Osabuohien, 2010). The EPZs were 
essentially designed to improve the export base of SSA countries in the world 
markets by providing tax holidays and other incentives. They were also meant to 
provide economies of scale production as operators (companies) agglomerate at 
the EPZs.  
Infrastructures were equally meant to be provided at the EPZs to reduce cost of 
production, improve productivity and as a result engender export competitiveness. 
However, establishment of several EPZs in many SSA countries was on political 
ground against economic efficiency. This, coupled with infrastructural challenges, 
has been some of the reasons why the laudable objectives of the EPZs are far 
from being realized. For instance, in Nigeria and Kenya, what all the EPZs in the 
respective countries produce are far less in value than what is been produced in a 
community in China (Collier, 2009). 
Given the increased recognition of export performance as vital agent of economic 
growth, the period after 1999 has witnessed the promotion of export capacities in 
many SSA countries. One of the measures was the need to improve export supply 
in SSA by reducing some of the inherent constraints (Bacchatta, 2007). The 
objective of promoting export supplies was to make SSA countries more 
competitive in foreign trade. The policy and institutional framework in this period 
can be described as New Trade and Industrial Strategy (Bhowon, Boodhoo and 
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Chellapermal, 2004). This was based on the re-engineering of the existing trade 
and industrial policies, to develop new strategies that will enable SSA countries 
meet the challenges in the New World Economic Order and also benefit from 
international trade. 
As observed from the discussion of institutions that relate to foreign trade, 
institutions that promoted foreign trade in SSA countries do exist. However, their 
ineffectiveness has been one of the factors accounting for the low foreign trade 
performance in SSA countries judging from some indicators. The respective 
periods mentioned had some peculiar features but in terms of policy changes, they 
were not too different from one another given the fact that they were interrelated. 
It will be worthwhile to note that adequate coordination of policy institutional 
instruments is essential in realizing any policy objectives. For instance, the 
Brazilian industrialization process was based on a network that involved the 
government, private and foreign actors. The first target was development of 
infrastructures and heavy industries, the second was manufacturing of consumer 
goods and the third was production of durable goods like automobiles, which 
witnessed the establishment of Volkswagen, Ford, GM and Mercedes in Brazil. 
This aspect of strong co-ordination is one of the missing gaps in most SSA. 
 
3.2.2 The Concept of Institutions and New Institutional Economics (NIE) 
Institutions have been seen to play key roles in the management of economies in 
recent years. They are crafted by man to create a peaceful habitation and reduce 
uncertainty in the exchange of values. This is due to the fact that it is becoming 
increasingly clear that those involved in economic transactions are not only 
influenced by economic variables (especially price) but also by a host of other 
factors that can be classified as institutions (Natal, 2001). North (1991) defined 
institutions as the humanly formulated constraints that structure political, 
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economic and social interactions, which consist of both informal constraints (such 
as sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions and codes of conduct) and formal rules 
(like constitutions, laws and property rights).  
In the 1960s and 1970s, economic history was characterized mostly by economic 
theorists who generally opined that the policy-making processes were done 
rationally by planners and managers of economies; and that economic policy 
instruments in countries were chosen in an optimal fashion with a view to 
maximizing the welfare of their citizenry (Soludo and Ogbu, 2004). Hence, the 
workings of an economy were assumed to be shaped by policy-makers who 
accomplish their vision of social welfare. The policy-makers were presumed to 
choose policies that would be in the interest of the public. 
In order to enjoy the benefits of economic growth, trade policies and institutions 
that are required for efficient functioning of the trading system need to be put in 
place to have meaningful results. This has been noted in political economy as well 
as public choice theoretical frameworks (Becker, 1985). The public choice 
framework provides a way of incorporating utility maximization concepts of 
traditional economics into policy-making process. It is based on the maxims that 
policy-makers tend to maximize their utility through the selection of policy mix 
that increase the possibility of continuing in the office, the public choice theory is 
similar to political theory of institutional development as enunciated by LaPorta et 
al. (1999). Therefore, the way and manner trade policies will be formulated and 
implemented will depend on the structure of a country in terms of institutions that 
are operational, which will eventually have effects on the country’s foreign trade. 
Institutions create the choice pattern that affects not only transactions and 
production costs but also the likelihood of engaging in economic activities (Ike, 
1977; 1984; Williamson, 2000; Rodrik, 2008). Institutions can reduce or increase 
transaction costs because they determine the nature of exchange. They form a link 
for connecting the past with the present and the future- a kind of path dependency. 
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Institutions provide the incentive structure of any economy because they create 
the structure that shapes the direction of economic change towards growth, 
stagnation, or decline. Thus, both political and economic institutions are essential 
parts of an effective institutional framework (Matthews, 1986; North, 1991). 
According to North (1991), history is largely a story of institutional evolution in 
which the historical performance of an economy can be understood as part of a 
sequential story. The major focus of the literature on institutions and transaction 
costs has been on institutions as efficient solutions to problems of organization in 
a competitive framework (Matthews, 1986; North, 1991; Williamson, 2000). 
Natal (2001) conceptualized NIE as a new development in economic ideas based 
on institutional economics and many of the principles of Neo-classical economics. 
On the other hand, Greif (1998), using the term ‘Historical Comparative 
Institutional Analysis’ (HCIA) captured institutions as non-technologically 
determined constraint that can influence social interactions and provide incentives 
that will maintain regularity in human behaviour. Though the HCIA relied 
considerably on past events in explaining human relations, it is closely related to 
NIE in terms of acknowledgement of both formal and informal institutions. 
In addition, the formal institutions which generally entail rules and regulations 
that control the existence of a system can be categorized into two. These are 
economic and political institutions. Economic institutions are essential for 
economic growth in a country due to their influence in shaping incentives for 
various economic actors in a society (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008). Economic 
institutions not only determine the level of economic growth potential of a 
country, they also determine how resources are efficiently distributed in the 
country (IMF, 2005). On the other hand, political institutions deal with the way 
the political structure in a country influences the behaviour of agents in the 
society especially with the distribution of political power (de jure and de facto). 
Examples of political institutions include the form of governance in a country 
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(democracy or dictatorship), rule of law and the extent of constraint of political 
power (Olomola, 2007; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008; Hassan, Wachtel and 
Zhou, 2009; Acemoglu, 2010). 
The NIE framework maintains that economic activities (transactions) among 
individuals are influenced by a range of social and legal ties amongst them. The 
economics of institutions deals with economic institutions while NIE embraces 
other areas outside economics such as political science, sociology, et cetera and 
their interplay in influencing economic outcomes. Matthews (1986) noted that 
institutions have become one of the liveliest areas in economics as it has brought 
the discipline more closely in touch with other disciplines in social sciences. It 
can be inferred that institutions are essential and their influence can be subjected 
to economic analysis. This is because institutions involve sets of formal and 
informal rules on how economic agents behave. The bottom-line of economic 
agents’ behaviour in this regard is to make Pareto-efficient choices in the midst of 
alternatives (LaPorta et al., 1999). Thus, NIE would become popular as the roles 
institutions play in economic life is understood and appreciated better. 
When not properly handled, there would be contractual incompleteness with 
added problems of opportunism in form of adverse selection, moral hazard, 
shirking and sub-goal pursuits among others. This is because actors involved in 
economic activities may not reliably disclose true conditions upon request or fulfil 
all forms of contracts when not supported by credible commitments. In other 
words, contracts are not self-enforcing and humans may not act in the best interest 
of others. Little wonder why witnesses that appears in the law courts are made to 
swear an oath to tell the whole truth and nothing but the truth (Williamson, 2000). 
This may also be one of the reasons why guarantors and witnesses are usually 
needed when serious contractual arrangements like employment, lending and hire 
purchase are to be made. Thus, some form of institutional arrangement is needed 
to make humans adhere to commitments. In this wise, parties to contract who look 
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ahead and observe potential flaws would certainly seek to work out contractual 
adjustments, which will make them enjoy some advantages over those who are 
myopic on the terms or leave their fate to chance. 
Other possible sources of contractual hazards include bilateral dependence, weak 
property rights especially intellectual property rights (IPRs), failure of probity 
among others. These have propensities to compromise contractual integrity and 
cause some (form of) distortions (Coase, 1992). For example, the relevance of 
contract enforcement and credible contracting have been valid for commercial 
contracting in Vietnam (McMillan and Woodruff, 1999) and contract farming in 
Kenya (Grosh, 1994). It has also been noted that institutional factors, especially 
civil liberties’ index and revolutions have strong influence on a state’s fragility, 
after accounting for economic, demographic and geographic factors (Baliamoune-
Lutz, 2009; Bertocchi and Guerzoni, 2010). Thus, without appropriate institutions 
no market economy of any significance is possible (Coase, 1992). 
 
3.3 The Concept of Strong and Weak Institutions 
It may not be very easy to term an institution weak because the fact that an 
institution is not performing to expectation today may be due to some 
impediments that, which when corrected would make the institution to perform 
well. The emphasis here would be on the role a strong institution plays on the 
economy. A strong institution is one that is good for economic growth and 
development. According to Shirley (2003), there are two sets of institutions 
countries need to meet to solve the challenges of development: first, those that 
foster exchange by lowering transaction costs and encouraging trust (contracts 
and contract enforcement mechanisms, commercial norms and rules, and habits 
and beliefs favouring shared values); second, those that influence the state to 
protect private property rather than expropriate it (constitutions, electoral rules, 
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laws governing speech and legal and civic norms). According to Acemoglu et al. 
(2004), a strong institution is one that provides secure property rights for broad 
cross-section of the society with some degree of equality of opportunity so that 
those with good investment opportunities can take advantage of them.  
There are four main approaches to the question of why countries have institutions 
that they are having now and why institutions differ across countries. According 
to ‘Efficient Institutions’ view, societies will choose institutions that are socially 
efficient, weighing social costs against benefits to determine which institutions 
should prevail. A second view is that institutions differ across countries because 
of belief and ideological differences, between societies or their leaders, on 
socially beneficial institutions. According to ‘Social Conflict’ view, institutions 
are social decisions chosen for their consequences. Because different groups and 
individuals benefit from different institutions, there is generally a conflict over 
these social choices, ultimately resolved in favour of groups with greater political 
power. These groups will choose the institutions that maximize their own rents. 
Finally, the ‘Incidental Institutions’ view takes institutions as the unintended 
consequence of other social interactions or historical accidents. And these 
institutions persist for a long time (Acemoglu et al., 2004). 
 
3.4 Determinants of the Quality of Institutions 
Institutions do not really work if they are not capable of shaping behaviours. In 
order to evaluate them, it is important to analyze not only the rules that 
institutions define, but also the individuals’ motivations to fulfil them. Institutions 
respond to problems that social interaction raises in an uncertain world. In this 
regard, institutions constitute a mechanism to reduce discretional behaviours and 
to limit opportunism. In addition, since they shape social behaviours, institutions 
foster social interaction and collective action, reducing coordination costs. Yet, it 
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would be mistaken to suppose that institutions always endure a rational response 
to social transaction costs. They are also a mechanism through which social actors 
express their strategies. Hence, a society does not have necessarily all institutions 
it needs nor are the existing ones necessarily optimal (Siba, 2008). 
Thus, institutions have two basic economic functions: firstly, the reduction of 
transaction costs, granting certainty and predictability to social interaction; and 
secondly, easing economic agents’ coordination. If these functions are kept in 
mind, institutional quality must be defined by four basic criteria, these are: 
(i) Static Efficiency: the institution’s capacity to be incentive-compatible. 
In other words, it is the capacity to promote behaviours that reduce 
social costs (Siba, 2008). 
(ii) Credibility (or legitimacy): the institution’s capacity to define inter-
temporary credible contracts. That is, it is the institution’s ability to 
generate a normative framework that truly determines agents’ conduct 
(Siba, 2008). 
(iii) Security (or predictability): an institution fulfils its function if it 
reduces the uncertainty associated with human interaction. In fact, one 
of the institutional functions is to grant a higher level of safety and 
stability to social relations by diminishing transaction costs (Siba, 
2008). 
(iv) Adaptability (or dynamic efficiency): This is the institutional ability to 
be able to anticipate social changes or at least to generate the 
incentives that facilitate agents’ adjustment to these changes (Siba, 
2008). 
The determinants of institutional quality must possess one or two of these criteria 
in order to be adjudged a yardstick for measuring the quality of institutions. 
Therefore, the determinants of the quality of institutions are: 
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(a) International openness is a factor that can encourage institutional quality. 
It is related to the dynamic efficiency of institutions in three ways; firstly, 
it creates a more dynamic, sophisticated and demanding environment, 
which fuels a larger demand for good institutions. Secondly, international 
openness encourages a more competitive environment; therefore it can 
hinder rent-seeking activities, corruption and nepotism; and thirdly 
openness can facilitate learning processes and good practices imitation 
from other countries experience (Heid and Larch, 2012).  
(b) Another determinant of institutional quality is education. It is a variable 
related to institutions dynamic efficiency. A more educated population 
demands more transparent and dynamic institutions and permits to build 
them (Heid and Larch, 2012).  
(c) Income distribution is a third determinant of institutional quality. It affects 
both institutional predictability and legitimacy in three ways; firstly, 
because a strong income inequality causes divergent interests among 
different social groups, which, in turn, leads to conflicts, socio-political 
instability and insecurity. Secondly, income inequality facilitates that 
institutions remain captured by groups of power, whose actions are 
orientated to particular interests rather than to the common good. Thirdly, 
it diminishes social agents’ disposition to cooperative action and favours 
corruption and rent-seeking activities (Heid and Larch, 2012).  
(d) Development level is the fourth determinant of the quality of institutions. 
This operates on institutional quality through both supply and demand in 
two ways; first, it determines the availability of resources to build good 
institutions. Second, it generates a larger demand for quality institutions. It 
is a determinant related to the static efficiency of institutions (Heid and 
Larch, 2012). 
(e) Finally, taxes are another determinant of institutional quality. It affects 
both the static efficiency and the legitimacy of institutions. A sound tax 
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system not only provides the necessary resources to build high quality 
institutions, but also enables the consolidation of a social contract that 
gives rise to a more demanding relationship between state and citizens. As 
a result, there will be higher transparency and accountability, which leads 
to better institutional quality (Tilly, 1992; Moore, 2002).  
Aside the above determinants of institutional quality, there are other determinants 
of institutional quality which includes: 
(f)  A determinant of institutional quality traditionally considered in the 
literature related to countries’ “historical” features is ethno-linguistic 
fragmentation which has a negative influence on institutional quality. 
Greater heterogeneity may fuel tensions and conflicts between different 
groups, reduce social cooperation and generate a mismatch between 
formal and informal institutions. Easterly and Levine (1997); Alesina et al. 
(2003); Fosu et al. (2006) found evidence supporting this hypothesis. 
(g) A country's legal system origin is another factor that has been identified as 
a potential determinant of institutional quality. It is argued that the British 
origin system and to a lesser extent German or Scandinavian systems, is 
based on a greater recognition of economic freedom, which limits the state 
intervention in the economy. On the contrary, the French origin legal 
system and even more the Soviet system were designed to determine the 
state's ability to organize economic and social life, leading to a weaker 
recognition of property rights and individual freedom. Accordingly, 
British and Nordic legal traditions are expected to be associated with 
higher institutional quality. LaPorta et al. (1999), Greif (2006), Chong and 
Zanforlinm (2000), Easterly and Levine (1997) find empirical support for 
this hypothesis. In the latter case, however, they do not control for 
development level.  
(h) Institutional quality can also be influenced by geographical conditions. It 
is considered that a country’s location in the tropics, lack of access to the 
Page | 69  
 
sea or soil fertility may have influenced the development of strong quality 
institutions. This argument is supported by Gallup et al. (1998); Easterly 
and Levine (1997). Valuable natural resources can also affect institutional 
quality. They can negatively affect institutions by fostering rent seeking 
activities and replacing tax revenues by other revenue sources less 
transparent and less subject to accountability. Sachs and Warner (1997); 
Easterly and Levine (1997) confirmed this relationship. 
 
 
3.5 Some Stylized Facts on SSA Countries 
Besides the World Trade Organization (WTO) that helps to facilitate international 
trade around the world, some trade groupings also known as Regional Economic 
Communities (RECs) exist in SSA that have been established to promote 
international trade both within the sub-regions and other regions. The membership 
is usually distributed across the geographical sub regions, namely: Central, East, 
Southern and West Africa. However, a few of them cut across with members from 
more than one geographical sub-region (for example, Angola, Burundi, 
Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda). The RECs in SSA grouped by 
geographical sub-regions include: 
Central Africa: Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) 
established in 1994 with six members, viz: Cameroon, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon. Economic Community of the Great 
Lakes Countries (ECGLC) established in 1976 with three members, viz: Burundi, 
Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda. Economic Community of Central 
African States (ECCAS) founded in 1983 with eleven members viz: Angola, 
Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda and Sao Tome and 
Principe. 
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West Africa: Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
established in 1975 with fifteen members, viz: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. But Mauritania has ceased to be a 
member of the organization. Another is West African Economic and Monetary 
Union (UEMOA) which was founded in 1994 with eight members (all French-
speaking countries) that include Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea 
Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo (UNCTAD, 2006, 2008a; WTO, 2008, 
2009). 
East and Southern Africa: Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA) which was founded in 1994 with nineteen members. The members 
include Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, 
Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, 
Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) which was established in 1992 with fourteen 
members, viz: Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho,  
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Southern African Currency Union 
(SACU) which is one of the oldest custom unions in the world was established in 
1910 (Moremi, 2010). The following member countries, viz: Botswana, Lesotho, 
Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland. 
The establishments of these regional economic communities in the various 
regions of SSA have helped to strengthen trading activities and international 
relations among the member countries. Some of them, for instance, ECOWAS is 
even planning to have a common currency that will be used in all member 
countries just like the ‘Euro’ used among the European Union (EU) member 
countries. This will help unify and strengthen the economies of these countries. In 
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terms of institutions, although these countries still have weak institutions but 
efforts are being made to improve the quality of institutions in these countries.   
 
3.6 Measures of Institutional Performance 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 present some institutional indicators. These were sourced from 
the World Governance Indicators (WGI, 2009) as computed by Kaufmann et al., 
(2009). They include: Control of Corruption (CC), Government Effectiveness 
(GE), Regulatory Quality (RQ), Rule of Law (RL), Political Stability (PS), Voice 
and Accountability (VA). Tables 3.1 and 3.2, show the values of the institutional 
measures as given by WGI. In Table 3.1, the values of Control of Corruption 
(CC) and Rule of law (RL) were presented. The values of CC and RL are quite 
low and far lower than the world average and those of other regions presented. 
The values of CC are between -0.58 and -0.67 while those of RL are between -
0.70 and -0.76. In Table 3.2, the values of Government Effectiveness (GE), 
Regulatory Quality (RQ) and Political Stability (PS) which depict the quality of 
government action as a measure of institutions.  
The values of Government Effectiveness (GE) ranged from -0.66 and -0.79 which 
is lower than those of other regions in the Table as well as the world average. A 
similar picture is observed for RQ where its values remained below global 
average within the same period, 1996-2008. Still in Table 3.2, another measure of 
institutions, political stability (PS) is presented. Like the others, the values are still 
low and quite lower than those of other regions as well as the global average. The 
above discourse points out that the quality of institutions in SSA is low. When 
this is compared alongside trade liberalization, then we can presume that the low 
trade performance is possibly related to the weak institutions in SSA. This, among 
others, triggered the research interest. 
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Table 3.1: Measures of Institutions (Respect for Institutions) (1996-2008) 
Region/Year   1996     1998       2000        2002        2003        2004       2005      2006        2007     2008 
                                                               Control of Corruption (CC) 
SSA              -0.63      -0.63       -0.58         -0.59      -0.62     -0.67      -0.68     -0.64      -0.63        -0.62        
World            -0.03      -0.02      -0.02         -0.02      -0.02     -0.02      -0.02     -0.02      -0.02        -0.02             
EAP              -0.43      -0.52      -0.60         -0.59      -0.62     -0.50      -0.53     -0.57      -0.59        -0.57          
ECA             -0.70       -0.61      -0.62         -0.66     -0.60      -0.62      -0.52     -0.49       -0.53       -0.48        
LAC             -0.35       -0.20       -0.18        -0.23      -0.20     -0.19      -0.16     -0.15       -0.16       -0.12            
MNA           -0.46        -0.53      -0.57         -0.48      -0.46     -0.49     -0.55     -0.60       -0.54        -0.62        
                                                                     Rule of Law (RL)                      
SSA               -0.76          -0.73       -0.72         -0.70      -0.73     -0.76      -0.76     -0.73      -0.74         -0.74        
World             -0.09          -0.06      -0.06         -0.07       -0.05     -0.03      -0.04      -0.04     -0.03        -0.03             
EAP               -0.41          -0.43       -0.43         -0.46      -0.32     -0.32      -0.16       -0.18     -0.21        -0.25          
ECA               -0.44          -0.61        -0.66       -0.64      -0.65     -0.58     -0.58       -0.60      -0.53         -0.45        
LAC               -0.30          -0.32      -0.27         -0.34      -0.30     -0.31      -0.34      -0.32       -0.33        -0.36            
MNA              -0.58          -0.47     -0.45        -0.50      -0.50     -0.44      -0.52       -0.55       -0.56        -0.54 
Source: World Bank Group (2010) World Trade Indicators 2009/10 based on Kaufmann et al (2009). Note: The value 
ranges from -2.5 (worst) to 2.5 (best) that is, the higher the better. EAP-East Asia and the Pacific; ECA- Europe and 
Central Asia; MNA- Middle East and North Africa; LAC- Latin America and Caribbean; SSA- Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The values for each region, including the world, are the averages for the respective region. This means the value of a 
representative country in for the respective region. 
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Table 3.2: Measures of Institutions (Government Actions) (1996-2008) 
Region/Year 1996     1998       2000          2002      2003      2004         2005        2006        2007      2008 
                                                      Government Effectiveness (GE) 
SSA         -0.66         -0.69      -0.72         -0.71      -0.71     -0.75        -0.78        -0.79        -0.76       -0.78        
World       -0.04         -0.01      -0.01         -0.02      -0.01     -0.00       -0.01        -0.01        -0.02        -0.01             
EAP         -0.30         -0.49      -0.48         -0.47      -0.55     -0.53       -0.46        -0.46        -0.54        -0.53          
ECA         -0.58         -0.49      -0.51        -0.48      -0.39      -0.37       -0.37        -0.34        -0.36        -0.31        
LAC         -0.34         -0.11      -0.15         -0.25      -0.21     -0.20       -0.14         -0.13       -0.12       -0.10            
MNA       -0.45         -0.68       -0.63         -0.58      -0.55     -0.53       -0.63        -0.63        -0.64        -0.61        
                                                Regulatory Quality (RQ)                      
SSA         -0.65         -0.66      -0.64        -0.66      -0.69     -0.72       -0.75         -0.72       -0.73          -0.70        
World      -0.05         -0.03      -0.03        -0.04      -0.04    -0.02        -0.02          -0.02      -0.01           -0.01             
EAP        -0.35         -0.59      -0.61        -0.73      -0.77    -0.62        -0.56          -0.61      -0.63           -0.69          
ECA        -0.59         -0.52      -0.49       -0.41       -0.38    -0.30        -0.32         -0.31      -0.20            -0.10        
LAC         0.22          0.18       0.07       -0.06       -0.07     -0.12        -0.07         -0.06      -0.09            -0.12            
MNA       -0.64        -0.85      -0.78       -0.78      -0.68      -0.66         -0.73        -0.72       -0.68            -0.63 
                                                       Political Stability (PS) 
SSA         -0.56         -0.65      -0.70         -0.65      -0.60     -0.54     -0.56           -0.54        -0.57         -0.56        
World      -0.11         -0.09      -0.09         -0.09      -0.04     -0.03     -0.03            -0.03        -0.03        -0.02             
EAP        -0.04         -0.02       -0.17         -0.09       0.07      0.13       0.20            0.14         0.14          0.10          
ECA       -0.36         -0.48       -0.52         -0.41     -0.42      -0.53       -0.44           -0.36       -0.24        -0.13        
LAC        -0.14         -0.15      -0.05         -0.18     -0.07      -0.03      -0.10           -0.10        -0.10        -0.13            
MNA      -0.90         -0.90       -0.74         -0.83     -0.89     -0.94      -0.94            -0.97       -0.94         -0.91 
Note and Source: Same as in Table 3.1. 
 
In the previous section, the study assessed the position of the SSA region within 
the global context in terms of the World Governance Indicators (WGI) measures 
of institutions; by way of extension, the study gives some background on the 
selected SSA countries with a view to examining if the countries with relatively 
better institutions will perform better in trade and economic growth.  To achieve 
this, some other institutional indicators besides those of WGI mentioned above 
were chosen from the Africa Development Indicators. The study used ‘Starting 
Business, ‘Enforcing Contracts and ‘Investor Protection Index’ as reported in ADI 
under ‘Ease of Doing Business’ measure of institutional environment. The 
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Starting Business indicator explains the bureaucratic and legal hurdles that an 
entrepreneur has to overcome in order to establish and register a new firm. It is 
ranked from 1 to 183 and lower ranks show less favourable institutional 
environment (World Bank Group, 2010). As observed in Table 3.3 below, the 
starting business indicator revealed that in the Central African sub-region, four 
out of the eight countries had values lower than the average in the whole SSA; in 
the East and Southern African sub-region, twelve out of the fourteen countries 
had values lower than the overall average while in the West African sub-region, 
three out of the eight countries had values lower than the overall average. In all, 
nineteen out of the total thirty selected SSA countries had values lower than the 
overall average, which is over 50 percent. This implies that these countries still 
have weak institutions. 
The Enforcing Contract indicator measures the efficiency of a country’s contract 
enforcement processes. It takes into account the evolution of a sale of goods 
dispute and tracking the time, cost and number of procedures involved from the 
time a complainant files a lawsuit until it is concluded. It also has a rank from 1 to 
183 with a lower value representing poor contract enforcement process and weak 
institutions, and vice versa (Osabuohien, 2011). From Table 3.3, the enforcing 
contract indicator revealed that in the Central African sub-region, three out of the 
eight countries had values lower than the average in the whole SSA; in the East 
and Southern African sub-region, ten out of the fourteen countries had values 
lower than the overall average while in the West African sub-region, four out of 
the eight countries had values lower than the overall average. In all, seventeen out 
of the total thirty selected SSA countries had values lower than the overall 
average. This implies that the contract enforcement processes in most of these 
countries have to be reviewed, in doing this; the quality of institutions will 
improve.  
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The Investor Protection Index measures the extent at which investors’ interest is 
protected, that is, how safe it is to transact business in a country. It has a rank 
from 0 to 10 with zero representing least protection and ten representing most 
protected. The data in Table 3.3 revealed that in the Central African sub-region, 
none of the eight countries had values lower than the average in the whole SSA; 
in the East and Southern African sub-region, two out of the fourteen countries had 
values lower than the overall average while in the West African sub-region, one 
out of the eight countries had values lower than the overall average. In all, three 
out of the total thirty selected SSA countries had values lower than the overall 
average. But in real life, the African continent generally is viewed in the 
international community as being unsafe for foreign investors because of the 
kidnappings, civil unrests, insecurity and other social vices predominant in most 
of these countries, for example, in Nigeria the criminal rate is on the increase 
daily, infact the Northern part of the country had been tagged a ‘no-go’ area to 
foreigners by some Western countries. Generally, based on the analysis above, 
Central African sub-region fared better than the other two sub-regions based on 
the institutional measures highlighted. 
 
Table 3.3: Economic and Political Institutions 
Performance  Indicators 
  Country Starting Business Enforcing Contract Investor Protection     
 
(Rank) (Rank) Index 
 
 
       Central Africa 
   
Angola 128.94 167 5 
 
Burundi 129.7 164 6 
 
Cameroon  170 173 5 
 
Chad 110.6 156.33 3 
 
Congo 97.43 100.35 3 
 
Equatorial Guinea 110.5 112.43 3 
 
Gabon 145.7 148 3 
 
Rwanda 48.67 44.67 7 
 
SSA Average 126.5 118 3 
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    East and Southern Africa 
  
Botswana 89.33 88 8 
 
Djibouti 117.4 116.23 4 
 
Ethiopia 108 67 2 
 
Kenya 116.3 114 4 
 
Lesotho 129 104.7 3 
 
Madagascar 45.67 153.7 4 
 
Malawi 121.3 139.7 3 
 
Mozambique 123 133 5 
 
South Africa 56.33 83.33 7 
 
Sudan 117.23 114 2 
 
Swaziland 153 129.3 5 
 
Tanzania 109.3 32 3 
 
Uganda 125.3 117.3 3 
 
Zambia 83.33 86.67 4 
 
SSA Average 126.5 118 3 
 
 
      
West Africa 
   
Benin 149.3 176 4 
 
Cape Verde 152.7 39.67 5 
 
Cote d'Ivoire 167 125.7 4 
 
Gambia 105.3 64 7 
 
Ghana 138 49 7 
 
Niger 158 135.3 2 
 
Nigeria 96.33 91.67 6 
 
Senegal 119 149 5 
 
SSA Average 126.5 118 3 
 Source: World Bank (Africa Development Indicators), 2011. Note: SSA average 
represents the average for all sub-Saharan African region not the average of the countries 
presented. Investor Protection Index – 0 (least protection), 10 (most protection).  
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Table 3.4: Cultural Institution Performance Indicator 
 
Country                       Ethnic Tension 
 
                                    Central Africa 
Angola                                 4 
Burundi                               2 
Cameroon                           3 
Chad                                   3 
Congo                                 4        
Equatorial Guinea              2      
Gabon                                 5   
Rwanda                              5      
SSA Average                     4 
 
 
                                                         East and Southern Africa 
Botswana                             4 
Djibouti                               3 
Ethiopia                               3            
Kenya                                  5 
Lesotho                               5 
Madagascar                        5     
Malawi                               4 
Mozambique                      4 
South Africa                       3    
Sudan                                 4 
Swaziland                          3                    
Tanzania                            3  
Uganda                              4 
Zambia                              4 
SSA Average                    4 
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                                                     West Africa 
Benin                                       4   
Cape Verde                              3 
Cote d'Ivoire                            3 
Gambia                                    5 
Ghana                                      5 
Niger                                       3 
Nigeria                                    2    
Senegal                                   4        
SSA Average                          4 
 
Source: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 2011. Note: SSA average represents the 
average for all sub-Saharan African region not the average of the countries presented. Ethnic 
Tension Index – 0 (high ethnic tension), 6 (low ethnic tension). 
 
The Ethnic Tension Index measures the extent of relative peace in a country. It 
has a scale of 0 to 6 with zero representing high ethnic tension and six 
representing low ethnic tension. The data in Table 3.4 revealed that in the Central 
African sub-region, four out of the eight countries had values lower than the 
average in the whole SSA; in the East and Southern African sub-region, five out 
of the fourteen countries had values lower than the overall average while in the 
West African sub-region, four out of the eight countries had values lower than the 
overall average. In all, fourteen out of the total thirty selected SSA countries had 
values lower than the overall average. It is evident from the civil and ethnic 
unrests in Africa, e.g. Mali, Nigeria, Egypt, Sudan that trading activities are 
hindered because both local and foreign investors will be afraid to invest in 
chaotic situations.  
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3.7 Trade Policy and Economic Performance in SSA  
In SSA and other developing regions of the world, trade plays a quantitatively 
important role, that is, a larger share of their income is spent on imports and a 
large share of their output is exported, than is the case for developed countries 
with similar economic size. Infact, it is logical to say that the larger a country’s 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the smaller the trade ratios. Most African 
countries have high ratios of external trade to GDP, which makes trade policy 
vital to the functioning and prospects of their economies. For instance, in Nigeria 
the percentage contribution of foreign trade to GDP rose from 35 percent in 1960 
to over 60 percent in the 1980s and over 75 percent in 2011. Other African 
countries depict similar characteristics – for example in 2008, the trade to GDP 
ratio for Botswana was 88 percent and that of Uganda was 66 percent. The 
comparative ratios for the developed countries were 28 percent for United 
Kingdom, 11 percent for the United States of America and 9 percent for Japan 
(World Development Indicators, 1996, 2011). 
 
Prior to political independence, trade policies of most Sub-Saharan African (SSA) 
countries were formulated as an integral part of colonial trade policies. They were 
aimed at promoting and regulating trade to serve the advanced country. These 
policies forged strong trade ties between the colonies and the western countries, 
effectively monopolizing the colonies’ external trade. Special licenses had to be 
issued to obtain goods from outside the realm of the colonizers and usually these 
could only be obtained where the goods in question were not available in the 
metropolitan country. One would say that SSA countries received their lessons in 
trade policy and practices from the western country, which in many countries 
have persisted over time. Trade policy in many SSA countries has been mainly 
dominated by stringent restrictions. These countries’ protectionist trade policies 
were initially influenced by the perceived need to stimulate and cocoon local 
industries under the banner of import substitution and infant industry protection. 
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In many of these countries, tariffs and quantitative restrictions have contributed 
the most important form of trade restriction. A large proportion of imports into 
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) were either subjected to outright prohibition or high 
tariffs or some sort of import ban or licensing mechanism. Usually an industry can 
be protected from imports by the use of any one of these measures – for example 
applying a quantitative restriction or a tariff. Trade barriers in Africa were, 
however, excessive in that countries applied quantitative restrictions, tariffs, 
licensing, import bans and foreign exchange regulations to control the flow of 
imports and exports. Protectionist policies were actually instituted to totally block 
imports into the countries, except those deemed as priorities by the government 
and obtainable through elaborate licensing arrangements (Mwaba, 2000).  
 
In many SSA countries, exports were subjected to similar measures, with rules 
making it illegal to export “strategic” items or subjecting exports to high taxes. 
Special marketing agencies and boards were instituted to ensure compliance. In 
some countries, farmers or traders needed to obtain special permits to export 
surplus agricultural or “controlled” products. The most cited example of the 
adverse effects of high protection is exemplified by the tale of two neighbours, 
Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire. In Ghana, import prohibitions in the 1980s and 1990s 
encouraged inefficient high cost production in manufacturing industries; controls 
and taxes on the main export crop cocoa, discouraged its production and other 
crops were adversely affected by the unfavorable exchange rate. Cote d’Ivoire on 
the other hand pursued an open policy with minimum quantitative restrictions that 
encouraged the development of both primary and manufactured goods. As a 
result, it increased its share in world cocoa exports, developed new primary 
exports and expanded manufacturing industries. Differences in policies applied 
may largely explain that between 1980 and 1998, per capita incomes fell from 
$430 to $390 in Ghana, as compared to an increase from $540 to $840 in Cote 
d’Ivoire (Meier, 1996). This occurred, inspite of the two countries having similar 
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resource endowments, and at the time of independence, Ghana having the 
advantage of a higher educational level. 
 
Table 3.5 indicates average tariffs on selected items in a number of African 
countries in 2006-2011. The Table reveals that tariffs on agricultural materials for 
all Sub-Saharan Africa averaged 23 percent. Corresponding rates for crude 
fertilizers averaged 17 percent. The average rates for all categories of goods, 
including final goods, were 26.7 percent for SSA. This shows that most of these 
countries are importing countries. What have been the experiences of the African 
countries, especially the lower income SSA countries in terms of export growth, 
in the light of the restrictive trade policies? Many countries have witnessed 
cyclical declines and marginalization in export performance over the past three 
decades. Yeats (2010) opined that Africa’s trade has grown at relatively low rates 
since the 1970s, with the result that today, the region’s share in world trade stands 
at around 1 percent, down from more than 3 percent in the mid-eighties. Indeed, 
SSA countries as a group have not fared well in trade, as seen from their exports, 
which have either stagnated or declined even in nominal terms. For example, 
between 1995 and 2004, African exports grew by an annual rate of 6.9 percent; 
this dropped to 2.9 percent during the period 2005-2009 (World Bank, 2009). 
Exports increased slightly after 1994 but the expansion slowed again in 2007. 
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Table 3.5: Average Percentage Tariffs in selected Sub-Saharan African 
(SSA) Countries 2006-2011 
 
Country Agricultural  Crude Chemicals Electric  Transport  Professional All Items 
 
Materials Fertilizers 
 
Machines Equipment Equipment 11.6 
Angola 8.2 9.4 9.2 17.4 6.2 8.6 29.8 
Botswana 29.6 22.5 22.2 27.5 13.7 9 29.9 
Burundi 9.3 18 20.7 25.4 17.4 8.3 23.1 
Madagascar 4.8 12 13.1 16.8 14.1 6 15.2 
Malawi 3.9 0.7 9.7 23.8 7.8 5.7 10.9 
Mali 6.5 9.8 11 14.9 11.5 8 12.9 
Mauritania 4.7 9.5 12.2 8.9 12.1 6.7 15.6 
Mozambique 16.2 11.9 10.3 11.5 16.2 4.7 15 
Cameroon 13.8 12.9 11.6 12 13.1 2.4 22 
Congo 12 0.8 7.9 10.3 11 3.5 15.6 
Chad 8 2 15 11.8 7.9 1.9 16.9 
Cape Verde 13.4 0.9 21.2 10 8.2 4 17.5 
Equatorial Guinea 11.9 2 20.9 13.1 10.6 5.3 16.8 
Niger 10.7 3.1 16.4 11.5 9.8 4.9 20 
Benin 13.7 0.5 9.3 10.1 8 6.3 16.9 
Rwanda 22.1 2.1 12.5 13 11.1 8 12.3 
Senegal 39.9 17.5 7.7 14.6 14.7 6.7 29.9 
South Africa 25.1 11.8 20.3 25.4 17.4 5 24 
Swaziland 20.8 0.7 9.6 11 12.9 6.8 23 
Sudan 22.4 1.7 5.8 13.4 12.9 4.8 19.8 
Djibouti 18.6 2.9 7.6 11.2 8.4 4.9 21.9 
Gabon 25 9.5 9.4 11.8 6.8 12 8.9 
Ghana 10 8.7 10 7 7 6 11.7 
Gambia 12.3 0.2 3.7 8.4 6.9 6.2 10.1 
Togo 1.4 0.6 5.3 15.4 7.8 5.2 15.6 
Namibia 12.6 16.9 22.2 12 4.8 4.7 32.8 
Nigeria 25 12 9.3 31.4 22.7 21.2 24.4 
Kenya 20.1 11.3 9.6 10.4 4.9 11 20.7 
Lesotho 13 10 12.3 13.9 10.5 8.4 15.6 
Uganda 26.1 11.2 13.1 17.8 14.3 10 17.4 
All SSA 23.6 17 19.8 28.5 18.9 26.5 26.7 
 
Source: World Bank (Africa Development Indicators), 2011. The figures for SSA comprise the average of all SSA countries and 
not that of the countries presented. 
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The dull performance in trade is closely reflected in the developments in Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) growth. Africa’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth 
averaged 2.6 percent over the period 1980-2009. Growth in the fastest growing 
developing countries outside Africa averaged 5.8 percent, while that for the rest of 
the developing world was 3.2 percent (Sachs and Warner, 2009). Furthermore, in 
the early 1970s, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in SSA was 60 
percent of the average of the rest of the developing world; by 1990, this had fallen 
to 35 percent and further fell to 28 percent by 2009. Much of the decline occurred 
during the period 1980-94, due to the introduction of reforms in some of the 
countries during this period. The region recorded some modest gains after 1995 as 
reforms in a number of countries began to take hold. In summary, we see in 
Africa, a continent where protectionist measures were instituted and sustained 
over time, in an effort to expand local industry that may lead to increasing 
manufactured exports. This has ironically not been the case as the continent 
continued to be marginalized in trade and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth.  
 
 
3.8 Aid for Trade in SSA  
Aid for Trade is part of the official development assistance to developing 
countries.  Aid for Trade is needed because many of the poorest countries have 
struggled to benefit from market access opportunities due to their inability to 
produce or export efficiently. While trading with other countries is fundamental to 
achieve high economic growth rates and poverty reduction targets, most African 
developing countries and the totality of African LDCs have neither the diversity 
of exportable products nor the production capacity to take immediate advantage 
from improved market access opportunities. Thus, while it is argued that trade 
barriers are of concern to trade, poor supply-side conditions have often been a 
more important constraint on the export performance in various regions of Africa. 
Many African countries desperately need resources to upgrade ports, 
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telecommunications, customs facilities and institutions. If they cannot send goods 
in a competitive way to the world market, then the countries stand to gain little 
from any improved market access.   
 
From the inception of the 2005 Hong Kong WTO Ministerial Declaration, Aid for 
Trade has assumed growing importance and a strong commitment to Aid for 
Trade has emerged from all sides: donor countries, recipient countries, 
multilateral agencies, civil society and private sector. The Hong Kong Ministerial 
Declaration provided the mandate for further developments of the Aid for Trade 
agenda. This was done so that in the long run, important gains in economic 
growth can be achieved, especially in Africa, through trade liberalization. Trade 
liberalization creates opportunities for development, but other factors determine 
the extent to which those opportunities are realized. To enable developing 
countries to reap full benefits from liberalization, public investment in 
infrastructure and institutions, as well as private and public investment in 
productive capacity, are necessary co-requirements to liberalization that 
developing countries alone are unable to deliver. Therefore, the core purpose of 
Aid for Trade is to help developing countries to: (i) increase their trade of goods 
and services; (ii) integrate into the multilateral trading system; and (iii) benefit 
from liberalized trade and increased market access. 
 
Substantially, Aid for Trade is about investing in developing countries and it is 
fundamental for African countries that the initiative reaches its full potential and 
that flows meet the needs of beneficiary countries. Monitoring in order to track 
progress in the implementation and impact remains a relevant issue. As Aid for 
Trade is part and parcel of the official development assistance (ODA) to 
developing countries, sustained increase in the total ODA increases the scope for 
trade related assistance. In the case of Africa, the increase in Aid for Trade 
commitments was more impressive than the total ODA commitments to the 
region. The growth rate of Aid for Trade commitments to Africa was almost twice 
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as fast as the growth in the total ODA commitments to the region with an average 
annual growth rate of 21.4 percent and 11.1 percent per year in real terms during 
2006-11 respectively. Africa is now the largest recipient of Aid for Trade, 
overtaking Asia in 2009 with an increasing trend in the global share. As revealed 
in Table 3.6, the total Aid for Trade grew to an annual average rate of 17.1 
percent in real terms in 2011. The region with the lowest figure as revealed in 
Table 3.6 is Oceania. Proper monitoring has to be carried out to ensure that this is 
not a worrying trend, and this might mean tracking individual projects from 
commitment to final disbursement stage. The proportion of Aid for Trade flows in 
the total ODA to Africa was also rising, up from the baseline period (2002-05 
avg.) annual average of 34.1 percent to 38.7 percent in 2011. This clearly 
indicates that the Aid for Trade commitments to Africa increases at much faster 
rate than the total ODA flows to the region. 
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Table 3.6: Aid for Trade to Regions (Billions US$ 2009 Constant rate) 
Aid for Trade by region, Com 
  2002-
05 avg. 
 
 
2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 
Africa  7.6  9.1  11.3  13.8  16.5  16.8  17.1 
America  1.7  2.0  2.3  1.9  3.1  3.3  3.7 
Asia  12.8  12.2  13.3  18.8  15.4  15.6  15.8 
Europe  1.6  1.7  1.4  2.2  1.4  1.6  1.9 
Oceania  0.2  0.4  0.3  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.5 
Cross 
border 
activities 
 
 
 
1.2  1.8  2.1  2.3  3.5  3.7  3.9 
                                     Africa’s Global Share of AfT and ODA commitments 
 
AfT               30.2               33.4              36.7                35.1           41.0                41.7               42.5 
ODA             34.1              38.8               35.7                35.1          37.1                37.8                38.7 
Africa’s 
Share of AfT  
In total ODA 
To Africa         18.5        16.0                 23.1                25.1         28.0                 29.5                 30.8                                                                                     
Source: OECD-DAC, Aid activities database (CRS). 
 
As presented in Table 3.7, a brief comparative analysis across all Regional 
Economic Communities (RECs) and inter-governmental organization considered 
revealed that COMESA was the largest recipient of Aid for Trade commitments 
and disbursements, followed by ECOWAS and SADC, with the total Aid for 
Trade commitments during the period 2002-11 amounted to US$30.6 billion, 
US$21.6 billion and US$18.9 billion, respectively. These three RECs respectively 
share 38 percent, 26 percent and 24 percent of Africa’s total population with Aid 
for Trade commitments share of 28.9 percent, 19.3 percent and 19.1 percent over 
the same period. The ranking of RECs remains the same for the proportional 
distribution of Aid for Trade disbursements and total population during the period 
2006-11. This clearly demonstrates that the distribution of the total Aid for Trade 
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commitments and disbursements to RECs in Africa mirrors the population share 
of RECs in Africa. 
 
Table 3.7: Total AfT commitments to the Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs) 
                2002-05 avg.   2006           2007            2008             2009                2010            2011                    
COMESA    3149            3335         4694             3640               5548               4304           5964                      
ECOWAS    1704            1763         2833             3609               4873               3270           3579            
SADC          2199            1878         2589             3332               3144               2736           2985                                       
CEMAC         324              567           518               380                 617                 521             575            
EAC             1115           1366          2497             1981               3404               2312           2546                   
ECCAS          908             869          1233               820               1493               1104           1397 
                             Growth rates of AfT commitments to RECs in Africa (%) 
COMESA       4.2              5.9          40.7             -22.4                52.4              19.1             20.3                             
ECOWAS       3.1             3.4           60.7              27.4                35.0              31.6             32.1    
SADC             8.4          -14.6           37.9              28.7                 -5.6              11.6             12.3      
CEMAC        56.7           75.2           -8.7             -26.6                 62.2             25.5              27.2    
EAC              21.3            22.5          82.8            -20.7                 71.8              39.1             40.7            
ECCAS         -2.6             -4.3          41.8             -33.4                 82.0             21.5             23.6                                    
 
Source: OECD-DAC, Aid activities database (CRS). 
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                                 CHAPTER FOUR 
 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the theoretical framework and methodology of this study. It 
will be recalled that the main aim of this study as stated in chapter one is to 
examine the impact of trade liberalization and institutions on economic growth in 
selected SSA countries. This chapter contains the theoretical/conceptual 
framework that form the basis of the study as well as the methodology which 
comprises model specification and the techniques of estimation.  
 
4.2 Theoretical Framework 
This section examines the theoretical base of this study. The theory upon which 
this study is based is the endogenous growth theory, theory of trade and the theory 
of institutional development. This is vital because the study examines the impact 
of trade liberalization and institutions on economic growth. The endogenous 
growth theory explains the long-run growth rate of an economy on the basis of 
factors apart from labour and capital (which are assumed to be endogenous) that 
affect growth, as against exogenous factors of the neoclassical growth theory. 
Trade theory was also adopted in this study because of the importance of trade to 
economic growth. The theory of institutional development is adopted because of 
the fact that it explains how a country can develop her institutions over time and 
why it is important to do so.  
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4.2.1 Endogenous Growth Theory 
The endogenous growth theory is an extension of some other growth theories 
before it. Harrod and Domar (1947) observed that investment plays a key role in 
the process of economic growth. Investment has a dual character: first, it creates 
income and secondly it augments the productive capacity of the economy by 
increasing the capital stock. The former is the ‘demand effect’ and the latter is the 
‘supply effect’ of investment. Thus, so long as net investment is taking place, real 
income and output will, ceteris paribus, continue to expand. 
Solow (1956), expanding the Harrod-Domar formulation, added a second factor, 
labour and introduced a third independent variable, that is technology to the 
growth equation. He presented his neoclassical growth model by defining a 
production function that permits the substitution of capital and labour. This 
implies that the marginal products of the factors are variable, depending on how 
much of the factor is already used in production and on how many other factors it 
combines with. Also, Solow assumed each factor of production - labour and 
capital, is subject to diminishing returns of their usage separately and constant 
returns to both factors jointly. Technological progress became the residual factor 
explaining long term growth. Conventional neoclassical theory, as modeled by 
Solow, holds that economic growth is as a result of accumulated physical capital 
and an expansion of the labour force, in conjunction with an exogenous factor, 
technological progress which makes physical capital and labour more productive.        
 
Generally, Solow’s model of economic growth is based on the premise that output 
in an economy is produced by a combination of labour (L) and capital (K), under 
constant returns, so that doubling input results in doubling output. Thus, the 
quantity of output (Y) is also determined by the efficiency of productivity (A) 
otherwise called “technical progress” with which capital and labour is used. 
Mathematically; 
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                                                                                                        (4.1)                                                                                                                             
Solow assumed that this production function exhibits constant returns to scale, 
that is, if all inputs are increased by a certain multiple, output will increase by 
exactly the same multiple. 
The Solow neoclassical growth model uses a standard Cobb-Douglas production 
function in which:  
1
t t t tY A K L
 
                     0 <α <1                                                          (4.2)                                                                                   
  
In this case, Y is Gross Domestic Product, K is stock of capital, L is labour and A 
represents a measure of productivity, assumed to grow at exogenous rate n.   is 
the share of capital in output production, 1-  is the share of labour in output 
production, but   has a value that ranges between zero and one such that     
    (which implies efficient use of capital and labour). The model further 
assumes that: 
0
nt
tL L e                                                                                                         (4.3)                                                                                                                   
0
nt
tA A e                                                                                                        (4.4) 
      
              
                                                                (4.5)                                                                           
                                                                              
 
 here; φ =L0A0, means the effective units of labour, which grows at rate n. 
However, the new endogenous growth theory was developed as a reaction to 
omissions and deficiencies in the Solow neoclassical growth model. The theory 
explains the long-run growth rate of an economy on the basis of endogenous 
factors as against exogenous factors of the neoclassical growth theory. This theory 
is of the view that the growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is a natural 
consequence of long-run equilibrium. The theory explains both growth rate 
differentials across countries and a greater proportion of the growth observed. 
Endogenous growth theory discards the neoclassical assumption of diminishing 
marginal returns to capital investments, permitting increasing returns to scale in 
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aggregate production and frequently focusing on the role of externalities in 
determining the rate of return on capital investments. By assuming that public and 
private investments in human capital generate external economies and 
productivity improvements that offset the natural tendency for diminishing 
returns, endogenous growth theory explains the existence of increasing returns to 
scale and the divergent long-term growth patterns among countries. Thus, the 
theory emphasises technical progress resulting from the rate of investment, the 
size of the capital stock and the stock of human capital (Todaro and Smith, 2011). 
In the light of the shortcomings of Solow’s growth model, the augmented version 
of the model was specified by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992). In this 
augmented version of the model, a Cobb-Douglas production function is assumed. 
This started off by adding human capital accumulation (divided into physical 
capital, human capital and productivity-augmented labour) to the Solow model. 
According to Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), for an economy to experience 
steady state the following assumptions must hold:  
(i) There are many firms in a market; 
(ii) All firms are identical; 
(iii) Knowledge or technological advance is a non-rival good;  
(iv) All markets (both input and output markets) are perfectly competitive; 
and  
(v)  Physical capital and human capital are accumulating factors i.e., the 
representative agent saves output to have more capital (either physical 
or human).  
Thus, the Cobb-Douglas production function is written as: 
1( ) ( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( )]Y t K t H t A t L t                                                                      (4.6)                                                                                   
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where; Y, K, H and L are respectively output, physical capital, human capital and 
labour, α and β are the elasticities of output with respect to physical and human 
capital, and A(t) is the level of technological and economic efficiency. H is 
measured by education and L includes both skilled and unskilled labour. Cellini 
(1997) however observed that, A(t) can be decomposed into two elements 
namely; an economic efficiency part I(t), that depends on a set X of institutions 
and public policies, and an exogenous technological progress component Ω(t) 
assumed to grow at the rate g(t).                            and t denotes 
time. This implies that the production function exhibits constant returns to scale in 
its three factors: physical capital (K), human capital (H) and a measure of 
productivity (A).  Cellini (1997) opined that due to the fact that the steady state 
income is not very useful, the observed growth rates include out-of-steady state 
dynamics, the transitional dynamics of y as well as the short-run dynamics around 
the transition path. 
 
4.2.2 Trade Theory 
Many scholars have stressed the fact that the growth of an economy is linked to 
the growth of export under the generally known "export-engine-of-growth" 
hypothesis (Fajana, 1979; Alege, 1993). The relevant theory is the Hecksher-
Ohlin (H-O), model that was postulated by two Swedish Economists, Eli 
Hecksher and Bertil Ohlin in 1933. This model has the following assumptions; 
two countries, two homogenous goods, two factors of production, labour and 
capital, under assumed perfectly competitive markets; identical production 
functions with freely available technologies across countries; constant returns to 
scale; perfect mobility of production within a country but immobility between 
countries; different factor intensities; general equilibrium condition; no 
transportation costs and no barriers to trade.     
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However, in life situations, these assumptions are not realistic as labour and 
capital are not the only factors of production; production functions are not 
identical in all countries and the markets are not perfectly competitive, hence the 
intervention of institutions; there are barriers to trade, there is transportation cost 
involved in moving goods from one place to another. The model shows that a rise 
in trade raises the demand for labour-intensive products in poor, labour-surplus 
countries (Todaro and Smith, 2011). This is commonly taken to mean that in H-O 
model, all markets clear with macroeconomic equilibrium and full employment 
throughout. A rise in trade can only cause an inter-sectoral shift towards labour - 
intensive activities (so, higher wages). 
 
The Hecksher-Ohlin neo-classical trade theory, which describes analytically the 
impact of economic growth on trade patterns and the impact of trade on the 
structure of the national economies and on the differential returns or payments to 
various factors of production predicts that, since developing countries have a large 
pool of labour, opening up to trade will involve them exporting goods and 
services that are relatively more labour- intensive and importing goods that are 
relatively more capital-intensive. This process depends on the fact that trade 
liberalization will raise the relative price of labour-intensive goods and services 
which, in turn, increases the demand for labour and hence employment in an 
economy. 
The Stolper-Samuelson (SS) theory was put forward by Wolfgang Stolper and 
Paul Samuelson and is an addition to the Hecksher-Ohlin theory in explaining 
comparative advantage. According to the Stolper-Samuelson theory, free trade in 
line with a country’s comparative advantage will increase the demand for 
unskilled labour in the labour-abundant countries and also raise wages once any 
labour surplus is eliminated. Conversely, the demand for skilled labour will rise in 
the capital- (and by extension skill-) intensive countries. The demand for, and 
wages of unskilled labour will, at the same time, fall. Freer trade is 
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unambiguously beneficial for a developing country since it not only promotes 
efficiency and growth but also has gainful effects on the abundant factor in the 
economy, unskilled labour. However, the beneficial growth, employment and 
distributional implications of trade liberalization hinge on the assumptions of 
existence of perfectly competitive markets and constant returns to scale. 
 
Both the Hecksher-Ohlin and Stolper-Samuelson trade theories complement each 
other in that they drive international specialization of countries of the world 
through the comparative advantage argument. If domestic factor prices were the 
same, all countries would use identical methods of production and would 
therefore, have the same relative domestic product price ratios and factor 
productivities, and there may be no need for international trade. But this is not the 
case in real life. Therefore, both theories portray international trade as a vehicle 
for a country to capitalize on her abundant resources through more intensive 
production, and export products that require large inputs of the abundant 
resources while relieving her factor shortage through the importation of products 
that use large amounts of her relatively scarce resources. 
 
4.2.3 Theory of Institutional Development 
LaPorta et al. (1999) developed the theories of institutional development which 
centres on factors that can lead to the formation and persistence of a given 
institutional framework in a society. The theories of institutional development can 
be classified into three based on their structural composition namely: economic, 
political and cultural institutional theories. The economic theory of institutional 
framework believes that institutions are essentially crafted when it is efficient to 
create them. The connotation of this is that institutions are mostly created by 
economic actors when the perceived social benefits of such creation significantly 
exceed the perceived transaction costs that are associated with their creation. The 
political theory of institutional development hinges fundamentally on 
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redistribution of societal resources much more than economic efficiency. The 
basic maxim of the political institutional development is that institutions are 
fashioned by those that have political powers in such a way that they can stay in 
power with a view to extracting economic rents (Persson, et al. 2003; Adewole 
and Osabuohien, 2007). While the cultural theory of institutional development 
postulates that a given society will usually hold beliefs that can shape collective 
actions of the constituting human agents. 
One important aspect of the relevance of institutional development is the fact that 
institutions aid the development of ideas and ideologies. Institutions play a major 
role in determining how ideas and ideologies matter in the performance of an 
economy. Ideas and ideologies shape the subjective mental constructs that 
individuals use to interpret the world around them and make choices. Moreover, 
by structuring the interaction of human beings in certain ways, formal institutions 
affect the price we pay for our actions, by deliberately or accidentally structured 
to lower the price of acting on one's ideas, they provide the freedom to individuals 
to incorporate their ideas and ideologies into the choices they make. A key 
consequence of formal institutions is mechanisms, like voting systems in 
democracies or organizational structures in hierarchies that enable individuals 
who are agents to express their own views and to have a very different impact 
upon outcomes than those implied by the simple interest-group model that has 
characterized so much of economic and public choice theory (North, 1991). 
Institutional measures allow the polity and the economy to be inextricably 
interlinked in the performance of an economy and therefore we must develop a 
true political economy discipline. Institutions determine the way political and 
economic systems work.  Not only do polities specify and enforce property rights 
that shape the basic incentive structure of an economy, in the modern world the 
share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) going through government and the ever-
present and ever-changing regulations imposed by it are the most important keys 
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to economic performance. This can only be done by a modeling of the political-
economic process that incorporates the specific institutions involved and the 
consequent structure of political and economic exchange (North, 1991). 
Institutions create the choice pattern that affects not only transactions and 
production costs but also the likelihood of engaging in economic activities (Ike, 
1977; 1984; Williamson, 2000; Rodrik, 2008). Institutions can reduce or increase 
transaction costs because they determine the nature of exchange which is the 
essence of international trade and by extension trade liberalization. Institutions 
form a link for connecting the past with the present and the future- a kind of path 
dependency. Institutions provide the incentive structure of any economy because 
they create the structure that shapes the direction of economic change towards 
growth, stagnation or decline. If the direction is towards growth, employment will 
increase, savings and investment will also increase and the economy will 
experience economic growth. Since economic growth leads to economic 
development, hence, institutions are vital in the development of an economy.  
This necessitated the adoption of the growth theory for this study. 
 
4.2.4 Trade Liberalization, Institutions and Growth Theory  
The link between trade and growth theories stems from the fact that when a 
country engages in international trade, her national markets draw additional 
domestic and foreign investment which increases capital accumulation. Apart 
from goods and services, technology is also traded among countries, all of which 
enhance the growth of any country. The rapidly expanding export market provides 
a stimulus for growing local demands which makes countries enjoy the 
consumption of goods and services that they do not have comparative advantage 
producing. Political institutions are defined by the nature of political leadership 
structure or governance structure that is persistent in the country. Examples of 
political institutions include the form of government in a country - military, 
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democracy or dictatorship, rule of law and the extent of constraint of political 
power (Olomola, 2007; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008; Hassan et al., 2009). 
Economic institutions, on the other hand, are essential for economic growth in a 
country due to their influence in shaping incentives for various economic actors in 
a society (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008). Not only do economic institutions 
determine the level of economic growth potential of a country, they also 
determine the distribution of resources and economic gains in the country (IMF, 
2005).  
 
Foreign trade opens up the economy to the international community and allows 
the movement of goods and services in and out of countries of the world thereby 
contributing to economic growth. It has been regarded as an ‘engine of growth’, 
that is, an important stimulator of economic growth. Trade liberalization brings 
about investment in a country by drawing both domestic and foreign investment 
and thus increases the rate of capital accumulation, which in turn generates more 
employment in the country and hence improves economic growth. The neo-
classical growth model contains a shift parameter that “reflects not just 
technology, but other factors such as resource endowments, climate and 
freedoms” (Mankiw, et al. 1992). This forms the basis under which institutions 
have come to play a very important role in determining the extent of growth a 
country will experience. Institutions help in shaping the interactive ways of the 
citizens of a country, not just among themselves internally but also the way they 
interact when trading with people from outside the country.  
 
The link between institutions and economic growth is also visible from the fact 
that institutions dictate the margins at which organizations operate and hence 
make comprehensible the interplay between the rules of the game and the 
behaviour of the actors. If organizations - firms, trade unions and political parties 
just to name a few - devote their efforts to unproductive activities, institutions 
Page | 98  
 
have provided the incentive structure for such productive activities. Third World 
countries are poor because their institutions define a set of payoffs to political and 
economic activities that does not encourage productive activity. Socialist 
economies are just beginning to appreciate that the underlying institutional 
framework is the source of their current poor performance and are attempting to 
struggle with ways to restructure the institutional framework to redirect incentives 
that in turn will direct organizations along productivity-increasing paths. And as 
for the Western world, we not only need to appreciate the importance of an 
overall institutional framework that has been responsible for the growth of the 
economy, but to be self-conscious about the consequences of the ongoing 
marginal changes that are continually occurring - not only on overall performance 
but also on specific sectors of the economy. We have long been aware that the tax 
structure, regulations, judicial decisions and statute laws, to name a few formal 
institutions, shape the policies of firms, trade unions and other organizations and 
hence determine specific aspects of economic performance.   
 
4.2.5 Conceptual Framework 
Based on what is gathered from theoretical literature, this section links the 
interactive mechanisms between institutions, trade liberalization and economic 
growth at a given point in time. As illustrated in figure 4.1, two broad forms of 
institutions can be identified namely; formal and informal (North, 1991; Greif, 
1998). The informal institutions involve basic human rules not written down that 
direct the behaviour of individuals in a given society. Examples of informal 
institutions include; norms, traditions, culture and so on (North, 1991, 2005; 
Greif, 2006). LaPorta et al. (1999)’s theories of institutional development can be 
summed up into two viz – formal institutions which comprise of economic and 
political theories and informal institutions which comprise of cultural theory. 
Figure 4.1 is adapted from the work of Osabuohien (2011). However, while he 
examined how political, economic and financial institutions influence different 
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trade export categories, this study examined the impact of trade liberalization and 
institutions on economic growth.    
 
The formal institutions are made up of laid down written rules that outline 
contractual obligations among the parties involved. Easterly (2008) refers to the 
formal institutions as ‘explicit’ that follow the ‘top-down’ process of laws written 
by political leaders. The informal institutions are referred to as ‘implicit’ that 
follow a ‘bottom-up’ approach, which emerges from the social norms, customs, 
traditions, beliefs and values of individuals within a society. The formal 
institutions have also been categorized into political and economic (Acemoglu 
and Robinson, 2008). In this study also, institutions are classified formal 
institutions into two – political and economic institutions.  
In terms of the channels and mechanisms of institutions and trade liberalization on 
economic growth, the nature of the institutions will have some effects on contract 
enforcement as depicted in Figure 4.1. For instance, when institutions are weak, 
there would be ineffective contract enforcement compared to a situation of strong 
institutions. On the other hand, the level to which contracts are enforced would 
have effects on transaction costs, which would in turn affect international trade. 
Thus, having ‘good type agent’ will reduce the cost of transacting (Greif, 2006). 
On the other hand, economic institutions, which can have both international and 
domestic dimensions, are put in place by the economic arrangements that a 
country is involved in. Both the domestic and international economic institutions 
affect one another because any policy made domestically affects the international 
community. Membership of World Trade Organization (WTO) and regional 
economic communities (RECs) are used as key examples of economic 
institutions.  
Basically, the more effective the nature of contract enforcement, the lower would 
be the level of transaction costs. For example, laws that are well received in a 
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country will influence contract enforcement as a result of better inevitability of 
human behaviour, which will reduce transaction costs. This may be the reason, 
among other things, why the services of specialists such as lawyers are usually 
required when parties are entering into contracts. This is to help situate the terms 
of the contract in order to reduce transaction costs and contractual hazards that 
might result from adverse selection. When transaction cost reduces, this boosts 
the level of economic activities by reducing the risks and uncertainties involved in 
doing business and as a result influence economic growth, and by extension 
international trade. In other words, transaction costs would have influence on the 
overall economic performance of a country. This is because, the higher the 
transaction cost, the more costly it would be to undertake economic activities, this 
means that high transaction costs would lead to higher cost of doing business, 
which will lower the level of economic activities, ceteris paribus. On the other 
hand, trade policy gives direction to the activities of those that are engaged in 
trade, that is, it dictates the trading partners of a country, this which will in turn 
affect the level of international trade via its effect on free trade among countries. 
As can be seen in Figure 4.1, there are other factors (like trade policies) that will 
possibly influence international trade (Lyakurwa, 2007). This is given the role 
that these indicators can play in the trading process especially with respect to 
trade policy which is essential to transaction cost.  
However, given the fact that this study is focused on the influence of trade 
liberalization and institutions on economic growth, these factors are given 
emphasis in this study because they help in the improvement of trade. Thus, this 
study examined the validity of the theory in the selected SSA countries. Theory 
predicts that trade liberalization should promote trade and in turn fuel economic 
growth in the long run and that trade liberalization expands trade opportunities, 
improves efficiency of allocation of resources (towards the most efficient sectors), 
and accelerates technological development especially through liberalization of 
imports. In addition, theory also predicts that the limited growth effects of trade 
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openness in Africa may be as a result of their weak institutions, this study is 
carried out in order to see if this is true or not in the selected SSA countries. 
Figure 4.1: Institutions, Trade and Growth Nexus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
Source: Adapted from Osabuohien (2011).   
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4.3 Research Method 
This study examined the impact of trade liberalization and institutions on 
economic growth in selected sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries. Therefore, 
based on the objectives of this study, and in order to test the hypotheses stated in 
chapter one, this study specified a model. The theoretical base for this 
specification is found in the Solow growth model and in its extension: the 
endogenous growth theory which is an improvement of the Solow growth model. 
The endogenous growth theory assumed that growth is affected by some other 
variables aside labour and capital. In this study, we assume that economic growth 
is influenced by these conventional growth variables (labour and capital), 
institutional variables as well as trade liberalization variables. The model is the 
economic growth/trade openness/institutions model specified in Section 4.3.1 
(under the model specification section) and was estimated using the Least Square 
Dummy Variable (LSDV) and Generalized Method of Moments (GMM).   
 
4.3.1 Model Specification 
The model for this study is adapted from the works of Kagochi et al., (2007); 
Baliamoune-Lutz and Ndikumana (2007) and Bhattacharyya (2011). In Section 
2.4 of chapter two of this study, these studies were reviewed. They all focused on 
trade liberalization, institutions and economic growth. From a methodological 
standpoint, these studies found out that trade liberalization and institutions have 
weak effects on growth. As regards trade liberalization, one probable explanation 
for this is the structure of trade. It was observed that the composition of trade 
determines the strength of growth. In terms of institutions, it was observed that 
weak institutions and an inadequate economic policy framework are partially 
responsible for the weak growth gains from trade liberalization in African 
countries (Baliamoune-Lutz and Ndikumana, 2007; Bhattacharyya, 2011). 
Therefore, this study is out to verify this assertion in the selected SSA countries.  
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However, the model specified in this study differs from that of Kagochi et al. 
(2007); Baliamoune-Lutz and Ndikumana (2007) and Bhattacharyya (2011)  in 
that some new variables like human capital, taxes and natural resource 
endowment are added to our model specification in order to align with the 
objectives of our study. The reason for this is that we discovered that taxes and 
natural resource endowment have been discovered from literature as two 
important factors that determine economic growth since the revenues generated 
from them is used for investments in the economy. The rationale for adding 
human capital (proxied by secondary and primary school enrolments) is because 
the aggregate output in a country is produced by both capital, labour and 
technology, and the development of human capital is crucial to production since it 
helps to increase aggregate output if efficiently utilized. Hence, it is expected that 
human capital contributes positively to economic growth in any country. This is 
one area in which this study made its contribution to knowledge.  
 
The Solow growth model assumed that growth in an economy is influenced by 
capital and labour. These variables are assumed to be exogenous. Thus, the set of 
variables in (4.7) represents the Solow growth equation:  
                                                                                            (4.7)                                                                                                      
where; Grgdp: is the growth rate of real GDP; 
            Gkap: is the gross fixed capital formation (measure of capital); 
            Lab: is the employment to population ratio (measure of labour).   
The endogenous growth model (which is an extension of the Solow model) 
assumed that aside labour and capital, economic growth is influenced by other 
variables. In order to satisfy the objectives of this study, we assume that economic 
growth is influenced by trade liberalization (TLIB) and institutional (INST) 
variables in addition to labour and capital. Thus, equation 4.7 is re-written as: 
                                                                                   (4.8)                                                                             
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Trade liberalization and institutional variables are made up of a set of variables 
which are specified in (4.9) and (4.10) below:                                                                                                          
                                                                   (4.9)                                             
                                                                                                   (4.10)                                                                                                                  
where;  Open: is the degree of openness (measure of trade liberalization);  
            Taxes: is proxied by tax revenue on natural resources;  
             Hkap: is human capital proxied by primary and secondary school    
 enrolments;  
Nare: is natural resource endowment (proxied by the share of fuel in total 
export);  
             Reprisk: is repudiation risk (proxy for contracting institutions - a 
 measure of economic institutions); 
             Polrig: is political Rights (proxy for political institutions); 
             Ethsion: is ethnic tensions (proxy for cultural institutions).   
   
However, based on the theoretical and conceptual frameworks on the impact of 
trade liberalization and institutions on economic growth, an endogenous growth 
model that incorporates trade liberalization and institutions is specified. It 
recognizes the interrelationships between economic growth, trade liberalization 
and institutions in a structural equation model. The specification allows for the 
identification of the channels through which trade liberalization, institutions and 
other policy interventions affect economic growth over time. Consequently, this 
study specifies the growth model explicitly as follows: 
The Growth/Institutions/Trade Liberalization Equation: 
                                                                      
                                                                                                                    (4.11)         
                                                                                                                     
where; Gdpini is the initial level of GDP and other variables are as defined 
previously.                                                     
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The specification of equation (4.11) is aided by the endogenous growth theory 
and empirical studies as discovered from the literature. In this regards, the 
dependent variable in the growth equation is the Grgdp, which is the growth rate 
of the value of final goods and services produced in a country within a year when 
valued at constant prices. This is often used as an indicator of economic growth. 
The higher the Grgdp, the higher the level of growth of the economy and vice 
versa. 
Initial level of GDP (Gdpini) proxied by the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
which is the monetary value of final goods and services produced in a country 
within a year when valued at current prices. This is included in our model because 
we assume that the initial level of growth of a country is related to the current 
growth rate of the country. There is an integrated growth process such that the 
current growth level is expected to be related and higher than the previous year’s 
level of growth. Empirical evidence opined that the current growth rate of a 
country is assumed to be affected by the initial level of growth, ceteris paribus. 
This implies that growth in the succeeding year is assumed to be affected by the 
growth experienced in the preceding year. This is closely related to the hypothesis 
of conditional convergence, which is often understood to mean that countries 
converge to parallel growth paths, the levels of which are assumed to be a 
function of a small set of variables (Durlauf, et al. 2005).  It is in this regards that 
we included the initial level of GDP (Gdpini) in the model to allow us observe the 
integration between previous level of growth and current level of economic 
growth on the assumption that the current growth rates of the selected SSA 
countries is affected by the previous level of growth. Theoretically, it is expected 
that this variable is negatively related with current rate of growth, this is due to 
the fact that the current rate of growth is expected to be higher than the previous 
year’s growth (Durlauf, et al. 2005). 
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Gross Fixed Capital Formation (Gkap) refers to capital invested on fixed assets, 
infrastructural and social amenities in an economy. This is a measure of capital or 
investment. This is included in our model because Gkap encourages investment. 
When investment increases, output will increase and Grgdp will also increase. 
Hence, it is expected to be positively related with economic growth. 
Employment to Population Ratio (Lab) is one of the key indicators of the labour 
market according to the International Labour Organization (ILO). The working 
age population comprises of the total number of persons that fall within the 
working age category that are engaged in employment. This means that persons 
like full-time housewives and students of working age that are still in tertiary 
institutions are excluded from the working population because they are not 
employed.  But this study is only interested in the number of persons that are 
willing and able to work, and are actually gainfully employed. If the level of 
employment increases, output level will increase, hence Grgdp will increase. 
Thus, Lab is expected to be positively related with economic growth.                                  
The institutional variables included in the model are explained in succession. 
Political Rights (Polrig) is the proxy for political institutions. Political Rights 
measures the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in 
selecting their government as well as freedom of expression and association. It is 
measured on a scale of 1-7, with 1 representing the highest degree of political 
freedom and 7 the lowest. The reason for the inclusion of this variable in the 
model stems from the fact that when the people select a good government, strong 
political institutions would be built and the country would experience economic 
growth. Polrig is expected to be negatively related with economic growth. 
In order to go beyond the frequently used “cluster” of institutions and explain 
economic institutions, this study decomposed economic institutions into two viz; 
property rights institutions and contracting institutions (Knack and Keefer, 1995; 
Rodrik, 2000a; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). Property rights institutions are the 
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contract between the state and the ordinary citizens as a group and depend on the 
distribution of political power between the two. While contracting institutions are 
contracts between two private citizens or between a state institution and a private 
citizen. A measure of property rights institutions is expropriation risk which 
captures the performance of institutions that constraints government and elite 
expropriation of private property (expropriation risk has a direct relationship with 
economic growth); and a measure of contracting institutions is the repudiation 
risk that captures the performance of institutions that supports private contracts. It 
has been observed from literature that there is an overlap between the two 
measures with a high correlation coefficient of 0.9 and both institutions are put in 
place to control opportunistic behaviour of an agent or a group (Bhattacharyya, 
2011). The difference between the two measures stems from the fact that if 
contracting institutions fail, it is possible to write an alternative contract but it is 
difficult to write an alternative contract when property rights institutions fail 
(Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005).  
However, this study used contracting institutions to capture economic institutions 
because it is more reliable than property rights institutions since an alternative 
contract can be written if one fails. Contracting institutions is proxied by 
repudiation risk (from International Country Risk Guide) which measures contract 
enforcement between private citizens. It is expected that the contracting 
environment between the government and a private citizen will be positively 
correlated with the contracting environment among private citizens. The measure 
operates on an eleven point scale ranging from 0 to 10 with a high score implying 
better contracting institutions. There is a positive relationship between repudiation 
risk and economic growth, when it is high, growth is high also. Thus, repudiation 
risk is expected to be positively related with economic growth. 
This study made use of ‘ethnic tensions’ as an indicator of ethnic fractionalization 
(a measure of cultural institutions).  It is used as a measure of the relative peace in 
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a country. It is measured on a 0-6 scale, with higher values implying lower ethnic 
tension. Ethnic tensions tend to be high in countries with high fractionalization. 
Several studies have shown that ethnic fractionalization or ethnic heterogeneity 
has a negative effect on growth (hence in this study ethnic tensions is expected to 
be negatively related with Grgdp). The effect could arise through the effects of 
ethnic tensions on private investment, public expenditure on education and health 
(Mauro, 1995; Easterly and Levine, 1997), or through increased incidence (and 
the probability) of internal armed conflicts which destroy economic activity 
(Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; Addison and Baliamoune-Lutz, 2004). The choice of 
ethnic tensions is due to the fact that in some SSA countries, there have been 
ethnic clashes among ethnic groups; this affects trade because when a country is 
not peaceful, trading with other countries becomes difficult. This affects the level 
of economic activities. Ethnic tension is used as a proxy for cultural institutions. It 
is expected to be negatively related with economic growth. 
It is worthy of note here that the institutional variables (repudiation risk and 
ethnic tensions) did not have a 0 value in any of the countries used as sample in 
this study. This enabled the researcher to be able to log the variables in the 
analyses.   
Trade liberalization is proxied by degree of openness (Open) which refers to total 
external trade as a proportion of GDP, that is, (export + import)/GDP. If a country 
is open to trade, the country attracts foreign investment which will increase the 
level of output, and hence Grgdp is expected to increase. The more the ratio is 
closer to unity, the more the economy is opened while in a closed economy, the 
ratio is close to zero. Degree of openness is expected to be positively related with 
economic growth. 
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The other variables are explained in succession below: 
Human capital (Hkap) is proxied by school enrolment (education). Education 
refers to the ability of the citizens to be able to read and write through the 
attendance of institutions of learning. It is a measure of human capital 
development. This variable is included in the model because the more educated 
the people of a country is, the better the institutions would be since education 
contributes to the growth of human capital in a country. The proxies used in this 
study to represent education are school enrolment – primary and secondary. The 
reason why we used these proxies is due to availability of data. The study did not 
include tertiary school enrolment because of the fact that data was not available 
for a lot of the sampled countries. Education is expected to be positively related 
with economic growth and institutions. 
Natural resource endowment (Nare) refers to the natural resource a country is 
endowed with. Natural resource endowment can negatively affect institutions by 
fostering rent seeking activities and replacing tax revenues by other revenue 
sources less transparent and less subject to accountability (Sachs and Warner, 
1997; Easterly and Levine, 2003). The reason for including this variable in the 
growth equation is because a significant proportion of the national income in SSA 
countries comes mainly from the exportation of primary products. The inclusion 
of Nare also helps to examine the impact of natural resources on economic 
growth. The variable is proxied by the share of fuel (oil) in total export. Nare is 
expected to be negatively related with economic growth because it fosters growth 
via the generation of revenue needed to fund projects.  
Taxes refer to the amount of money levied by the government of a country on 
natural resources (endowments). They also refer to revenues generated from 
royalties paid by organizations for the exploration of natural resources. A sound 
tax system promotes institutional quality, since it provides the necessary public 
revenue to build good institutions, and it creates a more direct relationship 
Page | 110  
 
between citizens and state. The rationale for including this variable is due to the 
fact that since taxes promote institutional quality, when a country has good 
institutions, economic growth is enhanced. This is proxied by tax revenue on 
natural resources in millions of US Dollars. It is expected to have a positive 
relationship with the dependent variable (Grgdp).  
It will be recalled that the model has some conventional variables found in the 
Solow growth model, and it is assumed that a non-linear relationship exists 
between the variables based on the Cobb-Douglas production function. Hence, 
equation (4.11) stated in Cobb-Douglas form gives: 
     
                                                                           
                                                                                                                           (4.12)                                                                                                                                              
where; A is the total factor productivity – a measure of productivity.  
The Cobb-Douglas production function is a regression function in which the 
explicit solutions of the unknowns cannot be obtained except it is transformed to a 
linear function. Thus, equation (4.12) cannot be estimated directly using the 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) technique of estimation since it is non-linear. 
Therefore, it would be necessary to transform it into linear form that allows the 
use of the OLS technique. In doing this, the double log-transformation rule is 
applied on the equation. The essence of this is that it provides estimated 
parameters that can be interpreted directly as elasticities, that is, the sensitivity of 
a change in the Grgdp following a change in the variables included in the model. 
Consequently, equation (4.12) becomes:      
                                                       
                                    (-)                    (+)                 (+)               (+)           
                                                                       
                               (+)                      (-)                     (-)                       (+)                              
                                                                                              (4.13) 
                               (-)              (+)             
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where; α0 is the intercept. The αi’s, for i = 1- 10, being elasticities are such that 
   
    the signs below the variables in brackets indicate the apriori expectations.  
 
4.3.2 Technique of Estimation 
The growth model (equation 4.14) was estimated using two econometric 
techniques namely; Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) and the Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM). The data was analysed with the use of STATA 11.0 
software package. This is based on the ability of the software to handle LSDV and 
various test statistics that the study is interested in. It will be recalled from chapter 
one that this study made use of thirty SSA countries; which means that we have 
both time series and cross-sectional data. The OLS technique cannot be used to 
estimate combined time series and cross-sectional data. Therefore, there is a need 
to use an appropriate technique that takes care of panel data, hence the use of the 
LSDV technique. Consequently, equation (4.11) expressed in panel data form 
becomes: 
                                                          
                                                                            
                                                                                               (4.14)      
                                                                                                                                                     
where; i = 1, 2… 30 (countries); t = 1, 2… 28 (years).   is the error term, i  is 
thi  
country and t is the time period for the variables we defined above. The intercept 
term carrying a subscript i  suggests that the intercepts of the selected countries 
may be different. The coefficients α1… α10 are elasticities because they measure 
the rate of change. α0 is the intercept.   
Panel Data is adopted in this study because of the following reasons: 
i. The technique of panel data estimation takes into account 
heterogeneity explicitly by allowing individual-specific variables; 
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ii. By combining time series and cross sectional observations, panel data 
gives more variability, more informative data, less collinearity among 
variables, more degree of freedom and hence more efficient results are 
produced; 
iii. Panel data is better suitable for studying the dynamics of change; 
iv. Panel data enables us to study more complicated behavioural models; 
v. Panel data can better perceive and compute effects that simply cannot 
be observed in pure time-series or pure cross-section data; and  
vi. Panel data supplements empirical analysis in ways that may not be 
possible if we only use cross section or time series data (Gujarati and 
Porter, 2009). 
 
There are four different estimating techniques under the panel data analysis. 
These are: 
(a) Pooled Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Model: In this case, all the 
observations are pooled together to get a ‘grand’ regression neglecting the 
cross-section and time series nature of data. This method is based on the 
following assumptions; explanatory variables are non-stochastic and 
strictly exogenous, the regression coefficients are the same for all 
observations, the error term is independently and identically distributed 
with zero mean and constant variance as well as normally distributed. 
(b) The Fixed Effects Model or Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV): 
Here, all observations are pooled together, but each cross sectional unit 
has its own (intercept) dummy variable. It assumes that the (slope and 
intercept) coefficients of the regressors vary across countries or over time; 
slope parameters are constant but intercept varies over individual unit and 
the explanatory variables and the error term are correlated. 
(c) The Random Effects Model (REM) or Error Components Model (ECM): 
Unlike the LSDV model, in which each unit has its own (fixed) intercept 
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value, in this case it is assumed that the intercept values are random 
drawing from a much bigger population of observations, having a 
common mean value for the intercept. It assumes that the explanatory 
variables and error term are uncorrelated. 
(d) The Fixed Effects Within-Group Model: In this case, all the observations 
are pooled together, but for each unit we express each variable as a 
deviation from its mean value and then estimate an OLS regression on 
such ‘mean-corrected’ or ‘de-meaned’ values(Gujarati and Porter, 2009).    
 
This study adopted the use of the Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) out of 
all these techniques. This is because the LSDV allows for heterogeneity among 
countries by allowing each country to have its own intercept value due to the fact 
that each cross-sectional unit may have some special features. The term ‘fixed 
effects’ is due to the fact that, although the intercept may differ across countries, 
each entity’s intercept does not vary overtime, that is, it is time invariant. It also 
assumed that the slope coefficients of the regressors do not vary across countries 
or over time (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). The LSDV technique is suitable in cases 
where the individual specific intercept may be correlated with one or more 
regressors and especially when the number of observations (N) is not too large. 
Hence, the εis are assumed to be fixed parameters and the remaining disturbances 
stochastic with itv identically independently distributed with zero mean and 
constant variance, that is, iid N (0, σ2). In this regards, the regressors  itX are 
taken to be independent of the itv  
for i and t (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). 
However, in order to determine which one of the Fixed Effects technique (FE) or 
Random Effects technique (RE) methods that is suitable for this study, the 
Hausman test is used. Therefore, expressing equation (4.8) explicitly, we have 
equation (4.15): 
                                                              (4.15)                                                                    
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where the constant term, i  are random, and they help to capture unobserved 
heterogeneity and ity is the dependent variable - Grgdp (the phenomenon whose 
variation we want to explain, using other phenomena assumed exogenous) for 
individual i at time t, INST is a vector of institutional variables and TLIB are the 
trade liberalization variables (the exogenous phenomena whose variation is not 
explained in the model) for individual or group i at time t. it  is the error term 
between the mean value of the explained variables and the actual value for 
individual i at time t. Therefore, the mean of the error term can be stated as: 
 1| , ,..., 0it it i iTE x x                                                                                                      
where; t = 1…,T 
 
Empirical work based on time series data assumes that the underlying nature of 
time series data is stationary. Thus, it is expected that economic variables are 
stationary in nature.  The unit root test is used to test the nature of time series to 
determine whether they are stationary or non-stationary. If a time series is 
stationary, it means that its mean, variance and auto covariance are the same at the 
very point they are measured. That is, they are time invariant. But if the mean, 
variance and auto covariance of a time series are not the same at any point they 
are measured, the time series is non stationary. This is a unit root problem. This 
implies that the study of the behaviour of that time series is only possible for the 
time period under consideration. It cannot be generalized to other time periods. 
Such time series may be of little value for forecasting. The stationarity of the time 
series is important because correlation could persist in non stationary time series 
even if the sample is very large and may result in what is called spurious or 
nonsense regression (Yule, 1989; Wei, 2006). Thus, in order not to have spurious 
results, this study carried out panel unit root tests.   
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The panel unit test can be carried out on a pooled data when two conditions are 
met; first, the time series and cross-sectional observations must be more than 
fifteen years each and second, the panel must be balanced, that is, there should not 
be any missing data. These two conditions are met by this study. There are thirty 
countries selected and the time period is twenty-eight years; while the data used is 
a balanced one. Panel unit root test is the panel data (both time series and cross-
sectional data) version of the time-series unit root test. The advantages of using 
panel unit root test are; (i) the power of a panel unit root test is significantly 
greater compared to the low power of the standard time-series unit root test in 
finite samples against alternative hypotheses with highly persistent deviations 
from equilibrium; (ii) since the power of unit root test depends on the total 
variation in the data used (both in the number of observations and their variation), 
panel unit root test is more powerful than standard time-series unit root test 
because the variation across countries adds a great deal of information to the 
variation across time, resulting in potentially more precise parameter estimates; 
(iii) the asymptotic distribution of a panel unit root test is standard normal, in 
contrast to individual time series unit root test (Wei, 2006). 
There are different methods used to test the panel unit root but this study made 
use of the non-parametric Fisher-type test which uses the Augmented Dickey 
Fuller (ADF) test. This method is used because the ADF test conducts unit root 
tests for each time series individually, and then combines the p-values from these 
tests to produce an overall test. The ADF test combines information based on 
individual unit root tests and allow for a heterogeneous alternative hypothesis 
where the probability values can vary across countries.  It is also a test that is 
conducted by combining the significance levels of the different tests. The null and 
alternative hypotheses are formulated as: 
H0: All panels contain unit roots. 
H1: At least one panel is stationary. 
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The rule of thumb for decision making under panel unit root test involves the 
rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1 percent statistical significance level, this 
implies that all panel series in the panel data set do not contain a unit root; 
therefore, at least one panel is stationary. This automatically implies the 
acceptance of the alternative hypothesis which means that at least one panel is 
stationary. The results of the panel unit test are presented in chapter five. 
The study carried out a robustness check of the results (see section 5.4 of chapter 
five) in order to examine if the results are better when the researcher adds some 
new variables to the growth model (equation 4.14) or the results would be 
different from the original result. The new variables added to equation 4.14 are 
foreign direct investment (FDI); Contract intensive money (CIM) and Economic 
freedom (ECOFRE). These variables are also variables used as proxies for trade 
liberalization, political and economic institutions respectively.  
Foreign direct investment (FDI) refers to the investment undertaken by an 
enterprise that is either wholly or partly foreign-owned. It is a cross-border 
investment in which a resident in one country (the direct investor) acquires a 
lasting interest in an enterprise in another country (the direct investment 
enterprise), this is a measure of trade liberalization and is expected to have a 
positive impact on economic growth.  
Economic Freedom (ECOFRE) enhances the efficiency with which productive 
inputs are converted into output. The Economic Freedom Index (EFI) measures 
the degree of economic freedom present in five major areas: size of government – 
expenditures, taxes, and enterprises; legal structure and security of property 
rights; sound money; freedom to trade with foreigners; and regulation of capital, 
labour, and business markets (Gwartney and Lawson, 2003). Each country is 
assigned a rating based on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 representing the lowest 
degree of economic freedom and 10 the highest level of economic freedom. It is 
expected that economic freedom has a positive impact on economic growth.  
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Contract Intensive Money (CIM) measures the extent to which property rights are 
protected and contracts are enforced. It is expressed as M2-C/M2 where M2 is 
broad money supply and C is currency outside the banking system. According to 
Clague et al. (1999), contract intensive money was used as a measure of 
democracy and property rights. They influence the accessibility and willingness 
of economic agents to exercise property rights. CIM is expected to be positively 
related with economic growth. 
Thus, the equation estimated for the robustness check in section 5.4 of chapter 
five is specified as: 
                                                          
                                                                            
                                                                      
                                                                                                             (4.16)                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
 
However, in order to examine the impact of trade liberalization on economic 
growth and the impact of institutions on economic growth independently in 
chapter five which is devoted to the estimation of the model, the study 
decomposed the growth/institutions/trade liberalization model into three 
estimation processes. The estimations were done one after the other or one by 
one, that is, we first estimate the growth/trade liberalization equation in order to 
examine the impact of trade liberalization on economic growth, and thereafter we 
estimate the growth/economic institutions equation in order to estimate the impact 
of economic institutions on economic growth, we also estimate the 
growth/political institutions equation in order to estimate the impact of political 
institutions on economic growth. Furthermore, we estimate the growth/cultural 
institutions equation in order to assess the impact of cultural institutions on 
economic growth. Lastly, the trade liberalization variable was excluded and the 
growth/institutions equation was estimated in order to assess the impact of the 
three institutions on economic growth. The reason for doing this is to find out 
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which out of trade liberalization and institutions have a higher impact on 
economic growth or to find out if they actually complement each other in 
impacting on economic growth. Thus, this gives rise to the following equations: 
                                                          
                                                                               (4.17)                                                                                                                                                   
                                                          
                                                                                 
                                                                                                                    (4.18)                                             
 
                                                           
                                                                                                                                                           
                                                                                                                   (4.19) 
 
                                                           
                                                                         
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
 
                                                            
                                                                 
                                                                                           (4.21)                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
where, all variables and coefficients are as previously defined. 
 
Equations (4.17), (4.18), (4.19), (4.20) and (4.21) are used to estimate the impacts 
of trade liberalization, economic, political and cultural institutions on economic 
growth, as well as the impact of institutions on economic growth respectively. 
These equations are not different from equation (4.14) specified above because 
they contain the same variables that are in equation (4.14). Hence, we have not 
specified any new equations. 
 
It is possible to estimate the partial effect, elasticity or semi-elasticity of the 
dependent variable in an equation with respect to an explanatory variable to 
depend on the magnitude of yet another explanatory variable. In other words, to 
find out if there is an ‘interaction effect’ between the two independent variables. 
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This prompted this study to examine the interaction effect of trade liberalization 
and institutions on economic growth in chapter five. This was done in order to 
verify if trade liberalization will affect economic growth more when we have 
economic, political or cultural institutions. A new variable was introduced into the 
growth equation; this new variable is the product of the trade liberalization 
variable (degree of trade openness) and the estimated values of the institutional 
variables (repudiation risk, political rights and ethnic tensions). For each of the 
institutional variable, the mean value was used as a yardstick, any value above 
this mean value is ascribed 1 and any value below the mean value is ascribed 0. It 
is this binary or dichotomous variable that is then used to multiply the trade 
liberalization variable (degree of trade openness) that gave us the new variable. 
When the coefficient of the new variable is greater than 0, there is an interaction 
effect between trade liberalization and institutions while if is less than 0, there is 
no interaction effect between trade liberalization and institutions.   
 
Therefore, this gave three equations which were estimated in chapter five. These 
equations are: 
   
                                                          
                                                                            
                                                                              (4.22)   
                                                                          
                                                          
                                                                           
                                                                                (4.23)    
                                                                           
                                                          
                                                                            
                                                                            (4.24) 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
where; Open*Reprisk; Open*Polrig and Open*Ethsion are the products of the 
trade liberalization variable (degree of trade openness) and the binary values of 
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the economic, political and cultural institutions variables respectively. All other 
variables and coefficients are as previously defined. When α11 > 0 (there is 
interaction effect); α11 < 0 (there is no interaction effect). Equations (4.22), (4.23) 
and (4.24) estimate the interaction effects of trade liberalization and economic, 
political and cultural institutions on economic growth respectively. 
 
Quite a number of sensitivity checks were carried out in chapter five via the 
estimation of equation (4.14), and the results reported in section 5.5. This was 
done by the decomposition of the sampled thirty SSA countries used in this study 
into the sub-regional groupings of Central Africa, West Africa and East/Southern 
Africa. The other decomposition that was done was based on the World Bank’s 
classification in 1987 and 2007 of the sampled countries into moderately outward-
oriented (MOOC), moderately inward-oriented (MIOC) and strongly inward-
oriented countries (SIOC). The detailed composition of these countries into the 
various categories is presented in section 5.5 of chapter five. Furthermore, in 
order to find out if the exclusion of Nigeria and South Africa which are two major 
outliers would portend possible outlier problem to the estimation, Nigeria and 
South Africa was excluded from the West Africa and East/Southern African sub-
regions where they belong to respectively; and the model was estimated to see if 
there was a noticeable change in the results.            
 
The limitations of the LSDV includes; (i) there is the degrees of freedom problem 
arising from introducing too many dummy variables; (ii) the problem of 
multicollinearity arising from too many variables, both individual and 
multiplicative, this makes precise estimation of one or more parameters difficult; 
and (iii) the LSDV may not be able to identify the impact of time invariant 
variables. Due to these limitations, this study introduced the concept of dynamic 
panel data. 
 
Page | 121  
 
This study assumed that there is a connection between the level of growth 
experienced in a country in the preceding year with that of the current level, that 
is, the level of growth achieved in the previous year has a link with the level of 
growth that the country would attain in the current year. In other words, there is 
integrated growth in the country. This is particularly necessary because the 
economy is assumed not to exist in isolation; there are interconnections among the 
various sectors in the economy, hence, the economic activities in the preceding 
year have a bearing with current economic activities. This is why the dynamic 
panel data is used in this study to estimate this link. Thus, the linear dynamic 
panel data model is expressed as: 
                                                                (4.25)                                                                    
 
where; Grgdpt-1: one period lag of growth rate of real GDP; INST is a vector that 
comprises of strictly institutional exogenous covariates; TLIB is a vector of trade 
liberalization exogenous covariates such that:   
The predetermined covariate includes: 
         is the first period lag of the dependent variable Grgdp; 
i ite  is the usual error component decomposition of the error term; 
i are unobserved individual-specific effects; 
ite are the observation-specific (individual) errors. 
    
The individual-specific effects, i are assumed to be uncorrelated across 
individuals, { ( , ) 0; }i jE i j     and with the disturbance of any individual at all 
leads and lags{ ( ) 0; , }i jE e i j   , but may be correlated with the explanatory 
variables  { ( ) , , }.it jE X unknown i t   The mean of i is zero ( ) 0; }iE i    and 
its variance 
2( )vi may differ across individuals. The observation-specific 
disturbance has mean zero { ( ) 0; , }itE e i t  and is uncorrelated across individuals 
Page | 122  
 
and { ( ) 0; 0, }.it js iE e e t s    In general, its variance 
2( )eit may differ across 
both individuals and periods. The initial observation 0iGRGDP is uncorrelated 
with the disturbance of any individual observation for all periods 
0{ ( ) 0; , , }i jtE GRGDP e i j t  but may be correlated with the individual 
effects                           . 
In order to get a consistent estimate of  as N → ∞ with T fixed, equation (4.25) 
is rewritten in first difference notations. This also eliminates the individual effects 
as follows: 
                                                           (4.26)                                                               
The unobserved individual-level effects i have now disappeared from the 
differenced equation (4.26) because it does not vary over time. The Ds are the 
first difference operators. This transformation has effectively removed the fixed 
effect elements from the model; the other variables are as previously defined. 
There are two major complications arising from estimating the dynamic panel 
data regression model using macroeconomic panel data. First, the presence of 
endogenous and/or predetermined covariates, and second, the small time-series 
and cross-sectional dimensions of the typical panel data set. The dynamic panel 
data regression model is in fact further characterized by some sources of 
persistence over time. There is the problem of autocorrelation which is due to the 
presence of a lagged dependent variable among the regressors and the other is the 
problem of heteroskedasticity (Okodua, 2010).  
 
Thus, expressing equation (4.14) in dynamic panel data form gives: 
                                                          
                                                                           
                                                                                         (4.27)                                                  
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where:         is the first period lag of the dependent variable Grgdp; and the 
other variables are as defined previously. To avoid the problem of 
multicollinearity, initial level of GDP (Gdpini) had to be replaced with the first 
period lag of the growth of real GDP (Grgdp) because leaving the two variables as 
explanatory variables in the same equation measures the same issue. 
 
Therefore, in order to resolve these shortcomings and to make the results of the 
estimations to be better, the second part of the econometric analysis used in this 
study which is the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) is imperative. This 
approach estimates the model parameters directly from the moment conditions 
that are imposed by the model. These conditions can be linear or non-linear in 
parameters. This is used because of the possibility of endogeneity and omitted 
variable bias. The variables that involve institutions may be endogenous and 
usually have limited time variation. 
 
Looking at the impact of trade liberalization and institutions on economic growth, 
current level of a country’s trade liberalization and institutions will affect future 
level of a country’s economic growth and this may, in turn, affect future country 
trade liberalization and institutions, and may therefore give rise to what is called 
“dynamic endogeneity”. The argument here centers on the fact that cross-
sectional variation in observed country economic structures is driven by both 
unobservable heterogeneity and the country’s peculiar characteristics. As such, 
any attempt to explain the role of trade liberalization and institutions on economic 
growth of these selected SSA countries that does not recognize these sources of 
endogeneity may be biased. Thus, trade liberalization and institutions variables 
will be instrumented for. 
 
However, the problem of endogeneity that is often associated with the use of 
panel data is resolved in this study by the choice of the System GMM Estimator 
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to estimate the relationship between trade liberalization, institutions and economic 
growth. This econometric technique not only eliminates any bias that may arise 
from ignoring dynamic endogeneity, but also provides theoretically based and 
powerful instruments that accounts for simultaneity while eliminating any 
unobservable heterogeneity. Dynamic panel data estimation is most useful in 
situations where some unobservable factor affects both the dependent variable and 
the explanatory variables, and some explanatory variables are strongly related to 
past values of the dependent variable (Okodua, 2010). This is likely to be the case 
in regressions of trade liberalization and institutions on economic growth.  
 
In the presence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, the two-step System-
GMM uses a consistent estimate of the weighting matrix, taking the residuals 
from the one-step estimate (Davidson and Mackinnon, 2004). Though 
asymptotically more efficient, the two-step GMM presents estimates of the 
standard errors that tend to be severely downward biased. However, it is possible 
to solve this problem using the finite-sample correction to the two-step covariance 
matrix derived by Windmeijer (2005), which can make two-step robust GMM 
estimates more efficient than one-step robust ones, especially for System-GMM 
(Roodman, 2009).    
 
As emphasized by Bun and Windmeijer (2009), the good performance of the 
System-GMM estimator relative to the Differenced-GMM estimator in terms of 
finite sample bias and root mean square error, has made it the estimator of choice 
in many applied panel data settings. In multivariate dynamic panel models, the 
System-GMM estimator is also known to perform better than the Differenced-
GMM when series are persistent and there is a dramatic reduction in the finite 
sample bias due to the exploitation of additional moment conditions (Blundell, 
Bond and Windmeijer, 2000). Bond, Hoeffler and Temple (2001) provide a useful 
insight in the GMM estimation of dynamic panel data models, arguing that the 
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pooled OLS and FE technique estimators should be considered as the upper and 
lower bound respectively. As a result, whether the Differenced-GMM coefficient 
is close to or lower than the within group one; this is likely a sign that the 
estimates are biased downward (maybe because of a weak instrument problem). 
Hence, if this is the case, the use of System-GMM is highly recommended and its 
estimates should lie between pooled OLS and Fixed Effects LSDV. The good 
performance of the System-GMM estimator relative to the Differenced-GMM 
estimator in terms of finite sample bias and root mean square error, 
 
In view of the good performance of the System-GMM estimator as enunciated by 
Blundell and Bond’s (1998), in their extended version of the GMM estimator 
analysis (also called the System-GMM estimator) in overcoming complications 
that may arise from efforts to estimate the usual linear dynamic panel data 
models, this estimator was considered appropriate and applied to estimate the 
specified model in this study.   
However, the properties of GMM estimator include: 
i) Unbiasedness: The expected value of  is equal to the true , that is 
( )E   or ( ) 0E    ;  
ii) Minimum Variance: 1 is said to be a minimum variance estimator of 
 if the variance of 1 is smaller than or at most equal to the variance
2 , which is any other estimator of  ; 
iii) Best Unbiased or Efficient Estimator: If 1 and 2 are two unbiased 
estimators of , and the variance of 1 is smaller than or at most equal 
to the variance 2 , then 1  is a best unbiased estimator; 
iv) Linearity: An estimator  is said to be a linear estimator of  if it is a 
linear function of the sample observations. Thus, the sample mean 
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defined as;  1 2
1 1
...i nX X x x x
n n
     is a linear estimator 
because it is a linear function of the X values; 
v) Best Linear Unbiased Estimator (BLUE): If  is linear, unbiased and 
best estimator of , then it is BLUE; 
vi) Minimum Mean-Square-Error (MSE) Estimator: The MSE of an 
estimator   is defined as MSE  
2
( ) E    ; 
vii) Asymptotic unbiasedness: An estimator  is said to be an 
asymptotically unbiased estimator of   if lim ( )n
n
E  

 ; and 
viii) Consistency:  is said to be a consistent estimator if it approaches the 
true value  as the sample size gets larger and larger (Gujarati and 
Porter, 2009).
                         
 
 
4.3.3 Data Sources and Measurements 
The data for this study were obtained from secondary sources and these include 
the World Development Indicators published by the World Bank, International 
Labour Organization (ILO) database, Freedom House and Fraser Institute. The 
growth rate of gross domestic product (Grgdp), gross fixed capital formation 
(Gkap), initial value of GDP (Gdpini), degree of trade openness (Open), primary 
and secondary school enrolment - proxy for human capital  (Hkap), taxes (proxied 
by tax revenue as a percentage of GDP), natural resource endowment (proxied by 
the share of fuel in total exports) were sourced from the World Development 
Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank while employment to population ratio (Lab) 
– proxy for labour was sourced from the ILO database. Political institutions 
indicator was sourced from the Fraser Institute and Freedom House, economic 
institutions indicator was sourced from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
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and Doing Business database. However, Table 4.1 shows the brief descriptions of 
the variables in equation (4.14). 
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Table 4.1: Description of Variables and their Measurements 
 
Source: Author's Compilation, 2013. 
S/N         Name Symbol Definition/Description Measurement 
1. Growth rate of real GDP. Grgdp  Annual percentage change in the value of real GDP.   Percentage 
2. Initial level of GDP Gdpini This refers to the monetary value of the final goods and    Dollars   
   services produced in a country within a year when valued at current 
prices.  
(million) 
     
3. Trade Openness. Open This is the extent to which a country is open to trade,  Ratio 
   openness promotes trade. It is measured as {(X+M/Y,  
   where X is exports, M is imports and Y is GDP}.  
4. Gross Fixed Capital Formation. Gkap Capital invested on fixed assets, infrastructural and  Dollars (million) 
   social amenities in an economy.  
5. Proportion of Labour  Lab This is the proportion of the working-age population  Ratio 
 Force employed.  that is employed. That is, employment to population ratio.  
6. Human Capital Hkap Education is used as a proxy for human capital.  Enrolment 
(million) 
   This refers to the ability of the citizens to be able to   
   read and write through the attendance of institutions  
   of learning. The more educated the people of a country 
   is, the better the country. Primary and secondary school 
   enrolment are used as proxies.  
7. Natural Resource  Nare This refers to the natural resource a country is endowed  Percentage 
 Endowment  with. This is proxied by the share of fuel (oil) in total   
   export.  
8. Ethnic Tension Ethsion This is an indicator of ethnic fractionalization. It is  Indices 
   measured on a scale of 0-6, with higher values implying  
   lower ethnic tension. It tends to be high in countries  
   with high fractionalization.  
9. Taxes Taxes These  take the form of royalties levied by the government Dollars (million) 
   of a country on organizations for the exploration of natural  resources.  
    
 
10. 
 
Political Rights 
 
Polrig 
 
Political Rights measures the extent to which a country’s  
 
Indices 
   citizens are able to participate in selecting their   
   government as well as freedom of association. This is  
   a proxy for political institutions.  
11. Repudiation Risk Reprisk This measures contract enforcement between private  Indices 
   citizens. It is a proxy for contracting institutions - a measure 
   of economic institutions.  
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                                      CHAPTER FIVE 
                        DATA ANALYSES AND INTERPRETATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the empirical results for the study. The chapter begins with 
the descriptive analyses of the trend on the growth rates of the regions of the 
world. The estimation was done using STATA 11.0 software package. The 
growth model that analyzed the impact of trade liberalization and institutions on 
economic growth in the selected SSA countries was estimated and the results are 
presented. The chapter also provides some robustness and sensitivity checks in 
order to ensure that the estimated results are reliable. 
5.2 Preliminary Analyses  
The preliminary analyses comprised the computation of the mean and standard 
deviation values for the variables and the correlation between the variables.  As 
mentioned in chapter one in the scope of the study, the number of SSA countries 
included in the analyses is thirty. The list of countries is provided in Table A1.2 
which contains each country’s identifier as used in the estimation. The period 
covered was 1985 to 2012. The choice of the countries used and period covered 
were based on data availability. 
Table 5.1 shows the growth rates of GDP in regions of the world for 1985, 1990, 
1995, 2000, 2010, 2011 and 2012 respectively. It is observed that the Sub-saharan 
Africa (SSA) witnessed the fourth lowest growth rate among the regions as 
against East Asia with the highest growth rate in 2010. But in 2012, SSA had the 
fifth highest growth rate behind East Asia which had the highest figure.  In 2010, 
world GDP was -1.1 percent. The economic slowdown was global in the sense 
that growth declined in every region of the world because of the aftermath of the 
global economic meltdown in comparison to 2005. While the developed 
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economies, Central and Southern Europe as well as Latin America and the 
Caribbean economies experienced actual recessions, the rest of the world 
experienced lower, but positive growth rates. The highest growth rates were 
accomplished in East Asia (6.1 percent) and South Asia (5.0 percent) in 2010. It is 
also evident that the North African countries’ average growth rates are higher than 
that of the SSA countries for the period under review except for year 2005 when 
the growth rates were the same.   
Table 5.1: Real GDP Growth Rates (%) in selected Regions                                                  
                                      1985        1990   1995      2000         2005      2010     2011      2012 
World                                     2.2         2.7       3.1         6.0            5.2       -1.1     -1.4        -2.2  
Developed Economies           1.3         1.5       1.7         2.8            2.6       -3.5     -3.8        -4.3 
And EU 
Central and South                  
Eastern Europe                      2.7         3.0        3.3         5.6             7.6       -6.5    -7.1       -7.4    
East Asia                               6.4         7.2        8.1         9.4            11.2       6.1      7.2        7.9 
South East Asia and             
the Pacific                             3.9          4.3       4.5         5.3              6.5       0.5      1.1        1.8           
South Asia                            3.2          3.6       3.9         6.1              8.7       5.0      5.7        6.2           
Latin America and  
the Caribbean                      2.4          2.7       3.0          4.3             5.7       -2.5     -3.2       -3.5        
Middle East                         3.1          3.3       3.8          5.1             6.1         1.4      1.9        2.3        
North Africa                        2.3          2.6       3.0          4.5             5.8         3.7      3.9        4.3          
SSA                                     2.1          2.5       2.8          4.1             5.8         1.2       1.7       2.1    
Source: World Bank, 2012. 
 
5.2.1 Descriptive Statistics of the Variables Used in the Models 
The descriptive statistics of the variables used in the models for this study are as 
presented in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. The mean values of the growth rate of GDP 
(Grgdp), degree of openness (Open) and repudiation risk (Reprisk) for the 
selected SSA countries are 4.44 percent, 0.07 and 3.32 units respectively. From 
the mean values of these variables, it can be seen that SSA countries indicators 
are quite low when compared to those of the developed countries with an average 
of 7.81 percent, 6.98 and 9.89 units (as presented in Table 5.3) respectively. In 
Table 5.2, the mean values of Gkap, Ssenr, Psenr, Lab, Taxes and Nare were 5.71, 
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28.68, 90.06, 66.26, 16.66 and 18.21, all in percentages respectively, with the 
exception of Ssenr, Psenr and Lab with high mean values, Gkap, Ssenr, Taxes and 
Nare have relatively low mean values which is an indication that these variables 
do not contribute much to economic growth. With respect to the economic 
institutions’ variable, the mean value of repudiation risk (Reprisk) is 3.32 units. 
This value falls below the value of the developed economies and European Union 
(9.89 units as presented in Table 5.3). By the same token, the political 
institutional variable had mean values of 4.74 units for Political rights (Polrig). 
This value is on the low side as well, compared to 9.67 units for political rights 
(Polrig) in the developed countries. 
Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables for the selected SSA 
Countries 
Variables Measurement Mean Std. 
Dev. 
 
Dependent     
Growth rate of GDP(Grgdp) Percentage 4.44 6.75  
Macroeconomic     
Initial level of GDP (Gdpini) Dollars (million) 4.12 6.45  
Gross Fixed Capital Formation (Gkap) Dollars(million) 5.71 6.62  
Secondary school enrolment (Ssenr) Enrolment (million) 28.68 19.32  
Primary school enrolment (Psenr) Enrolment (million) 90.06 29.25  
Employment to population ratio (Lab) Ratio 66.26 12.54  
Economic Institution Variable     
Repudiation Risk (Reprisk) Index 3.32 0.95  
Political Institution Variable     
Political Rights (Polrig) Index 4.74 1.61  
Cultural Institution Variable     
Ethnic tensions (Ethsion) Index 51.64 1383.86  
Trade Liberalization     
Degree of Openness (Open) Ratio 0.07 0.39  
Other Variables     
Taxes Dollars (million) 16.66 7.72  
Natural Resource Endowment (Nare) Percentage 18.21 32.17  
     Source: Computed by the Author, 2013. 
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Table 5.3: Comparison of Mean Values of Variables in selected Regions 
Regions  Growth rate of 
GDP 
Degree of 
Openness  
Repudiation 
Risk 
 Political Rights  Ethnic Tension 
Developed 
Economies and EU 
7.81 6.98 9.89  9.67  38.92 
Central and South 
Eastern Europe 
7.64 5.72 9.65  9.59  38.87 
East Asia 6.51 5.49 9.54  8.60  40.42 
South East Asia 
and the Pacific 
6.32 4.87 8.45  8.41  40.54 
South Asia 6.13 4.56 8.92  7.56  42.96 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 
5.58 4.38 6.87  6.92  39.86 
Middle East 6.72 4.62 5.87  6.32  47.54 
North Africa 5.14 2.85 4.53  5.12  50.97 
SSA 4.44 0.07 3.32  4.74  51.64 
Source: Author’s Computation, 2013. 
 
Table 5.4 shows the descriptive statistics of variables for the sub-regional groupings. The 
study classified the selected SSA countries into West Africa, Central Africa as well as East 
and Southern Africa sub-regions. Recall that we have thirty sampled SSA countries in this 
study. The West African sub-region comprises of Benin, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, 
Ghana, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal. The Central African sub-regional countries are Angola, 
Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Rwanda. The third group 
consists of countries that fall under the East and Southern African sub-region, these countries 
include Botswana, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, 
South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. This classification was done 
in order to be able to compare the results across sub-regions of SSA.   
 
In Table 5.4, the descriptive statistics of the variables across the sub-regions in SSA are as 
presented based on the groupings above. The results show that the mean values of Grgdp in 
East and Southern Africa was the highest, followed by that of Central Africa and then West 
Africa with 5.44, 4.15 and 3.87 percent respectively. The mean value of Open (trade 
liberalization variable) for East and Southern Africa is the highest at 0.24 percent while that of 
Central African countries was the lowest at 0.16 percent. For Ethsion (proxy for cultural 
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institutions), West Africa has the highest mean value while that of Central Africa is the lowest 
at 3.67 units. The mean values of Psenr, Gkap and Lab were the highest at 92.04, 2.88 and 
68.43 percent respectively for East and Southern Africa. The mean values of Gkap (in West 
Africa), Ssenr, Psenr and Lab (in Central Africa) were the lowest at 1.14, 27.14, 85.88 and 
66.53 percent respectively.  In the same vein, the economic institutional variable – Reprisk has 
the highest mean value of 3.58 units in Central Africa while West Africa has the lowest value 
of 3.30 units. For the political institutional variable - Polrig, East and Southern Africa had the 
highest mean value of 9.87 units while Central Africa had the lowest mean value of 6.14 units. 
Also presented in the results are the mean values of the other variables, East and Southern 
Africa had the highest mean value of 9.49 percent for natural resource endowment (Nare) 
while West Africa had the lowest value with 9.07 percent for Nare. For Taxes, East and 
Southern Africa had the highest mean value while West Africa had the lowest mean value.   
 
In summary, we can deduce that East and Southern Africa experienced a higher mean value of 
the growth variable because averagely the sub-region had 5.44 percent, as against 3.87 percent 
for West Africa and 4.95 percent for Central Africa in the mean values of the variables. This is 
probably due to the fact that the East and Southern African countries are open to trade and they 
tend to gain more from trade liberalization. This is also evidenced from the fact that the quality 
of their institutions tend to be better than the other two sub-regions (that is, West African and 
Central African countries). The discrepancy in the number of observations as revealed in Table 
5.4 stems from the fact that there are more countries in the East/Southern Africa sub-region 
than the other two countries.  
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Table 5.4: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables for Sub-regional Classification 
  West Africa Sub-region Central Africa Sub-region East and Southern 
Africa 
Variables 
 
Measurement Mean  Std.Dev.   Obs.      Mean Std.Dev. Obs.                 Mean Std.Dev. Obs. 
Growth rate of GDP 
(Grgdp) 
Percentage 3.87      3.80         224 4.15      5.61       224 5.44     9.94       392 
 
Initial level of GDP 
(Gdpini) 
Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation (Gkap) 
Secondary School 
enrolment (Ssenr) 
Primary School 
enrolment  (Psenr) 
Employment to 
population ratio (Lab) 
 
Dollars (million) 
 
Dollars (millions) 
 
Enrolment 
(million) 
Enrolment 
(million) 
Ratio 
 
3.30     3.71         224 
 
1.14      1.09         224 
 
32.41    17.02       224 
 
88.38    26.53       224 
 
 
63.91    10.85       224 
 
 
4.21      5.67        224 
 
1.58      1.03        224 
 
27.14    21.59      224 
 
85.88    26.55      224 
 
 
66.53    15.56      224            
 
5.41     9.88       392 
 
2.88      2.20      392 
 
24.03    16.30     392 
 
92.04    33.82     392 
 
 
68.43    10.17     392         
 
 
Economic Institutions: 
Repudiation Risk 
(Reprisk) 
Political Institutions: 
Political Rights (Polrig) 
Cultural Institutions: 
Ethnic tensions (Ethsion) 
 
 
Index 
 
 
Index 
 
Index 
 
 
3.30      0.78        224 
 
 
7.63      3.18        224 
 
3.98      0.40        224 
 
 
 
3.58       0.99       224 
 
 
6.14       2.44       224      
 
3.67       0.45      224 
 
 
3.35     1.05        392 
 
 
9.87     6.35        392 
 
3.88     0.93        392     
Trade Liberalization: 
Degree of Openness 
(Open) 
 
Ratio 
 
0.14     0.40         224       
 
0.16      0.35      224 
 
0.24      0.37       392 
Other Variables: 
Taxes 
Natural Resource 
endowment (Nare) 
 
Dollars (million) 
Percentage 
 
1.15     0.74         224 
9.07     1.47         224  
 
1.27     0.84        224 
9.35     1.52        224  
 
2.80    0.97          392 
9.49    1.58          392  
Source: Computed by the Researcher, 2013. 
 
5.2.2 Correlation between the Variables 
In order to check for the possibility of multicollinearity among explanatory variables, there 
is a need to examine the correlation between the explanatory variables. Correlation gives an 
indication of the degree of relationship between variables. There is positive correlation 
between two variables when an increase in one brings about an increase in the other, 
otherwise, the correlation is negative. This is carried out to verify the extent of relationship 
between the explanatory variables. Correlation takes values between -1 and +1. For perfect 
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negative correlation, the correlation coefficient is -1 while for perfect positive correlation it 
is +1. From Table 5.5, all the variables have either low or negative correlation with one 
another. But lssenr and lgdpini; lpsenr and lssenr; lssenr and lgkap; lgkap and lgdpini with 
moderately high correlation coefficients of 0.3068, 0.5980, 0.3951 and 0.5049 respectively. 
This implies that there is no multicollinearity among the variables so we can proceed with 
the estimations of the equations.  
Table 5.5: Correlation matrix of the log of the explanatory variables in the model 
 Lgdpini Lgkap Lssenr Lpsenr Llab Lopen lethsion Lreprisk Lpolrig Ltaxes Lnare 
Lgdpini 1.0000             
Lgkap 0.5049 1.0000          
Lssenr 0.3068 0.3951 1.0000         
Lpsenr 0.1898 0.3034 0.5980 1.0000        
Llab -0.3532 -0.3428 -0.5776 -0.1384 1.0000       
Lopen -0.1379    0.0501 0.3634 0.2713 -0.1006 1.0000      
Lethsion -0.0616 -0.0375 0.0238 0.0850 0.1730 -0.0499 1.0000     
Lreprisk 0.3064 0.2643 0.1135 -0.0089 -0.1596 -0.0485 -0.0682 1.0000    
Lpolrig -0.0027 -0.0813 -0.3351 -0.1778 0.2239 -0.1470 -0.0779 0.0084 1.0000   
Ltaxes 0.0271 0.1128    0.3564 0.2183 -0.3959    0.2505 -0.0272 -0.1190 -0.3402 1.0000  
Lnare 0.4619    0.4725    0.2639 0.2670 -0.1733    0.2924 -0.0177 0.1941 0.0727 0.0064 1.0000 
  
Source: Calculated by the Author, 2013. 
In addition, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test for multicollinearity was carried out and 
the results are presented in Table 5.6, the results showed that all the variables have VIF 
values less than 10 and 1/VIF greater than 0.10 which is the ideal condition for the relative 
absence of multicollinearity among variables. Thus, the result reported in Table 5.6 shows 
that there is no multicollinearity among the explanatory variables. The results from the 
correlation matrix and the VIF as presented in Tables 5.5 and 5.6 complement each other in 
this respect. 
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Table 5.6: Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) Test for Multicollinearity 
Variable   VIF   1/VIF     
Lgdpini 7.86 0.127304 
Lgkap 7.16 0.139653 
Lssenr 3.00 0.333472 
Llab 2.07 0.482090 
Lpsenr 1.85 0.539610 
Lopen 1.70 0.586649 
Lnare 1.62 0.618734 
Ltaxes 1.43 0.696948 
Lpolrig 1.25 0.798747 
Lreprisk 1.16 0.864173 
Lethsion 1.08 0.923953 
Mean VIF  2.74 
Source: Calculated by the Author, 2013. 
 
5.3 Estimation Results 
In this section, the results of the various estimations carried out are presented and interpreted. 
5.3.1 Diagnostic Tests of Results 
With the data set in this study, three analytical methods were used and these are:  
(i) Pooled  OLS Technique 
(ii) Fixed Effects LSDV Technique 
(iii) Random Effects Technique 
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In order to verify which of these techniques is appropriate for the analysis in this study, the 
three possible techniques were subjected to the Hausman test to ensure that the models are 
devoid of any correlated random cross-sectional effects. However, this study used the FE 
technique. The underlying hypothesis formulated in order to determine whether to use 
Fixed Effect or Random Effect is specified as: 
H0:                 there is no correlated random effect. 
H1:                 there is correlated random effect. 
Var(b) and Var(B) refer to the variances of the fixed effect and random effect respectively. 
The null hypothesis states that there is no correlated random effect which suggests that 
random effect estimates are better than those of fixed effect; while the alternative 
hypothesis states that there is correlated random effect which suggests that fixed effect 
estimates are better than those of random effect in this study.  
However, the estimate of the diagnostic test (Chi-sq = 5.63, Prob = 0.0008) showed that the 
null hypothesis is rejected at 1 percent significant level. Thus, there is no correlated random 
effect in the model. Hence, we conclude that the fixed effect model significantly perform 
better than the random effect as seen in Table 5.7. This indicated that the results from Fixed 
Effects (FE) were more efficient than that of Random Effects (RE). At any rate, given the 
fact that the study had the interest of obtaining country fixed effects that were relevant in 
the second aspect of the estimation, it would have still been appropriate to make a choice in 
favour of FE. Table 5.7 shows the results of the Hausman specification test carried out in 
order to determine which of the fixed effects or random effects is more appropriate to use 
in this study. The results support the use of the fixed effects since we reject the null 
hypothesis that states that there is correlated random effect. In summary, diagnostic tests 
show that there is no random effect; we thus adopt the results from the fixed effect model 
as basis for the interpretation of the relationship between the dependent variable and 
independent variables in the model. 
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Table 5.7: Hausman Specification Test  
                       Coefficients  
                           (b)             (B)                     (b-B)                  
                           FE             RE                 Difference    
     lgdpini   -0.3432096    -0.3287435       -0.0144661         
       lgkap     0.3581586     0.3630029       -0.0048443         
      lssenr    -0.1031496    -0.0765512       -0.0265984         
      lpsenr     0.2130704     0.2293822       -0.0163118         
        llab      0.0479995      0.1783024       -0.1303029         
       lopen    -0.1290892    -0.1018618       -0.0272273         
    lethsion   -0.3481124    -0.3592369        0.0111246         
    lreprisk     0.0879661     0.1198021        -0.031836         
     lpolrig    -0.1203411    -0.1522454        0.0319043         
      ltaxes    -0.1139865     -0.1117163      -0.0022702         
       lnare    -0.0422849     -0.0430707        0.0007858         
       χ2 = 5.63  (0.008) 
Source: Calculated by the Author.  
 
5.3.2 Discussion of Results 
The estimation process, which involved the fitting of the formulated model in the 
previous chapter into data, was carried out in two main aspects. The first aspect of the 
process started with the estimation of Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV). The 
results from the second aspect of the estimation process using the Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) technique as formulated in chapter four are presented afterwards. 
Equation (4.14) which is the growth/institutions/trade liberalization model specified in 
chapter four was estimated. This equation contained institutional and trade liberalization 
variables that influence economic growth. But before these analyses were carried out, the 
panel unit root tests were carried out in order to test if the variables in the growth model 
(equation 4.14) specified in chapter four are stationary or non-stationary.  
The results are presented in Table 5.8. The results in Table 5.8 reveal that all the 
variables except contract intensive money (CIM) used in the growth model are 
statistically significant at 1 percent. CIM is statistically significant at 5 percent. 
Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis that states that all panels contain unit roots. This 
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means that there are no unit roots in the panels of this study, therefore, this implies that at 
least one panel is stationary. The implication of this is that the variables are stationary 
which means that the results obtained from this study is not only possible for the present 
time period but can also be generalized for other time periods. In addition, this means that 
the results obtained from this study are not spurious. 
Table 5.8: Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) Unit Root Test Results at Levels 
Variables Chi-squared Statistic Remark 
Lngrgdp 206.02
***
 (0.0000) Stationary 
Lngdpini 210.01
***
 (0.0000) Stationary 
Lngkap  142.09
***
 (0.0034) Stationary 
Lnssenr 132.43
***
 (0.0086) Stationary 
Lnpsenr 123.02
***
 (0.0000) Stationary 
Lnopen 181.09 
***
 (0.0002) Stationary 
Lnethsion 244.47
***
 (0.0000) Stationary 
Lnreprisk 128.87
***
 (0.0012) Stationary 
Lnpolrig 89.61
*** 
 (0.0084) Stationary 
Lntaxes 88.23
*** 
 (0.0074) Stationary 
Lnnare 166.12
***
 (0.0000) Stationary 
Lnecofre 197.06 
***
(0.0017) Stationary 
Lncim 84.02
**    
 (0.0143) Stationary 
 Number of panels    30 
 Number of periods   26 
 
Source: Estimated by the Author. Probability values are  
displayed in parentheses beside the chi-squared coefficients.
  
Note: 
***
 - significant at 1 percent, 
**
 - significant at 5 percent. 
 
Equations (4.17), (4.18), (4.19), (4.20) and (4.21) in chapter four were estimated to 
obtain the results in Tables 5.9 and 5.10. The estimated model is the 
growth/institutions/trade liberalization equation. The estimations were carried out 
one after the other or one by one. That is, the growth model was estimated in such a 
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way that the impacts of trade liberalization, economic, political and cultural 
institutions were examined in succession one at a time to find the individual impact 
on economic growth. Equation (4.17) was estimated in order to examine the impact 
of trade liberalization on economic growth and the results are presented in regression 
I, then equation (4.18) was estimated in order to examine the impact of economic 
institutions on economic growth and the results are presented in regression II; then 
equation (4.19) was estimated in order to examine the impact of political institutions 
on economic growth, the results are presented in regression III. Thereafter, equation 
(4.20) was estimated in order to examine the impact of cultural institutions on 
economic growth, the results are presented in regression IV and lastly; equation 
(4.21) was estimated in order to examine the impact of the three institutions on 
economic growth, the results are presented in regression V.  
 
The results in Table 5.9 reveal that there is an improvement in the values of the 
adjusted R
2 
for LSDV than that of the pooled OLS. The adjusted R
2 
measures the 
percentage variation of the dependent variable explained by the independent 
variables. The results also showed that the adjusted R
2
 are 0.1722, 0.1724 and 
0.1843 for regressions I, II and III respectively. This suggests that the explanatory 
variables in the model explain about 17.22 percent, 17.24 percent and 18.43 percent 
variations in the dependent variable, Grgdp. The F-stat. probability results showed 
that they are 0.0000, meaning that it is significant at 1 percent. This implies that the 
model is robust, that is, all the independent variables jointly explain the dependent 
variable. However, the low adjusted R
2 
is not unexpected in cross sectional data.   
 
The results in Table 5.9 reveal that Psenr and Ssenr (primary and secondary school 
enrolment - proxies for human capital) are statistically significant at 5 percent in 
regression I but in regression III, only primary school enrolment is statistically 
significant at 5 percent. The coefficients of both Psenr and Ssenr are inelastic, that is, 
the coefficients of Psenr and Ssenr measuring the elasticities are less than one in 
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absolute values in regressions I, II and III: this implies that a one percent change in 
Psenr and Ssenr brings about a less than one percent change in economic growth. 
The gross fixed capital formation (Gkap) is statistically significant at 1 percent in 
regressions I, II and III. It can be deduced from this result that the better the state of 
education in a country, the higher the level of growth in the country. The coefficients 
of Gkap measuring the elasticities are less than one in absolute values in regressions 
I, II and III: this implies that a one percent change in the stock of capital brings about 
a less than one percent change in economic growth. In addition, Psenr, Ssenr and 
Gkap are positively related to economic growth.  
 
As regards employment to population ratio (Lab) is statistically significant at 5 
percent in regressions I and II. However, the coefficients of labour are inelastic, that 
is, the coefficients of Lab measuring the elasticities are less than one in absolute 
values: this implies that a one percent change in labour brings about a less than one 
percent change in economic growth. It is observed in a country that when a high 
number of the population is employed, aggregate output increases and this boosts 
economic growth. With respect to the initial level of GDP (Gdpini), it is statistically 
significant at 1 percent. From theoretical literature, it is expected that the previous 
level of growth is lower than current growth level, that is, a country is expected to 
experience better growth than the previous year. In addition, the coefficients of 
Gdpini measuring the elasticities are less than one in absolute values in regressions I, 
II and III: this implies that a one percent change in Gdpini brings about a less than 
one percent change in economic growth. 
 
Considering Polrig (political rights – proxy for political institutions) in regression 
III, it is observed from the results in Table 5.9 that it is statistically significant at 1 
percent. The implication of this result is that political institutions do have a 
statistically significant influence on economic growth in the selected SSA 
countries. The political situation in a country has a lot to do with economic 
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growth, the better the style of governance in a country, the higher the level of 
growth in the country. A country that is politically stable will attract foreign 
investments and will have a say in the international community. This probably 
explains why the developed countries, for example, the United States of America, 
France and Germany are always in the forefront in the international scene. Some 
of these SSA countries have not had good governance and this have affected their 
growth adversely. This means that a lot still needs to be done to reduce the rate of 
political instability predominant in some of these SSA countries, for example 
Sudan, Mali. This can hinder trade liberalization and growth if not addressed. 
Also, the coefficient of Polrig measuring the elasticity is less than one in absolute 
value: this implies that a one percent change in Polrig brings about a less than one 
percent change in economic growth.  
The results for Reprisk - the proxy for economic institutions were also presented 
in Table 5.9. The coefficient of Reprisk is inelastic, that is, its coefficient 
measuring the elasticity is less than one in absolute value: this implies that a one 
percent change in Reprisk brings about a less than one percent change in 
economic growth. The result also showed that economic institutions do not have a 
significant impact on economic growth in these SSA countries. The implication of 
this is that the SSA countries need to improve on the state of their economies 
since a conducive economic environment boost economic growth. From 
theoretical literature, it is expected that economic institutions have a positive 
impact on economic growth. 
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Table 5.9: Results of the Trade Liberalization/Growth Equation  
DEPENDENT VARIABLE – MEASURE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH (Grgdp) 
VARIABLE        REGRESSION I 
 LSDV                   Pooled OLS   
      REGRESSION II 
 LSDV                  Pooled OLS  
      REGRESSION III 
LSDV                    Pooled OLS                
lGdpini -0.407***   [3.65]   -0.323*** [4.98] 
(0.000)                 (0.000) 
-0.406***[3.64]    -0.330*** [5.06] 
(0.000)                (0.000) 
 -0.408*** [3.69]   -0.315***  [4.84] 
(0.000)                  (0.000)         
lGkap 0.453***  [6.51]      0.372*** [6.12]            
(0.000)                   (0.000) 
0.446***   [6.37]      0.373*** [6.14] 
(0.000)                   (0.000) 
0.489***   [7.01]    0.363***    [5.96] 
(0.000)                     (0.000)      
lSsenr 0.192**     [2.07]      0.085*   [1.93]  
(0.024)                 (0.063) 
0.182*      [1.99]      0.088**    [1.98] 
(0.051)                  (0.046)      
0.299*       [1.87]    0.110*      [1.94] 
(0.062)                     (0.051) 
lPsenr  0.440**  [1.99]      0.216* [1.80] 
 (0.050)                (0.072) 
0.434*     [1.94]     0.225*    [1.87] 
(0.053)                (0.062)  
0.473**     [2.12]       0.221*   [1.85] 
(0.034)                   (0.065)  
lLab 0.719**  [2.25]        0.011* [1.75]  
 (0.018)                  (0.060) 
0.689**     [2.02]      0.011*     [1.75]  
(0.036)                (0.061) 
0.645*    [1.88]       0.012*     [1.96] 
(0.059)                      (0.055) 
lOpen 0.094*    [1.79]        0.082*  [1.68]     
(0.085)                   (0.081)    
0.099*    [1.98]     0.078*** [2.29] 
(0.058)                (0.004) 
0.214**    [2.10]     0.179*       [1.85] 
(0.018)                      (0.095) 
lReprisk               - 0.117*    [1.91]       0.131*    [1.87] 
(0.065)                (0.084)          
   -                                     - 
lPolrig                -  -  0.351***   [3.38]     0.140*     [1.72] 
 (0.001)                      (0.086) 
lEthsion                - -              -                                  - 
lTaxes  0.077*      [1.74]      0.097* [1.92] 
(0.089)                   (0.064)     
0.071**   [2.09]       0.086** [2.08]  
(0.020)                   (0.029)    
0.187*       [1.79]     0.133**   [2.09] 
 (0.096)                       (0.037) 
lNare 0.036*      [1.98]      0.047*** [3.27] 
(0.057)                   (0.001) 
0.036*   [1.98]       0.048*** [3.34] 
(0.058)                  (0.001) 
0.031***    [2.63]      0.043*** [3.07]  
(0.003)                        (0.002)    
Constant 3.362**    [2.65]      0.573*  [1.83] 
(0.014)                    (0.067)  
3.198**  [2.02]       0.407* [1.70] 
(0.035)                  (0.062) 
0.315*    [1.88]       0.927*    [1.89] 
(0.098)                        (0.091) 
R2 
Adjusted R2 
F-stat 
Country 
Dummy 
Countries 
Number of 
Observations 
0.2154                   0.077 
0.1722                   0.068 
4.99 (0.000)           7.36 (0.000)                  
Yes                        No 
 
30                          30 
 
713                        713 
0.2163                  0.079 
0.1724                  0.067 
4.88  (0.000)         6.67  (0.000)                      
Yes                       No  
 
30                         30  
 
713                       713 
0.2281                       0.081 
0.1843                       0.069  
5.23  (0.000)            6.88  (0.000)  
Yes                              No 
 
30                                30 
  
713                              713     
Source: Estimated by the Author. Notes: Regression I are the results for trade liberalization and economic 
growth; regression II are the results for economic institutions and economic growth; regression III are the 
results for political institutions and economic growth respectively. Absolute t statistics are displayed in 
parentheses beside the coefficient estimates while probability values are in brackets under the coefficient 
estimates. * - significant at 10 percent; ** - significant at 5 percent; *** - significant at 1 percent.    
 
The results in regressions I, II and III in Table 5.9 reveal the impact of trade 
liberalization on economic growth. The results show that the degree of openness 
(the measure of trade liberalization) is statistically significant at 5 percent in 
regression III. In addition, the coefficients of the degree of trade openness (Open) 
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measuring the elasticities are less than one in absolute values in regressions I, II 
and III: this implies that a one percent change in the degree of openness brings 
about a less than one percent change in economic growth. Judging from the 
coefficients of the measure of trade liberalization (Open), it can be deduced that in 
the selected SSA countries, the impact of trade is not very pronounced on the 
economies of these countries since most of them are predominantly importing 
nations with little exports to other countries of the world.  
As regards taxes, it has a positive impact on economic growth. The variable is 
statistically significant at 5 percent in regression II. The implication of this result 
is that the revenues generated from taxes needs to be invested into more 
economically viable projects which should be closely monitored in the selected 
SSA countries. Also, the coefficients of taxes measuring the elasticities are less 
than one in absolute values in regressions I, II and III: this implies that a one 
percent change in taxes brings about a less than one percent change in economic 
growth. As for natural resource endowment (Nare), the coefficients of Nare 
measuring the elasticities are less than one in absolute values: this implies that a 
one percent change in Nare brings about a less than one percent change in 
economic growth. In addition, it is statistically significant at 1 percent in 
regression III. From the results, as regards the coefficient estimates of this 
variable, the values of the coefficients are low which means that the governments 
of the selected SSA countries need to harness their natural resources fully so as to 
maximize their benefits to boost economic growth. 
From the results in Table 5.9, it can be deduced from the results that political 
institutions play a significant role in determining the economic growth of the selected 
SSA countries because it is significant at 1 percent. However, there seem to be strong 
political institutions in the SSA countries than economic institutions (evident from the 
coefficients of 0.351 for Polrig and 0.117 for Reprisk in Table 5.9). This is because 
when there is political stability, economic activities take place more than when there 
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is no peace politically. Therefore, for countries to gain from international trade there 
should be strong institutions in place that will ensure that trading activities go on 
smoothly among nations of the world. It also revealed that SSA countries can only 
engage in free trade when they have political and ethnic peace in their economies; so 
as not to endanger the lives and investments of their trading partners. As regards the 
comparison of the LSDV and the Pooled OLS regression results, it is observed from 
the results in Table 5.9 that the LSDV results performed better than the pooled 
regression results in almost all parameter estimates (for example, Gkap, Psenr, Ssenr, 
Lab, Nare).  
 
The results in Table 5.10 reveal that there is an improvement in the values of the 
adjusted R
2 
for LSDV than that of the pooled OLS. The adjusted R
2 
measures the 
percentage variation of the dependent variable explained by the independent variables. 
The results also showed that the adjusted R
2
 are 0.1733 and 0.186 for regressions IV 
and V respectively (higher than 0.074 and 0.077 for the pooled OLS in regressions IV 
and V respectively). This suggests that the explanatory variables in the model explain 
about 17.33 percent and 18.6 percent variations in the dependent variable, Grgdp. The 
F-stat. probability results showed that they are 0.0000, meaning that it is significant at 
1 percent. This implies that the model is robust, that is, all the independent variables 
jointly explain the dependent variable. However, the low adjusted R
2 
is not unexpected 
in cross sectional data. 
Table 5.10 reveals the regression results when the impact of cultural institutions on 
economic growth and the impact of the combination of economic, political and 
cultural institutions on growth were examined. The results are presented in regressions 
IV and V in Table 5.10 respectively. Equation (4.20) in chapter four was estimated to 
obtain the results in regression IV in Table 5.10. In terms of the impact of cultural 
institutions on economic growth, the coefficient of Ethsion measuring the elasticity is 
less than one in absolute value: this implies that a one percent change in Ethsion brings 
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about a less than one percent change in economic growth. Though, the result showed 
that Ethsion has a high coefficient but it is insignificant.  
The implication of the high coefficient of Ethsion is that cultural institutions are 
important in affecting trading activities among countries; a country that has ethnic 
unrest will scare away foreign investors from investing in such a country. When 
investment falls, aggregate output falls, savings will also fall, aggregate income falls 
and hence there will be a low level of economic growth. Quite a number of reasons are 
attributed to the cause of ethnic unrests in some of these SSA countries, these reasons 
include; the issue of land disputes between villages and towns, religious clashes and 
crises that have the influence of external terrorist groups’ sponsorship. For example, 
the ‘Boko Haram’ insurgency in Nigeria that have been causing havoc in the Northern 
part of the country for more than two years is believed to be receiving sponsorship 
from the renowned ‘Al-Qaeda’ terrorist sect, and this have reduced the rate of foreign 
investment in Nigeria. Although in most of these SSA countries, the role of cultural 
institutions have been given little attention because the government have not been able 
to offer a lasting solution to most of these ethnic unrests.   
The results in Table 5.10 also reveal that the degree of openness - Open (measure of 
trade liberalization) is inelastic, that is, its coefficient measuring the elasticity is less 
than one in absolute value: this implies that a one percent change in the degree of 
openness (Open) brings about a less than one percent change in economic growth. 
Also, the coefficient estimate of Open is very low (about 0.075). The implication of 
this result is that trade liberalization have not had a noticeable impact on the level of 
economic growth in the selected SSA countries because most of these countries are 
predominantly import dependent on the advanced Western countries. The volumes of 
their exports are so low that revenue generated in form of foreign exchange is small 
when compared to the payments on imports.  
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Table 5.10: Results for Institutions/Growth Equation 
Dependent Variable - Grgdp  
Variable   REGRESSION IV 
LSDV                      Pooled OLS      
REGRESSION V 
LSDV                Pooled OLS                    
Lgdpini -0.416***  [3.73]     -0.324*** [5.01] 
(0.000)                     (0.000) 
-0.418***  [3.82]     -0.291*** [4.89] 
(0.000)                     (0.000) 
Lgkap 0.445***    [6.39]      0.371*** [6.13] 
(0.000)                  (0.000)       
0.473***    [6.94]      0.344*** [5.89] 
(0.000)                  (0.000)       
Lssenr 0.211*     [1.73]        0.042*    [1.84]  
(0.084)                   (0.090)          
0.301*     [1.89]        0.097*    [1.90]  
(0.059)                   (0.096)          
Lpsenr 0.432*    [1.93]       0.221*   [1.85]  
(0.054)                   (0.065)    
0.457**    [2.07]     0.238**   [1.99]  
(0.039)                   (0.047)    
Llab 0.706**     [2.03]       0.172*  [1.92]  
(0.026)                   (0.070)    
0.634*     [1.88]       0.192**  [2.11]  
(0.063)                   (0.018)    
Lopen 0.075*      [1.96]       0.097*** [2.28] 
(0.077)                     (0.001)     
 
-                        - 
Lreprisk -                        - 0.093*   [1.73]      0.141**   [1.96] 
(0.066)                  (0.048)   
Lpolrig -                           -   0.338***  [3.35]      0.165**     [2.01]  
(0.001)                     (0.044)              
Lethsion -0.843*   [1.91]     -0.332** [2.50] 
(0.090)                    (0.013) 
-0.732**   [1.96]        -0.348*** [2.62] 
(0.048)                      (0.009) 
Ltaxes 0.097*     [1.88]      0.085**   [2.08] 
(0.095)                    (0.028)  
0.199*     [1.81]      0.131**   [1.98] 
(0.071)                    (0.039)  
Lnare 0.038**     [1.99]       0.046***  [3.22]  
(0.046)                   (0.001) 
0.033*      [1.81]       0.050***  [3.86]  
(0.071)                    (0.000) 
Constant 0.145*   [1.91]       0.095**  [1.97] 
(0.060)                   (0.043) 
0.118*   [1.81]        0.191*   [1.84] 
(0.080)                   (0.088) 
R2 
Adjusted R2 
F-stat 
Country Dummy 
Countries 
Number of 
Observations 
0.2171                     0.085                
0.1733                     0.074 
4.91 (0.000)           7.28  (0.000)  
Yes                        No       
30                          30 
 
713                        713  
0.230                     0.090                
0.186                     0.077 
5.17 (0.000)           6.98  (0.000)  
Yes                        No       
30                          30 
 
713                        713  
Source: Estimated by the Author. Notes: Regression IV are the results for cultural institutions and economic 
growth; regression V are the results for institutions and economic growth. Absolute t statistics are displayed in 
parentheses beside the coefficient estimates while probability values are in brackets under the coefficient estimates. 
* - significant at 10 percent; ** - significant at 5 percent; *** - significant at 1 percent. 
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As regards the result of taxes in Table 5.10, its coefficient measuring the elasticity is 
less than one in absolute value: this implies that a one percent change in taxes brings 
about a less than one percent change in economic growth. In addition, the coefficient 
of the variable is low (about 9.7 percent). The implication of this result is that taxes do 
not have a significant impact on the level of economic growth in the selected SSA 
countries revenues generated which means that the governments of these SSA 
countries have to judiciously utilize the revenues from taxes by channeling the funds 
into economically viable projects. Considering the result of natural resource 
endowment (Nare), its coefficient is inelastic, that is, its coefficient measuring the 
elasticity is less than one in absolute value: this implies that a one percent change in 
Nare brings about a less than one percent change in economic growth. In addition, the 
coefficient estimate shows that it has about 3.8 percent impact on economic growth, 
this is very low. This implies that the governments of the selected SSA countries need 
to harness their natural resources fully so as to maximize their benefits to boost 
economic growth. However, it is statistically significant at 5 percent in regression IV.  
 
In examining the impact of economic, political and cultural institutions on economic 
growth, equation (4.21) in chapter four was estimated to obtain the results in 
regression V in Table 5.10. The model contained only the institutional variables 
excluding the trade liberalization variable. The results showed that in terms of the 
magnitude of the coefficients, cultural institutions have a higher impact on economic 
growth than political and cultural institutions (73.2 percent, 33.8 percent and 9.3 
percent for Ethsion, Polrig and Reprisk respectively). Thus, based on these results, it 
can be inferred that cultural institutions exert a greater impact on economic growth 
than political and economic institutions in the selected SSA countries. In addition, 
Polrig and Ethsion are statistically significant at 1 percent and 5 percent respectively.  
However, the three institutional variables are inelastic, that is, their coefficients 
measuring the elasticities are less than one in absolute values: this implies that a one 
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percent change in institutions brings about a less than one percent change in economic 
growth.  
In addition, the results in regression V in Table 5.10 reveal that the institutional 
variables have significant impact on economic growth. However, comparing this result 
with that of regression I in Table 5.9, the adjusted R
2
 for the impact of institutions on 
economic growth is higher than that of the impact of trade liberalization on economic 
growth with values of 0.186 and 0.1722 respectively. This implies that institutions 
exert more impact on economic growth than trade liberalization in the selected SSA 
countries. This implies that the selected SSA countries can experience higher growth 
rates when their institutions are strong. As earlier stated, these SSA countries have not 
been able to maximize the benefits from trade liberalization and this has affected their 
levels of growth adversely. In terms of the comparison of the LSDV and the Pooled 
OLS regression results in Table 5.10, the LSDV results performed better than the 
pooled regression results in almost all parameter estimates (for example, Gkap, Psenr, 
Ssenr, Lab, Ethsion, Taxes). 
 
Equation (4.14) was estimated to obtain the results in Table 5.11. The estimated model 
is the growth/institutions/trade liberalization model. The results in Table 5.11 reveal 
that there is an improvement in the values of the adjusted R
2 
for LSDV than that of the 
pooled OLS. The adjusted R
2 
measures the percentage variation of the dependent 
variable explained by the independent variables. The results also showed that the 
adjusted R
2
 are 0.184 and 0.078 for LSDV and the pooled OLS respectively. This 
suggests that the explanatory variables in the model explain about 18.4 percent 
variation in the dependent variable, Grgdp. The F-stat. probability results showed that 
they are 0.0000, meaning that it is significant at 1 percent. This implies that the model 
is robust, that is, all the independent variables jointly explain the dependent variable. 
However, the low adjusted R
2 
is not unexpected in cross sectional data. 
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Table 5.11: Results for the Overall Growth Model 
Dependent Variable - Grgdp  
Variable LSDV                      Pooled OLS      
Lgdpini -0.415***  [3.75]     -0.322*** [4.95] 
(0.000)                     (0.000) 
Lgkap 0.476***    [6.75]      0.362*** [5.98] 
(0.000)                  (0.000)       
Lssenr 0.304*     [1.99]        0.071*    [1.91]  
(0.059)                   (0.063)          
Lpsenr 0.461**   [2.07]       0.237** [1.98]  
(0.039)                   (0.048)    
Llab 0.611*     [1.75]       0.209*  [1.88]  
(0.080)                   (0.080)    
Lopen 0.023*      [1.97]       0.091** [2.41] 
(0.067)                     (0.026)     
 
Lreprisk 0.092*      [1.92]       0.132*   [1.88] 
(0.073)                  (0.081) 
Lpolrig 0.342***  [3.29]       0.164**   [2.00]  
(0.001)                    (0.045)    
Lethsion -0.744**   [2.07]     -0.362*** [2.71] 
(0.044)                    (0.007) 
Ltaxes 0.198*     [1.86]      0.114***  [2.27] 
(0.074)                    (0.004)  
Lnare 0.033*     [1.91]       0.044***  [3.04]  
(0.087)                   (0.002) 
Constant 2.069*   [1.79]       0.297**  [1.92] 
(0.098)                   (0.027) 
R2 
Adjusted R2 
F-stat 
Country Dummy 
Countries 
Number of Observations 
0.230                     0.092                
0.184                     0.078 
5.02 (0.000)           6.46  (0.000)  
Yes                        No       
30                          30 
713                        713  
Source: Estimated by the Author. Notes: Gkap, Lab, Ssenr and Psenr are proxies for employment to 
population ratio, capital or investment and human capital respectively. Absolute t statistics are displayed in 
parentheses beside the coefficient estimates while probability values are in brackets under the coefficient 
estimates. LSDV- Least Square Dummy Variable, OLS – Ordinary Least Square. * - significant at 10 
percent; ** - significant at 5 percent; *** - significant at 1 percent. 
 
The results in Table 5.11 reveal that Gkap (gross fixed capital formation), initial level 
of growth (Gdpini) and political rights (proxy for political institutions are statistically 
significant at 1 percent, while Psenr (primary school enrolment – proxy for human 
Page | 151  
 
capital) and ethnic tensions (proxy for cultural institutions) are statistically significant 
at 5 percent. In addition, all the coefficients of the explanatory variables are inelastic, 
that is, their coefficients measuring elasticities are less than one in absolute values: this 
implies that a one percent change in Gkap, Gdpini, Psenr and Ethsion brings about a 
less than one percent change in economic growth respectively. It can be deduced from 
the results that political and cultural institutions have statistically significant impact on 
economic growth in the selected SSA countries. This supports the empirical findings 
of Alonso and Garcimartin (2009) who opined that strong political and cultural 
institutions exert a negative impact on economic growth.  
 
The initial level of GDP (Gdpini) according to theory has a negative relationship 
with economic growth. The implication of this is that, ceteris paribus, a country is 
expected to be experiencing higher growth rate every succeeding year. But this 
may not be totally true for the sampled SSA countries as some of them are not 
experiencing the growth they are supposed to, due to many militating factors such 
as economic and political insecurity, high inflation rate and so on. In addition, the 
degree of openness (the measure of trade liberalization), Ssenr (secondary school 
enrolment – proxy for human capital), repudiation risk (proxy for economic 
institutions), taxes, natural resource endowment, employment to population ratio 
(Lab) are not very significant. The result of taxes did not support the findings of 
Alonso and Garcimartin (2009), who believed that taxes have a significant impact 
on economic growth. The value of the coefficient of the trade liberalization 
variable buttressed the earlier assertion that trade have not contributed 
significantly to economic growth in the selected SSA countries due to the fact that 
most of these countries are predominantly importing nations with little exports to 
other countries of the world. In addition, the comparison of the LSDV and the 
pooled OLS regression results in Table 5.11 show the LSDV results performed 
better than the pooled regression results in almost all parameter estimates (for 
example, Gkap, Psenr, Ssenr, Lab, Polrig, Taxes). 
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Equations (4.22), (4.23) and (4.24) in chapter four were estimated to obtain the 
results in Table 5.12. The estimations were carried out one after the other. 
Equation (4.22) was estimated in order to examine the interaction effect between 
trade liberalization and economic institutions and the results are presented in 
regression I. Equation (4.23) was estimated in order to examine the interaction 
effect between trade liberalization and political institutions and the results are 
presented in regression II. And lastly equation (4.24) was estimated in order to 
examine the interaction effect between trade liberalization and cultural institutions 
and the results are presented in regression III. 
The results in Table 5.12 reveal that there is an improvement in the values of the 
adjusted R
2 
for LSDV than that of the pooled OLS. The adjusted R
2 
measures the 
percentage variation of the dependent variable explained by the independent 
variables. The results also show that the adjusted R
2
 are 0.171, 0.175 and 0.174 in 
regressions I, II and III for LSDV respectively. While the results of the pooled 
OLS are 0.067, 0.067 and 0.077 in regressions I, II and III respectively. This 
suggests that the explanatory variables in the model explain about 17.1, 17.5 and 
17.4 percent variations in the dependent variable, Grgdp. The F-stat. probability 
results showed that they are 0.0000, meaning that it is significant at 1 percent. 
This implies that the model is robust, that is, all the independent variables jointly 
explain the dependent variable. However, the low adjusted R
2 
is not unexpected in 
cross sectional data. 
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Table 5.12: Interaction Effect Estimation Results  
DEPENDENT VARIABLE – MEASURE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH (Grgdp)                                                                              
VARIABLE REGRESSION I 
 LSDV                   Pooled OLS   
REGRESSION II 
 LSDV                  Pooled OLS  
REGRESSION III 
LSDV                 Pooled OLS                
lGdpini -0.285*** [2.77]   -0.239*** [4.15] 
(0.006)                 (0.000) 
-0.283***[2.75]    -0.244*** [4.19] 
(0.006)                (0.000) 
-0.293***[2.76]   -0.264***  [4.21] 
(0.006)               (0.000)         
lGkap 0.383***  [6.09]      0.286*** [5.22]            
(0.000)                   (0.000) 
0.381***   [6.05]      0.290*** [5.25] 
(0.000)                   (0.000) 
0.391***[6.06]     0.294***    [5.26] 
(0.000)                  (0.000)      
lSsenr 0.293**     [1.83]      0.097*   [1.69]  
(0.068)                 (0.098) 
0.284*      [1.78]      0.094**    [2.25] 
(0.076)                  (0.011)      
0.294*    [1.79]     0.097**     [2.26] 
(0.077)                 (0.011) 
lPsenr  0.477**  [2.14]      0.253** [2.12] 
 (0.033)                (0.035) 
0.469*     [2.11]     0.252**    [2.11] 
(0.036)                (0.035)  
0.489** [2.12]      0.262**   [2.14] 
(0.038)                (0.036)  
lLab 0.256**  [2.59]        0.401*** [2.84]  
 (0.021)                  (0.001) 
0.588***   [2.52]      0.199***  [2.84]  
(0.001)                (0.003) 
0.598*** [2.53]     0.189***    [2.85] 
(0.002)                  (0.003) 
lOpen 0.033*    [1.63]        0.013**  [2.19]     
(0.094)                   (0.022)    
0.060*    [1.71]     0.056*    [1.74] 
(0.092)                (0.085) 
0.062*  [1.73]        0.058*      [1.76] 
(0.093)                   (0.086) 
lReprisk 0.047*  [1.77]        0.185*  [2.11] 
(0.088)                 (0.068)    
0.124**    [2.26]      0.251**    [2.23] 
(0.037)                 (0.021)          
0.134**   [2.06]     0.271**   [2.24]  
(0.038)                  (0.023)             
lPolrig 0.347*** [3.45]      0.189**  [2.34] 
(0.001)                  (0.019)     
0.350***  [3.47]      0.190**  [2.35] 
(0.001)                    (0.019)   
0.360***   [3.48]     0.194**    [2.36] 
 (0.001)                  (0.019) 
lEthsion -0.792** [2.23]     -0.357***[2.67] 
 (0.020)                 (0.008) 
-0.816***  [2.27]     -0.356*** [2.68] 
(0.005)                    (0.008)        
-0.826***   [2.28]   -0.376***  [2.69] 
 (0.006)                   (0.009) 
lTaxes  0.326*      [2.54]      0.122*  [1.86] 
(0.023)                   (0.075)     
0.224**   [2.53]       0.118*     [1.81]  
(0.026)                   (0.090)    
0.244**      [2.34]      0.128*    [1.83] 
(0.028)                    (0.092) 
lNare 0.034**     [1.80]      0.049*** [3.52] 
(0.073)                   (0.000) 
0.033*   [1.76]       0.048*** [3.52] 
(0.080)                  (0.000) 
0.043*       [1.77]       0.058*** [3.53]  
(0.080)                     (0.000)    
Open*Reprisk -0.208**  [2.65]     -0.035*  [1.90] 
(0.014)                  (0.067) 
      -                           -     -                                 - 
Open*Polrig -                        -       0.207*  [1.96]      0.323**  [2.03] 
(0.092)                 (0.047)   
    -                                 - 
Open*Ethsion     -                             -  -                       - 0.370*    [1.74]         0.252** [2.06] 
(0.094)                      (0.048)  
Constant 8.413**  [2.09]      2.116**  [2.08] 
(0.030)                    (0.033)  
0.435**  [2.09]      2.157*** [2.11] 
(0.026)                  (0.009) 
0.445**   [2.11]       2.159***   [2.13] 
(0.028)                      (0.008) 
R2 
Adjusted R2 
F-stat 
Country 
Dummy 
No of 
Countries 
Number of 
Observations 
0.219                     0.082 
0.171                     0.067 
4.60 (0.000)           5.25 (0.000)                  
Yes                        No 
 
 
30                          30 
 
715                        715 
0.219                    0.083 
0.175                    0.067 
4.59  (0.000)         5.28  (0.000)                      
Yes                       No  
 
 
30                         30  
 
715                       715 
0.221                         0.093 
0.174                         0.077  
4.59  (0.000)               5.28  (0.000)  
Yes                              No 
 
 
30                                30 
  
715                              715     
Source: Estimated by the Author. Notes: Regression I are the results for the interaction effect of trade 
liberalization and economic institutions; regression II are the results for the interaction effect of trade 
liberalization and political institutions; regression III are the results for the interaction effect of trade 
liberalization and cultural institutions respectively. * - significant at 10 percent; ** - significant at 5 percent; 
*** - significant at 1 percent. 
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The results in Table 5.12 also reveal that Gkap (gross fixed capital formation), 
initial level of growth (Gdpini) and political rights (proxy for political 
institutions) are statistically significant at 1 percent, while Ssenr and Psenr 
(secondary and primary school enrolments – proxies for human capital), ethnic 
tensions (proxy for cultural institutions), employment to population ratio (the 
measure of labour) and natural resource endowment are statistically significant at 
5 percent in regression I. While the results in regressions II and III show that 
Gkap (gross fixed capital formation), initial level of growth (Gdpini), employment 
to population ratio (the measure of labour), political rights (proxy for political 
institutions), ethnic tensions (proxy for cultural institutions) are statistically 
significant at 1 percent, while repudiation risk (proxy for economic institutions) 
and taxes are statistically significant at 5 percent. In addition, Psenr is statistically 
significant at 5 percent in regression III. In addition, the coefficients of the 
explanatory variables are inelastic, that is, their coefficients measuring the 
elasticities are less than one in absolute values: this implies that a one percent 
change in the respective variables brings about a less than one percent change in 
economic growth.   
It is also observed from the results in Table 5.12 that the coefficient of 
Open*Reprisk is -0.208 while the coefficients of Open*Polrig and Open*Ethsion 
are 0.207 and 0.370 respectively. This implies that the interaction effect between 
trade liberalization and economic institutions is lower than that of trade 
liberalization and political and cultural institutions. Therefore, it can be inferred 
that the impact of trade liberalization on economic growth is more pronounced 
when strong political and cultural institutions are involved; and seems to be less 
pronounced when strong economic institutions are involved. Also, since the 
results of the interactions between trade liberalization and political institutions are 
not too far from the interaction effect between trade liberalization and cultural 
institutions, it can be concluded that both political and cultural institutions are 
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important. Hence, there is a need for the SSA countries to develop institutions 
generally whether political, cultural and economic.     
The implication of this interaction effects between trade liberalization and 
institutions is that international trade in the selected SSA countries has more 
benefits on the economy when strong political and cultural institutions are in 
place than strong economic institutions. The political stability of the SSA 
countries encourage trading activities to take place among the countries and with 
other countries of the world. The results in Table 5.12 also reveal that the political 
institutions variable, Polrig (political rights) is statistically significant at 1 percent 
in regressions I, II and III, but the coefficient is higher in regression III than in 
regressions I and II, this implies a higher impact on economic growth (36.0 
percent in regression III as against 35.0 percent in regression II and 34.7 percent 
in regression I). In terms of the cultural institutions variable, Ethsion is 
statistically significant at 5 percent in regression I and statistically significant at 1 
percent in regressions II and III, but its coefficient is higher in regression III than 
in regressions I and II which implies a higher impact on economic growth (82.6 
percent in regression III as against 81.6 percent in regression II and 79.2 percent 
in regression I).  
In terms of the economic institutions variable, Reprisk is statistically significant at 
5 percent in regressions II and III. But it had a higher coefficient in regression III 
than regression II (13.4 percent in regression III and 12.4 percent in regression II). 
The results in Table 5.12 also reveal that the trade liberalization variable, (degree 
of openness) had a higher coefficient estimate in regression III than in regressions 
I and II (6.2 percent in regression III, 6.0 percent in regression II and 3.3 percent 
in regression I). From the foregoing results, therefore, it is not out of place to say 
that for trade liberalization to have a noticeable impact on economic growth in 
these SSA countries, there has to be strong economic, political and cultural 
institutions in place so that these countries will be able to compete with the 
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developed countries of the world and will not remain tied to the ‘apron strings’ of 
these developed countries for a long period of time. 
The second aspect of the estimation process involved the Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) regression analysis. Equation (4.27) specified in chapter four 
was estimated and the results are presented in Table 5.13.  
The system GMM estimator is categorized into the one-step and two-step options, 
these are reported in columns 2 and 3 respectively. The Pooled Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) and the Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) results are reported 
in columns 1 and 4 respectively. The results in Table 5.13 begin with some 
diagnostic tests. The starting point is based on the assumption that, the individual 
errors are serially uncorrelated for the system GMM estimators for consistent 
estimations. The presence of autocorrelation will indicate that lags of the 
dependent variable (and any other variables used as instruments that are not 
strictly exogenous), are in fact endogenous, hence bad instruments. Arellano and 
Bond (2001) develop a test for this phenomenon that would potentially render 
some lags invalid as instruments. Of course, the full disturbance     is presumed 
autocorrelated because it contains fixed effects, and the estimators are designed to 
eliminate this source of trouble.  
 
The Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation is applied to the differenced residuals 
in order to purge the unobserved and perfectly autocorrelated individual errors. 
These results are reported as AR(1), AR(2) and AR(3) in the lower portion of 
Table 5.13. The AR(1) is the only one out of the three that the result is valuable 
and useful in determining the validity of the estimates. According to theory, the 
AR(1) should be significant at 5 percent, but it is not mandatory that AR(2) and 
AR(3) should be significant, although if they are significant it adds to the validity 
of the estimates. The null hypothesis here that                     for k = 1, 2 
and 3 is rejected at a level of 5 percent if p     . This null hypothesis implies 
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that the standard errors are consistent If    are serially uncorrelated, then the null 
hypothesis of no serial correlation will be rejected at AR(1) but not at higher 
orders. In Table 5.13, it can be concluded that there is no evidence of serial 
correlation at 1 percent level of significance since AR(1) is significant in the one-
step and two-step GMM. Given these results, the estimates can be regarded as 
consistent. 
 
          Table 5.13: GMM Results of the Growth Model 
Dependent Variable – Grgdp 
                                                                                SYSTEM-GMM                                            
Regressors                        Pooled OLS                One-step                  Two-step                LSDV  
                                                                             Collapsed                Collapsed 
(1)                             (2)                              (3)                          (4)            
LGrgdp(-1)                             -               0.265*** (0.000)         0.197***  (0.000)                  -                                       
LLab                      0.021*    (0.080)        0.436**  (0.045)          1.380*   (0.072)            0.611*   (0.080)  
LGkap                   0.362***  (0.000)        0.159*   (0.083)          0.140**  (0.037)          0.476***  (0.000) 
LSsenr                    0.071*    (0.063)        0.073**  (0.045)         0.160**  (0.040)           0.304*     (0.059) 
LnPsenr                  0.237**  (0.048)         0.279*   (0.067)          0.118**  (0.048)           0.461**    (0.039) 
LOpen                    0.091**  (0.026)           0.057**  (0.011)        0.076**   (0.034)          0.023*      (0.067) 
LPolrig                   0.164**  (0.045)           0.291**  (0.026)        0.235**  (0.029)           0.342***   (0.001) 
LReprisk                0.132**  (0.081)           0.047**  (0.028)         0.088*  (0.070)            0.092*     (0.073)   
LEthsion               -0.362*** (0.007)          -0.375** (0.038)         -0.483***(0.003)          -0.744**    (0.044) 
LTaxes                   0.114*** (0.004)           0.219**  (0.042)         0.098**  (0.040)           0.198*     (0.074) 
LNare                     0.044***  (0.002)         0.024*    (0.055)         0.040*   (0.056)           0.033*     (0.087) 
Constant                 0.297**   (0.027)        -3.716*** (0.006)       -8.260*** (0.006)           2.069*     (0.098)    
No. of Instruments              -                           30                                30                     -                                                                                                                
Country Effects                 No                         No                                No                  Yes 
F-stat (Wald χ2 )             -                               66.41                         1849.28                  - 
F-stat (p-value)              [0.000]                      [0.000]                        [0.000]             [0.000] 
AR(1)                               -                              [0.000]                        [0.001]                  -  
AR(2)                               -                              [0.957]                        [0.761]                  -   
AR(3)                               -                                 -                               [0.531]                  - 
No of Observations         713                            605                              605                    713 
Sargan Test (OIR)            -                             [0.023]                        [0.023]                   - 
Hansen Test (OIR)           -                                 -                              [0.528]                   - 
Number of Countries        30                           30                                 30                      30 
Source: Estimated by the Author. Notes: The standard errors are robust and consistent in the 
presence of any pattern of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Robust standard errors are with 
Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample correction for the two-step covariance matrix which are reported 
in braces. Probability values are in parenthesis. 
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The next diagnostic test is a test of over-identifying restrictions of whether the 
instruments, as a group, appear exogenous. This test of instrument validity has to 
do with a comparison of the number of instruments used in each case and the 
related number of parameters. It is implemented by the Sargan and Hansen J tests. 
The Sargan and Hansen J tests are used to test if the instruments as a group are 
exogenous. The test is carried out in order to either accept or reject the null 
hypothesis that states that the instruments as a group are exogenous. The higher 
the p-value of the Sargan statistic, the better. 
 
For one-step, non-robust estimation, the Sargan statistic which is the minimized 
value of the one-step GMM criterion function, is applicable. The Sargan statistic 
in this case is, however, not robust to autocorrelation. So for one-step, robust 
estimation (and for all two-step estimation), the xtabond2 (STATA command) 
also reports the Hansen J statistic, which is the minimized value of the two-step 
GMM criterion function, and is robust to autocorrelation. In addition, xtabond2 
still reports the Sargan statistic in these cases because the Hansen J test has its 
own problem: it can be greatly weakened by instrument proliferation. Only the 
respective p-values are reported for this test results in the lower part of Table 
5.13. Here, the null hypothesis that the population moment condition is valid is 
not rejected if         The summary statistics indicate that the one-step and 
two-step system GMM dynamic panel models of the selected 30 SSA countries 
have 30 instruments and 11 parameters each. This represents a total of 19 over-
identifying restrictions in each case. The number of instruments satisfies the rule 
that says that the number of instruments should be less or equal to the number of 
groups. In this study, we have thirty sampled countries. In both specifications, the 
Hansen–J statistic does not reject the over-identifying restrictions (OIR), thus 
confirming that the instrument set can be considered valid. The Sargan test is 
significant at 5 percent. 
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The F-stat. is the small-sample counterpart of the Wald (Chi-square) statistic and 
it is a measure of the overall significance of the estimated models and the values 
here in each of the specifications are considerably not satisfactory because the 
result in each case is not significant at 1 and 5 percents. This, of course is 
indicative that all the exogenous variables do not jointly explain significantly, the 
economic growth process across the sampled SSA countries over the study period. 
 
With respect to the results of the measures of the stock of capital and labour 
(gross fixed capital formation and employment to population ratio respectively); 
the stock of capital and labour are statistically significant at 5 percent in the two-
step and one-step system GMM respectively. Also, the coefficients of Gkap and 
Lab measuring the elasticities are less than one in absolute values: this implies 
that a one percent change in the stock of capital and labour brings about a less 
than one percent change in economic growth respectively. The results also 
indicate that the lagged growth value (first lag – Grgdpt-1) is statistically 
significant at 1 percent across the sampled SSA countries. The implication of this 
result is that past realizations of economic growth do produce some significant 
impact on the current level of economic growth.  
Secondary and primary school enrolments – proxies for education produced some 
very interesting results in the system GMM. One striking observation here is that 
education produced a positive impact on economic growth across the sampled 
countries over the study period. This variable is also statistically significant at the 
5 percent level in the collapsed one-step and two–step system GMM options. In 
more definite terms, a one percent change in secondary and primary school 
enrolment under the one-step and two–step system GMM estimates brings about a 
less than one percent change in economic growth across the study group 
respectively. Education is expected to have a positive impact on economic growth 
in the selected SSA countries. Theoretically, the implication of this result is 
education has a great impact on economic growth in the selected SSA countries. 
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The more educated the citizens of the countries are, the higher growth these 
countries experience, ceteris paribus. The coefficient of employment to 
population ratio (Lab) is inelastic, that is, its coefficient measuring the elasticity is 
less than one in absolute value: this implies that a one percent change in labour 
brings about a less than one percent change in economic growth. The coefficient 
estimate of this variable implies that labour does significantly contribute to 
economic growth in the selected SSA countries. The implication of this is that 
when labour increases, aggregate output increases and hence an improvement in 
the level of economic growth.  
Surprisingly, capital input (gross fixed capital formation) is statistically 
significant at 5 percent when the two-step system GMM with collapsed 
instrument options is considered. Capital input in this sense turns out to be a 
major consideration in driving economic growth in the sampled SSA economies. 
Though, some of these SSA countries are still relatively characterized with the 
dominance of the labour intensive sectors in most SSA economies but inspite of 
this, there are huge capital investments in these countries. In terms of the trade 
liberalization variable – degree of openness (Open), it is statistically significant at 
5 percent in both the one-step and two-step system GMM. From the result, the 
coefficient of the degree of openness under both the one-step and two–step system 
GMM is inelastic, that is, the coefficient of Open measuring the elasticity is less 
than one in absolute value across the study group: this implies that a one percent 
change in the degree of trade openness brings about a less than one percent 
change in economic growth. In addition, the coefficient estimates are low (0.057 
and 0.076 in one-step and two-step system GMM respectively), this means that 
trade liberalization does not have a noticeable impact on the economic growth of 
the selected SSA countries. 
 
In terms of the influence of economic institutions on economic growth, the result 
of repudiation risk (Reprisk) shows that it is statistically significant at 5 percent in 
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the one-step system GMM. From the result, the coefficient repudiation risk under 
both the one-step and two–step system GMM is inelastic, that is, the coefficient of 
Reprisk measuring the elasticity is less than one in absolute value across the study 
group: this implies that a one percent change in repudiation risk brings about a 
less than one percent change in economic growth across the study group. It can be 
deduced from this result that economic institutions affect economic growth 
positively in the selected SSA countries. In terms of cultural institutions, the result 
for ethnic tensions (Ethsion) reveals that it is statistically significant at 1 percent 
under the two-step system GMM and significant at 5 percent under the one-step 
system GMM. From the coefficient estimates, the impact of Ethsion on economic 
growth is fairly large. This may be due to the fact that some of these SSA 
countries e.g. Sudan, Nigeria had been plagued with ethnic crises which have 
hindered trade liberalization and economic growth. However, the coefficient of 
Ethsion is inelastic, that is, its coefficient measuring the elasticity is less than one 
in absolute value in columns 2 and 3 in Table 5.13: this implies that a one percent 
change in Ethsion brings about a less than one percent change in economic 
growth.   
 
Furthermore, the political institutions variable – political rights (Polrig) is 
statistically significant at 5 percent in columns 2 and 3 across the sampled 
countries over the study period. What this finding suggests is that, political 
institutions have a positive impact on economic growth in the selected SSA 
countries but this is not pronounced as the levels of economic growth is low in 
these countries. This result does not conform to the findings of Bhattacharyya 
(2011) who asserted that political institutions have a negative impact on growth. 
From the result in Table 5.13, the coefficient of Polrig is inelastic, that is, its 
coefficient measuring the elasticity is less than one in absolute value under the 
two–step system GMM estimates across the study group: this implies that a one 
percent change in Polrig brings about a less than one percent change in economic 
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growth. Generally, the results in Table 5.13 depict that trade liberalization and 
institutions have significant impacts on economic growth in the selected SSA 
countries covered in this study, but in terms of coefficient estimates of the 
variables, trade liberalization had the higher impact on growth. 
 
With respect to natural resource endowment (Nare), one of the explanatory 
variables, the result reveals that the coefficient of Nare is inelastic, that is, its 
coefficient measuring the elasticity is less than one in absolute value under both 
the one-step and two–step system GMM estimates across the study group: this 
implies that a one percent change in natural resource endowment brings about a 
less than one percent change in economic growth. It is also observed that the 
coefficient estimates of Nare are very small (2.4 percent under one-step and 4 
percent under two-step system GMM). The implication of this is that the revenue 
earned from the export of natural resources have not been properly utilized in the 
selected SSA countries hence they have not experienced the expected growth.  
 
Finally, concerning the variable - taxes, its coefficient is inelastic, that is, its 
coefficient measuring the elasticity is less than one in absolute value: this implies 
that a one percent change in taxes brings about a less than one percent change in 
economic growth. The variable is statistically significant at 5 percent under both 
the one-step and two–step system GMM estimates across the study group. In 
terms of the coefficient estimates of taxes, they are low in columns 2 and 3, the 
implication of this is that the revenue generated from taxes in the sampled SSA 
countries may not have been channeled to viable economic projects that will 
contribute to economic growth but rather some corrupt government officials in 
charge of the collection of taxes in the tax office may have misappropriated the 
funds. 
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In addition, apart from providing some additional robustness check, the results in 
columns 1 and 4 provide a guide based on the position of Bond, Hoeffler and 
Temple (2001) that suggests the pooled OLS and the LSDV estimators should be 
considered as the upper and lower bound  respectively for the system GMM 
coefficients. With this guide in place, it will be easy to tell when each coefficient 
estimate is either downward or upward biased. Repudiation risk (proxy for 
economic institutions), Ethsion (proxy for cultural institutions), degree of 
openness (the measure of trade liberalization) and natural resource endowment are 
the only variables that have their pooled OLS and LSDV values as upper and 
lower bound respectively, the other variables did not fulfil this criterion. It is 
evident from the results in Table 5.13 that most of the coefficient estimates are 
downward biased. 
 
5.4 Robustness of Results 
The robustness check on the results of this study is imperative so as to verify what 
happens to the results when the researcher adds some new variables into the 
model, are the results actually better or will they be indifferent from the results 
already obtained. Equation (4.16) specified in chapter four was estimated to get 
the results in Table 5.14.The study added three new explanatory variables into the 
growth model. These explanatory variables are foreign direct investment (measure 
of trade liberalization), contract intensive money (proxy for political institutions) 
and economic freedom (proxy for economic institutions). These three explanatory 
variables were described in chapter four. 
The results in Table 5.14 reveal that the adjusted R
2
 is 0.185 which is just about 
0.001 different from 0.184 which is the value of the adjusted R
2
 in Table 5.11.  
Since the difference in the values of the adjusted R
2
 of the growth model and that 
of the model for the robustness check is just 0.001, thus, it can be concluded that 
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the results obtained earlier on are reliable. Finally, in terms of the comparison of 
the LSDV and the Pooled OLS regression results in Table 5.14, it is observed that 
the LSDV results performed better than the pooled regression results in almost all 
parameter estimates (for example, Gkap, Psenr, Ssenr, Lab, Reprisk, Ecofre). 
Also, there is an improvement in the values of the adjusted R
2 
for LSDV than that 
of the pooled OLS (0.185 for LSDV and 0.079 for Pooled OLS). The F-stat. 
probability results showed that they are 0.0000, meaning that it is significant at 1 
percent. This implies that the model is robust, that is, all the independent variables 
jointly explain the dependent variable. However, the low adjusted R
2 
is not 
unexpected in cross sectional data. 
The first estimation process started with the LSDV as presented in Table 5.14. 
The LSDV results indicated that all the eleven explanatory variables have their 
coefficients measuring the elasticities less than one in absolute values: this 
implies that a one percent change in the respective variables brings about a less 
than one percent change in the economic growth. Gdpini (initial level of growth), 
Gkap (gross fixed capital formation – the measure of stock of capital) and Ssenr 
(secondary school enrolment - proxy for human capital) were statistically 
significant at 1 percent. While Polrig (proxy for political institutions), Open 
(degree of openness – the measure of trade liberalization), Taxes, Ethsion (ethnic 
tensions - proxy for cultural institutions) and Ecofre (proxy for economic 
freedom) were statistically significant at 5 percent. 
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Table 5.14: Robustness Check Results  
DEPENDENT VARIABLE - Grgdp  
VARIABLE LSDV                             Pooled OLS 
Lgdpini -0.450***   [4.05]              -0.380***  [5.84] 
(0.000)                               (0.000)   
Lgkap 0.459***    [6.26]                0.351***   [5.68] 
(0.000)                            (0.000) 
Lssenr 0.273***    [2.63]                0.114**    [2.15] 
(0.003)                            (0.049) 
Lpsenr 0.266*      [1.88]              0.062**   [2.50]     
(0.081)                            (0.017) 
Llab 0.350*       [1.99]                0.082**   [2.33] 
(0.053)                           (0.038) 
Lopen 0.052**     [2.36]                0.175**   [2.21] 
(0.015)                               (0.027) 
Lreprisk 0.082*       [2.22]                0.057**   [2.05] 
(0.061)                           (0.050) 
Lpolrig 0.260**    [2.37]                 0.138***  [2.64] 
(0.018)                               (0.002) 
Lethsion -0.025**   [1.94]                -0.320**   [2.32] 
(0.070)                               (0.021) 
Ltaxes 0.012**    [2.08]                 0.102**   [1.98] 
(0.036)                               (0.068) 
Lnare 0.033*     [1.65]                 0.055***  [3.62] 
(0.099)                              (0.000) 
Lfdi 0.022*    [1.85]                  0.078***  [3.79] 
(0.096)                              (0.000) 
Lcim 0.033*    [1.96]                  0.039**    [2.07] 
(0.079)                              (0.030) 
Lecofre 0.141**   [2.19]                 0.102**    [1.95] 
(0.036)                              (0.044) 
Constant 3.119**   [2.43]                 2.626*     [1.73] 
(0.027)                              (0.084) 
R2 
Adjusted R2 
F-stat 
Time Dummy 
Country Dummy 
Countries 
Number of Observations 
0.233                              0.093 
0.185                              0.079  
4.46  (0.000)                   6.54 (0.000)     
No                                  No 
Yes                                Yes   
30                                   30 
626                                 626   
Source: Estimated by the Author.  Notes: Same as in Table 5.11. 
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5.5 Sensitivity Checks 
In addition to the above robustness of the estimated results, this study also 
examined the sensitivity of the results. This was achieved by estimating growth 
model used to examine the impact of trade liberalization and institutions on 
economic growth. The growth equation was specified as equation (4.14) in 
chapter four. The study classified the selected SSA countries into West Africa, 
Central Africa and East/Southern African sub-regions. Recall that we have thirty 
sampled SSA countries used in this study. The West African sub-region 
comprises of Benin Republic, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Niger, 
Nigeria and Senegal. The Central African sub-regional countries are Angola, 
Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Congo Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and 
Rwanda. The third group consists of countries that are  under the East and 
Southern African sub-region, these countries include Botswana, Djibouti, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, 
Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. This was done via the 
estimation of the thirty countries based on the group basis in order to compare the 
results across sub-regions of SSA. The LSDV regression results were used for the 
comparison. This is because the LSDV results are better than the pooled OLS 
results. 
The second aspect of the classification has to do with the categorization of the 
thirty (30) countries based on the World Bank’s classification (2007) of countries 
into moderately outward-oriented (MOOC), moderately inward-oriented (MIOC) 
and strongly inward-oriented countries (SIOC). The moderately outward-oriented 
countries include Benin Republic, Chad, Congo Republic, Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Swaziland, and Uganda. The strongly 
inward-oriented countries include Angola, Burundi, Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Madagascar, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, and Zambia. The 
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moderately inward-oriented countries include Botswana, Cameroon, Cape Verde, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Gambia, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi and Senegal.  
The results shown in Table 5.15 are the sensitivity checks (the LSDV results) for 
the economic growth model. The table reveals that there is an improvement in 
adjusted R
2 
results for LSDV. The adjusted R
2 
measures the percentage variation 
of the dependent variable explained by the independent variables. The results also 
show that the adjusted R
2
 for LSDV are 0.184, 0.267, 0.176 and 0.231 in the 
overall, Central Africa, West Africa and East/Southern African sub-regions 
respectively. This suggests that the explanatory variables in the model explain 
about 18.4, 26.7, 17.6 and 23.1 percent variations in the dependent variable, 
Grgdp in the overall sample, Central Africa, West Africa and East/Southern 
African sub-regions respectively. The F-stat. probability results show that they are 
0.0000 (except in West Africa where the F-stat. is 0.002), meaning that it is 
significant at 1 percent. This implies that the model is robust, that is, all the 
independent variables jointly explain the dependent variable. However, the low 
adjusted R
2 
is not unexpected in cross sectional data.   
The implication of this is that empirically, Central Africa tends to have better 
growth rate, followed by East/Southern Africa and then West Africa. The reasons 
for this result may be due to the fact that some of the Central African countries 
have been observed to have higher annual growth rates than some countries in 
West Africa and East/Southern Africa. For instance, in 2011, the annual growth 
rates of Angola, Chad, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea and Congo Republic were 
9.5, 5.5, 3.1, 16.4 and 2.2 percents respectively; while that of Benin Republic, 
Ghana, Nigeria, Djibouti, Kenya, Lesotho, South Africa and Sudan were 1.4, 3.8, 
3.6, 1.8, 2.1, 3.2, 3.7 and 5.2 percents for the same period, respectively (Africa 
Development Indicators, 2011).  
Similar trend is also observed for labour, the percentage of total labour force in 
the Central African countries are higher than in West Africa and East/Southern 
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Africa. For example, in 2011, the percentage of total labour force in Angola, 
Chad, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea and Congo Republic were 47.3, 48.9, 43.1, 
46.7 and 43.8 percents respectively; while that of Benin Republic, Ghana, 
Nigeria, Djibouti, Kenya, Lesotho, South Africa and Sudan were 44.1, 48.3, 36.2, 
44.1, 47.2, 42.6, 46.3 and 31.0 percents for the same period, respectively (Africa 
Development Indicators, 2011). In addition, the Central African countries are 
predominantly labour-intensive in their production processes. However, generally 
speaking, the results of these three categories of countries do not show a very 
wide disparity from the overall sample results for the entire 30 countries. 
The results in Table 5.15 also show that the coefficients of employment to 
population ratio (Lab) measuring the elasticities is less than one in absolute values 
for the overall sample and the East/Southern African sub-region: this implies that 
a one percent change in labour brings about a less than one percent change in 
economic growth in the overall SSA countries and East/Southern African sub-
region. While the coefficients of elasticities are greater than one in absolute 
values in the Central and West African sub-region: this implies that a one percent 
change in labour brings about a greater than one percent change in economic 
growth in Central and West African sub-region. Theoretically, labour force is 
supposed to have a positive impact on economic growth via the production of 
aggregate output. But out of these three sub-regional groupings of countries, the 
result for the Central African sub-region has a higher coefficient estimate than the 
East/Southern and West African sub-regions. This buttresses the earlier empirical 
finding that the Central African countries used in this study have better 
performance indicators (institutional measures) as displayed in chapter two of this 
study. Also, the variable is statistically significant at 1 percent in the Central and 
East/Southern African sub-regions.  
With respect to the proxy for stock of capital (gross fixed capital formation - 
Gkap), both the overall sample and the categorical results reveal that it is 
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statistically significant at 1 percent. In addition, in all the results, the coefficients 
of Gkap measuring the elasticities are less than one in absolute values: this 
implies that a one percent change in the stock of capital brings about a less than 
one percent change in economic growth. Theoretical evidence says that there is a 
positive relationship between the stock of capital and economic growth, that is, as 
the growth rate increases, the stock of capital increases. The implication of these 
results is that in the Central Africa, West Africa and East/Southern African 
countries, capital has a positive impact on economic growth. Therefore, in order 
to have a higher level of growth in the selected SSA countries, there is a need for 
these SSA countries to keep encouraging both local and foreign investments so as 
to be able to increase aggregate output, savings and the stock of capital.  
From Table 5.15, in terms of the proxies for human capital (Psenr and Ssenr), 
Ssenr is statistically significant at 1 percent in West and East/Southern African 
sub-regions while Psenr is statistically significant at 1 percent in the Central 
African sub-region and 5 per significant in the overall sample result. The 
implication of this is that empirically in our sampled SSA countries used in this 
study, education does affect growth positively. The results also show that the 
coefficients of Psenr and Ssenr measuring the elasticities are less than one in 
absolute values in the overall sample and categorical results: this implies that a 
one percent change in human capital brings about a less than one percent change 
in economic growth. The overall and categorical results of the initial level of GDP 
variable (Gdpini) show that its coefficients measuring the elasticities are less than 
one in absolute values: this implies that a one percent change in Gdpini brings 
about a less than one percent change in economic growth. The implication of this 
is that the sampled SSA countries in this study have experienced some higher 
level of growth than the previous year, though, not very noticeable. 
From the results in Table 5.15, in terms of the measure of trade liberalization - the 
degree of openness (Open), the results for both the overall sample and sub-
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regional grouping of countries reveal that the coefficients of Open measuring the 
elasticities are less than one in absolute values: this implies that a one percent 
change in the degree of openness brings about a less than one percent change in 
economic growth. Also, it is statistically significant at 5 percent in Central 
African sub-region. In terms of the coefficient estimates of the variable, of the 
three sub-regional groupings, trade liberalization had a higher value in Central 
Africa than in West and East/Southern Africa. This may be due to the fact that 
Central Africa gained more from trade liberalization and the earlier empirical 
finding that Central Africa fared better in the performance indicators than West 
and East/Southern Africa. 
In terms of the natural resource endowment variable (Nare), the results show that 
its coefficients measuring the elasticities are less than one in absolute values in 
the overall sample and the three sub-regional groupings: this implies that a one 
percent change in Nare brings about a less than one percent change in economic 
growth. The variable is statistically significant at 1 percent and 5 percent in 
Central and West African sub-regions respectively. In terms of the coefficient 
estimates, of the three sub-regional categories, the result for the Central African 
sub-region has the highest value of 16.0 percent on economic growth.  In terms of 
taxes, the overall and categorical results reveal that the coefficients of taxes 
measuring the elasticities are less than one in absolute values: this implies that a 
one percent change in taxes brings about a less than one percent change in 
economic growth. Also, the variable is statistically significant at 5 percent in West 
African sub-region. In terms of the coefficient estimates, of the three sub-regional 
categories, the result for the West African sub-region has the highest value of 49.2 
percent on economic growth. This result implies that taxes do not have a highly 
noticeable impact on economic growth and this may probably be due to the fact 
the proceeds from taxes may not have properly utilized in the selected SSA 
countries except in the West African countries. 
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Table 5.15: Sensitivity Sample Checks of Results (Sub-regional 
Classification) 
Dependent Variable – Measure of Economic Growth (Grgdp) 
                                                                                           LSDV 
Regressors ALL CEAF WAF EASAF 
Lgdpini 
 
LGkap 
 
LSsenr 
 
LPsenr 
 
LLab 
 
LOpen 
 
LEthsion 
 
LReprisk 
 
LPolrig 
 
LTaxes 
 
LNare 
Constant 
 
 
 
R2 
Adjusted R2 
F-stat 
Country Dummy 
Countries 
Number of 
Observations 
 
-0.415*** [3.75] 
(0.000) 
0.476***  [6.75] 
(0.000) 
0.304*    [1.99] 
(0.059) 
0.461** [2.07] 
(0.039) 
0.611*  [1.75] 
(0.080) 
0.023*  [1.97] 
(0.067) 
-0.744**[2.07] 
(0.044) 
0.092*   [1.92] 
(0.073) 
0.342***[3.29] 
(0.001) 
0.198*  [1.86] 
(0.074) 
0.033* [1.91] 
(0.087) 
2.069* [1.79] 
(0.098) 
 
0.230 
0.184 
5.02  (0.000) 
Yes 
30 
 
713 
-0.150**  [2.19] 
(0.028) 
0.571*** [3.32] 
(0.001) 
0.666*    [1.95] 
(0.063) 
0.256*** [2.38] 
(0.001) 
15.536*** [2.74] 
(0.007) 
0.478**   [2.24] 
(0.015) 
-1.330** [2.13] 
(0.027) 
0.425*   [1.82] 
(0.087) 
1.768***[3.98] 
(0.000) 
0.181*  [1.73] 
(0.094) 
0.160*** [2.60] 
(0.010) 
59.606** [2.49] 
(0.014) 
 
0.344 
0.267 
4.44  (0.000) 
Yes 
8 
 
171 
 
-0.430** [2.00] 
(0.035) 
0.552*** [2.84] 
(0.005) 
0.186***  [2.67] 
(0.003) 
0.419*     [1.91] 
(0.064) 
2.928*    [1.95] 
(0.052) 
0.409*   [1.77] 
(0.085) 
-0.812* [1.69] 
(0.090) 
0.221*   [1.98] 
(0.065) 
0.098** [2.12] 
(0.039) 
0.492** [2.15] 
(0.031) 
0.043** [2.14] 
(0.039) 
11.585  [0.68] 
(0.497) 
 
0.198 
0.176 
2.42  (0.002) 
Yes 
8 
 
195 
-0.697***   [2.88] 
(0.004) 
0.420***     [4.57] 
(0.000) 
0.033***      [2.72] 
(0.004) 
0.495*         [1.70] 
(0.090) 
0.722***    [2.67] 
(0.007) 
0.078*      [1.84] 
(0.058) 
-1.145**    [2.06] 
(0.045) 
0.146*      [1.98] 
(0.071) 
0.436***   [2.94] 
(0.004) 
0.150*     [1.95] 
(0.077) 
0.031*     [1.70] 
(0.095) 
3.724    [0.58] 
(0.562) 
 
0.284 
0.231 
5.33 (0.000)  
Yes 
14 
 
347 
Source: Estimated by the Author.  Notes: Variables are as previously defined. Absolute t statistics 
are displayed in parentheses beside the coefficients while probability values are in brackets. 
LSDV- Least Square Dummy Variable. CEAF – Central African sub-region, WAF – West African 
sub-region, EASAF – East and Southern African sub-region.* - significant at 10 percent; ** - 
significant at 5 percent; *** - significant at 1 percent. 
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From the results in Table 5.15, in terms of the political institutions variable - 
political rights (Polrig), the results for the overall sample and sub-regional 
groupings reveal that the coefficients of Polrig measuring the elasticities are less 
than one in absolute values: this implies that a one percent change in Polrig brings 
about a less than one percent change in economic growth. But in Central Africa, 
the coefficient of Polrig measuring elasticity is greater than one in absolute value: 
this implies that a one percent change in Polrig brings about a greater than one 
percent change in economic growth. Polrig is statistically significant at 1 percent 
in the overall sample, Central and East/Southern African sub-regions while it is 
significant at 5 percent in West African sub-region. In terms of the coefficient 
estimates, of the three sub-regional categories, the result for the Central African 
sub-region has the highest value of 176.8 percent on economic growth. 
In terms of the economic institutions variable (repudiation risk - Reprisk), the 
results for the overall and the three sub-regional groupings show that the 
coefficients of repudiation risk measuring the elasticities are less than one in 
absolute values, with the overall sample coefficient estimate being the lowest 
(0.092): this implies that a one percent change in Reprisk brings about a less than 
one percent change in economic growth. In terms of the coefficient estimates, the 
results showed that Central African sub-region had the highest value than West 
and East/Southern African sub-regions.  
As regards the cultural institutions variable (Ethsion), the results reveal that the 
coefficients of Ethsion measuring the elasticities are less than one in absolute 
values in the overall sample and West African sub-region: this implies that a one 
percent change in Ethsion brings about a less than one percent change in 
economic growth in the selected SSA countries and West African sub-region. 
While the coefficients of Ethsion measuring the elasticities are greater than one in 
absolute values in Central and East/Southern African sub-regions: this implies 
that a one percent change in Ethsion brings about a greater than one percent 
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change in economic growth in Central and East/Southern African sub-regions. 
The implication of this result is that cultural institutions in these SSA countries 
have negative impact on economic growth. This supports what theory says, when 
there are ethnic crises in a country, growth is adversely affected. But the results 
are statistically significant at 5 percent in the overall sample, Central and 
East/Southern African sub-regions. In terms of the coefficient estimates, the 
results showed that Central African sub-region had the highest value than West 
and East/Southern African sub-regions. 
As part of the sensitivity checks, the study further carried out estimations for West 
African sub-region (excluding Nigeria) and East/Southern African sub-region 
(excluding South Africa). The equation used for the estimations is still equation 
(4.14) specified in chapter four. The reason why this is done is because Nigeria 
and South Africa are regarded as two major outliers (countries) in West Africa 
and East/Southern Africa respectively. It was also considered expedient to 
examine these checks given the fact that Nigeria has a high population which is 
about 18.43 percent of that of the SSA region and 15.54 percent of that of the 
entire African continent (World Population Reference Bureau, 2011). 
Furthermore, the choice of excluding South Africa stems from the fact that South 
Africa has been known to have a different growth pattern compared to other SSA 
countries. This study is interested in finding out if the exclusion of these two 
countries from their respective sub-regions will greatly affect the results we got 
when they were included and to find out if these countries have any significant 
impact or ‘carry any weight’ in their respective sub-regions. This is to either 
buttress or refute the widely acclaimed belief of Nigeria being the ‘Giant of 
Africa’.      
The results from Table 5.16 reveal that the adjusted R
2 
values for LSDV in the 
overall sample for West Africa and when Nigeria was excluded from the sample 
were 0.176 and 0.186 respectively. While for the overall sample for East/Southern 
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Africa and when South Africa was excluded from the sample, the adjusted R
2 
values were 0.231 and 0.231 respectively. Since the coefficients point out that the 
changes in the values were minimal, therefore, we can infer that Nigeria and 
South Africa do not exert outlier effects in the estimated results. Invariably, the 
implication of this is that Nigeria and South Africa do not foretell possible outlier 
problem in the estimated results. The F-stat. probability results showed that they 
are 0.0000 (except in West Africa where the F-stat. is 0.002), meaning that it is 
significant at 1 percent. This implies that the model is robust, that is, all the 
independent variables jointly explain the dependent variable. However, the low 
adjusted R
2 
is not unexpected in cross sectional data. 
The results in Table 5.16 reveal that there was not much difference in the results 
of the variables. Considering the measure of trade liberalization (degree of 
openness), its coefficients measuring the elasticities are less than one in absolute 
values in both cases, that is, when Nigeria and South Africa were excluded from 
the West Africa and East/Southern Africa, and when they were included 
respectively: this implies that a one percent change in the degree of openness 
brings about a less than one percent change in economic growth. However, in 
terms of the coefficient estimates, the coefficients are higher in both cases; when 
Nigeria was excluded from the West African sub-region; the value is 0.513 as 
against 0.409 when Nigeria was included in the analysis. The result was the same 
when South Africa was excluded from East/Southern African sub-region, the 
coefficient is 0.115 as against 0.078 when South Africa was included in the 
analysis.   
In terms of repudiation risk (proxy for economic institutions), the coefficients of 
repudiation risk measuring the elasticities are less than one in absolute values in 
both cases, that is, when South Africa was excluded from the East/Southern 
African sub-region and when Nigeria was excluded from West African sub-region 
as well as when the two countries were included in their respective sub-regions. 
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This implies that a one percent change in repudiation risk brings about a less than 
one percent change in economic growth. But the variable is statistically 
significant at 1 percent when South Africa was excluded from the East/Southern 
African sub-region. The coefficient estimate of repudiation risk was more than 
two-fold from 22.1 to 44.8 for the West Africa sample and when Nigeria was 
excluded from the sample respectively. The coefficient is also higher when South 
Africa was excluded from East/Southern African sub-region and when South 
Africa was included in the analysis, 0.196 and 0.146 respectively. 
With respect to the political institutions variable (political rights - Polrig), its 
coefficients measuring the elasticities are less than one in absolute values in both 
cases, that is, when South Africa was excluded from the East/Southern African 
sub-region and when Nigeria was excluded from West African sub-region as well 
as when the two countries were included. This implies that a one percent change 
in political rights brings about a less than one percent change in economic growth. 
But the variable is statistically significant at 1 percent when South Africa was 
included in the East/Southern African sub-region and significant at 5 percent in 
the West Africa sample and when Nigeria was excluded from West Africa. In 
terms of the coefficient estimates, political rights had a higher value when Nigeria 
was excluded from the West African sub-region than the West Africa sample, 
0.148 and 0.098 respectively. The coefficient is also higher when South Africa 
was included in East/Southern African sub-region than in South Africa sample 
0.436 and 0.309 respectively. 
In terms of the cultural institutions variable (ethnic tensions - Ethsion), as regards 
the coefficient estimates, the results show a wide disparity. For West Africa, the 
value increased almost three-fold from -0.812 to -2.396 for the overall sample and 
when Nigeria was excluded respectively. For East and South Africa, a similar 
scenario was witnessed; the value decreased almost two-fold from -1.145 to -
0.638 for the overall sample and when South Africa was excluded respectively. 
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The implication of this result is that for trading activities to take place among the 
SSA countries, there should be ethnic peace in the countries. The coefficients of 
ethnic tensions measuring the elasticities are less than one in absolute values 
when South Africa was excluded from the East/Southern African sub-region and 
the result of the West African sub-region. This implies that a one percent change 
in Ethsion brings about a less than one percent change in economic growth. While 
its coefficients that measures elasticities are greater than one in absolute values in 
the East/Southern African sub-region and when Nigeria was excluded from West 
African sub-region. This implies that a one percent change in Ethsion brings 
about a greater than one percent change in economic growth.  
Table 5.16 also reveals the results of the proxies for human capital (Psenr and 
Ssenr). Ssenr is statistically significant at 1 percent in West Africa and 
East/Southern Africa samples while Psenr is statistically significant at 1 percent in 
the West Africa minus Nigeria result and 5 per significant in the East/Southern 
Africa minus South Africa result. The results also show that their coefficients 
measuring the elasticities are less than one in absolute values in all the results. 
This implies that a one percent change in Psenr and Ssenr brings about a less than 
one percent change in economic growth. The results of the initial level of GDP 
variable (Gdpini) show that its coefficients measuring the elasticities are less than 
one in absolute values in all the results.  
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Table 5.16: Sensitivity Sample Checks of Results (Outliers Effect) 
Dependent Variable – Grgdp 
                                                                             LSDV 
Regressors WAF                         Less NGA EASAF                         Less ZAF 
Lgdpini 
 
Lgkap 
 
Lssenr 
 
Lpsenr 
 
Llab 
 
Lopen 
 
Lethsion 
 
Lreprisk 
 
Lpolrig 
 
Ltaxes 
 
Lnare 
 
Constant 
 
 
R2 
Adjusted R2 
F-stat 
Country Dummy 
Countries 
Number of 
Observations 
 
-0.430** [2.00]          -0.454**   [1.94]  
(0.035)                      (0.027)       
0.552*** [2.84]           0.651***  [3.37] 
(0.005)                      (0.001) 
0.186***  [2.67]          0.361*     [1.66] 
(0.003)                      (0.076) 
0.419*    [1.91]            0.227***  [2.51] 
(0.064)                      (0.009) 
2.928*   [1.95]            2.421**   [2.65] 
(0.052)                    (0.017)  
0.409*  [1.77]           0.513*    [1.81] 
(0.085)                    (0.092) 
-0.812* [1.69]           -2.396*  [1.83] 
(0.090)                     (0.085)  
0.221*   [1.98]           0.448*   [1.86] 
(0.065)                     (0.065) 
0.098** [2.12]           0.148**  [1.97]        
(0.039)                     (0.031)   
0.492** [2.15]           0.599**  [1.94] 
(0.031)                    (0.054) 
0.043** [2.14]           0.043**  [2.23] 
(0.039)                    (0.019) 
11.585*[0.68]           6.521*   [1.64] 
(0.497)                    (0.090)   
 
0.198                       0.267 
0.176                       0.186 
2.42 (0.002)             3.30 (0.000) 
Yes                          Yes       
8                               7  
 
195                           172 
-0.697***   [2.88]            -0.598***   [2.59] 
(0.004)                          (0.010) 
0.420***     [4.57]             0.442***   [5.06] 
(0.000)                           (0.000) 
0.033***      [2.72]            0.233*     [1.89] 
(0.004)                           (0.074) 
0.495*         [1.70]             0.661**    [2.35] 
(0.090)                           (0.020) 
0.722***    [2.67]             0.411***  [2.38]   
(0.007)                       (0.007)  
0.078*      [1.84]           0.115*     [1.69]  
(0.058)                       (0.093) 
-1.145**    [2.06]          -0.638**  [2.82] 
(0.045)                        (0.014) 
0.146*      [1.98]            0.196***  [2.26] 
(0.071)                        (0.010) 
0.436***   [2.94]            0.309*    [1.86] 
(0.004)                        (0.064)  
0.150*     [1.95]             0.078***  [4.69] 
(0.077)                        (0.000)    
0.031*    [1.70]              0.035**   [1.97] 
(0.095)                        (0.019)              
3.724    [0.58]              0.863*     [1.75] 
(0.562)                        (0.082)  
 
0.284                           0.286          
0.231                           0.231 
5.33  (0.000)                5.22  (0.000)                            
Yes                               Yes  
14                                  13    
 
347                                324 
Source: Estimated by the Author.  Notes: Variables are as previously defined. Absolute t statistics 
are displayed in parentheses beside the coefficients while probability values are in brackets. 
LSDV- Least Square Dummy Variable WAF – West African sub-region, EASAF – East and 
Southern African sub-region. NGA: Nigeria, ZAF: South Africa. * - significant at 10 percent; ** - 
significant at 5 percent; *** - significant at 1 percent. 
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From the results in Table 5.16, in terms of the stock of capital (gross fixed capital 
formation - Gkap), its coefficients measuring the elasticities is less than one in 
absolute values: this implies that a one percent change in the stock of capital 
brings about a less than one percent change in economic growth. The variable is 
statistically significant at 1 percent in all the results. The coefficient estimates are 
higher when Nigeria and South Africa were excluded from West and 
East/Southern African sub-regions respectively than the overall West African and 
East/Southern African results. The results of the employment to population ratio 
(Lab) show that its coefficient measuring the elasticity is greater than one in 
absolute value in the West Africa sample and when Nigeria was excluded from 
West Africa: this implies that a one percent change in labour brings about a 
greater than one percent change in economic growth. While its coefficient 
measuring the elasticity is less than one in absolute value in the overall 
East/Southern African sub-region and when South Africa was excluded from 
East/Southern Africa results. This implies that a one percent change in labour 
brings about a less than one percent change in economic growth. Labour is 
statistically significant at 1 percent in East/Southern Africa sample and when 
South Africa was excluded from East/Southern Africa results while it is 
significant at 5 percent in the West Africa minus Nigeria result.  
The results shown in Table 5.17 are the sensitivity checks (the LSDV results) for 
the growth model for the categorization of countries based on the World Bank’s 
classification in 2007. The results show that the adjusted R
2
 and probability 
values for the F-stat. are 0.184 and 0.0000, 0.140 and 0.0000, 0.146 and 0.0000 as 
well as 0.251 and 0.0000 for overall, moderately inward-oriented countries 
(MIOC), strongly inward-oriented countries (SIOC) and moderately outward-
oriented countries (MOOC) respectively. However, the best of these results in 
terms of the adjusted R
2
 is the MOOC result. This means that the combined 
independent variables explain about 25.1 percent variation of the change in 
economic growth in MOOC while that of SIOC is 14.6 percent and that of MIOC 
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is 14.0 percent. The implication of the F-stat. significance at 1 percent portrays 
that the model is robust, that is, all the independent variables jointly explain the 
dependent variable. However, the low adjusted R
2 
is not unexpected in cross 
sectional data.   
Generally, the implications of these results reveal that the moderately outward-
oriented countries (MOOC) are likely to have better growth than the other two  
sub-groups of countries (that is, moderately inward-oriented countries and the 
strongly inward-oriented countries) empirically. This is evident from the value of 
the adjusted R
2
 and the coefficient estimates of variables like Gkap, Ssenr, Psenr, 
Lab, Reprisk, Polrig and Nare. This implies that seven out of the eleven 
explanatory variables had higher coefficients representing about 64 percent in 
MOOC. However, the results of these three sub-groups of countries do not show a 
very wide disparity from the overall results from the entire thirty countries. 
From Table 5.17, the result reveal that the coefficients of employment to 
population ratio (Lab) measuring the elasticities are less than one in absolute 
values in the overall and the strongly inward-oriented countries (SIOC) results. 
This implies that a one percent change in labour brings about a less than one 
percent change in economic growth. While its coefficients measuring the 
elasticities are greater than one in absolute values in the moderately inward-
oriented countries (MIOC) and the moderately outward-oriented countries 
(MOOC) results. This implies that a one percent change in labour brings about a 
greater than one percent change in economic growth. The results also reveal that 
labour is statistically significant at 1 percent in the moderately outward-oriented 
countries (MOOC) result. But of the three sub-grouping of countries that are 
presented in Table 5.17, the coefficient estimate of labour in MOOC is higher 
than the two others (MIOC and SIOC). This implies that labour had a higher 
impact on economic growth in MOOC than in MIOC and SIOC. Labour had 
positive signs in all the results. Theoretically, labour force has a positive impact 
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on economic growth via the production of aggregate output. The outcome of this 
result may be due to the fact that the moderately outward-oriented countries have 
a strong support for the purchase of domestic goods which boosts industrialization 
and increases the rate of employment and hence economic growth. In terms of the 
stock of capital (gross fixed capital formation - Gkap), the results reveal that the 
coefficients of gross fixed capital formation measuring the elasticities are less 
than one in absolute values in both the overall and the three sub-groups’ results. 
This implies that a one percent change in the stock of capital brings about a less 
than one percent change in economic growth. In addition, all the results in the 
overall and three sub-groups are statistically significant at 1 percent except the 
result for the strongly inward-oriented countries (SIOC). In addition, the 
coefficient estimate of labour MOOC is higher than the two others (MIOC and 
SIOC). This implies that labour had a higher impact on economic growth in 
MOOC than in MIOC and SIOC.  
Concerning the taxes variable, the results reveal that taxes is statistically 
significant at 5 percent in SIOC and MOOC results. In addition, the coefficients 
of taxes measuring the elasticities are less than one in absolute values in both the 
overall and the three sub-groups of countries. This implies that a one percent 
change in taxes brings about a less than one percent change in economic growth. 
In terms of the coefficient estimates, the value is higher in SIOC than in MIOC 
and MOOC. This implies that taxes have a higher impact on economic growth in 
the strongly inward-oriented countries (SIOC) than in the moderately inward-
oriented countries (MIOC) and moderately outward-oriented countries (MOOC). 
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Table 5.17: Sensitivity Sample Checks of Results (World Bank Classification) 
Dependent Variable – Measure of Economic Growth (Grgdp) 
Regressors ALL MIOC SIOC MOOC 
Lgdpini 
 
LGkap 
 
LSsenr 
 
 
LPsenr 
 
 
LLab 
 
LOpen 
 
LEthsion 
 
LReprisk 
 
LPolrig 
LTaxes 
 
LNare 
 
 
Constant 
 
R2 
Adjusted R2 
F-stat 
Country Dummy 
Countries 
Number of 
Observations 
-0.415*** [3.75] 
(0.000) 
0.476***  [6.75] 
(0.000) 
 
0.304*    [1.99] 
(0.059) 
 
0.461** [2.07] 
(0.039) 
 
0.611*  [1.75] 
(0.080) 
 
0.023*  [1.97] 
(0.067) 
-0.744**[2.07] 
(0.044) 
0.092*   [1.92] 
(0.073) 
0.342***[3.29] 
(0.001) 
0.198*  [1.86] 
(0.074) 
0.033* [1.91] 
(0.087) 
 
2.069* [1.79] 
(0.098) 
 
0.230 
0.184 
5.02  (0.000) 
Yes 
30 
 
713 
-0.441**  [1.99] 
(0.048) 
0.419***  [3.38] 
(0.001) 
 
0.030**    [2.10] 
(0.018) 
 
0.162**   [2.37] 
(0.015) 
 
1.658*    [1.99] 
(0.074) 
0.230*   [1.85] 
(0.098) 
-1.001** [2.08] 
(0.027) 
0.019**   [2.09] 
(0.026) 
0.071*  [1.93] 
(0.065) 
0.111*  [1.98] 
(0.064) 
0.041**  [2.03] 
(0.053) 
 
5.712* [1.96] 
(0.076) 
0.211 
0.140 
2.96  (0.000) 
Yes 
10 
242 
 
-0.005*      [1.89] 
(0.088) 
0.192*      [1.98] 
(0.053) 
 
0.163*     [1.94] 
(0.058) 
 
0.272**   [2.05] 
(0.046) 
 
0.310*    [1.74] 
(0.089) 
0.123**  [2.18] 
(0.030) 
-0.684*   [1.88] 
(0.082) 
0.142**   [2.11] 
(0.043) 
0.314*    [1.96] 
(0.080) 
0.410**    [2.07] 
(0.043) 
0.022*     [1.77] 
(0.084) 
 
 
4.236*   [2.04] 
(0.057) 
 
0.219 
0.146 
3.01  (0.000) 
Yes 
10 
 
236 
-0.289*    [1.90] 
(0.059) 
0.689***  [5.94] 
(0.000) 
 
1.023***   [3.07] 
(0.002) 
 
0.758**     [2.19] 
(0.012) 
 
11.116***  [3.02] 
(0.003) 
0.028**   [2.08] 
(0.034) 
-1.808**  [2.31] 
(0.016) 
0.250**  [2.14] 
(0.019) 
0.898***   [3.56] 
(0.000) 
0.367**    [2.07] 
(0.045) 
0.092**    [2.55] 
(0.012) 
 
 
38.125** [2.51] 
(0.013) 
 
0.315 
0.251 
4.90  (0.000) 
Yes 
10 
 
234 
Source: Estimated by the Author.  Notes: Variables are as previously defined. Absolute t statistics 
are displayed in parentheses while probability values are in brackets. LSDV- Least Square 
Dummy Variable. MIOC – moderately inward-oriented countries; SIOC – strongly inward-
oriented countries; MOOC – moderately outward-oriented countries.* - significant at 10 percent; 
** - significant at 5 percent; *** - significant at 1 percent. 
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The results in Table 5.17 also reveal that education/human capital (proxied by 
Psenr and Ssenr) have their coefficients which measures elasticities are less than 
one in absolute values in the overall and three sub-groups: this implies that a one 
percent change in Psenr and Ssenr brings about a less than one percent change in 
economic growth. But the coefficient of Ssenr measuring the elasticity is greater 
than one in absolute value in MOOC: this implies that a one percent change in 
Ssenr brings about a greater than one percent change in economic growth in 
MOOC. Ssenr is statistically significant at 1 percent in MOOC and statistically 
significant at 5 percent in MIOC. While Psenr is statistically significant at 5 
percent in the overall and the three sub-groups. The implication of this is that 
empirically in our sampled SSA countries used in this study, education influences 
economic growth positively. Though, the educational standards in these countries 
can be improved upon than the state in which they are now. However, in terms of 
the coefficient estimates, the values are higher in MOOC than the two others 
(MIOC and SIOC) for both Ssenr and Psenr. This implies that education had a 
higher impact on economic growth in MOOC than in MIOC and SIOC. 
In terms of the initial level of GDP (Gdpini), its coefficients measuring the 
elasticities are less than one in absolute values in both the overall and the three 
sub-groups (that is, MIOC, SIOC and MOOC). The variable is statistically 
significant at 1 percent and 5 percent in the overall and MIOC results 
respectively. The implication of this is that the sampled SSA countries used in this 
study have experienced better growth levels than the previous year. Concerning 
the measure of trade liberalization (Open), the results reveal that the coefficients 
of the degree of openness measuring the elasticities are less than one in absolute 
values in both the overall sample and the three sub-groups. This implies that a one 
percent change in the degree of openness brings about a less than one percent 
change in economic growth. It is observed that the coefficient estimates of the 
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degree of openness are small in all the results, this buttresses the earlier 
observation that the sampled SSA countries have not really benefitted from trade 
liberalization. But of the three sub-groups, the coefficient estimate of the degree 
of openness is higher in the moderately inward-oriented countries (MIOC) than in 
SIOC and MIOC. This means that of trade liberalization affects economic growth 
higher in moderately inward-oriented countries (MIOC) than in the strongly 
inward-oriented countries (SIOC) and moderately outward-oriented countries 
(MOOC). The implication of this is that the MIOC countries encourage the 
production of domestic goods which they can export, that is, they encourage 
export promotion. 
The results in Table 5.17 also reveal that the coefficients of the political 
institutions variable (political rights – Polrig) measuring the elasticities are less 
than one in absolute values in both the overall and the three sub-groups of 
countries. This implies that a one percent change in political rights brings about a 
less than one percent change in economic growth. In addition, political rights is 
statistically significant at 1 percent in the overall and MOOC results. For the 
coefficient estimates, the moderately outward-oriented countries (MOOC) had a 
higher value than the strongly inward-oriented countries (SIOC) and the 
moderately inward-oriented countries. As regards economic institutions variable – 
repudiation risk, the results show that a one percent change in repudiation risk 
brings about a less than one percent change in economic growth in both the 
overall and three sub-groups of countries. That is, its coefficient which measures 
elasticity is less than one in absolute value. Also, the results show that repudiation 
risk is statistically significant at 5 percent in MIOC and MOOC. In terms of the 
coefficient estimates, of the three categories; the moderately outward-oriented 
countries (MOOC) had a higher value than the moderately inward-oriented 
countries (MIOC) and strongly inward-oriented countries (SIOC). This implies 
that economic institutions have a higher impact on growth in MOOC than in 
MIOC and SIOC. 
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From Table 5.17, the cultural institutions variable (ethnic tensions - Ethsion) 
results reveal that the coefficients of ethnic tensions measuring the elasticities are 
less than one in absolute values in the overall and SIOC results: this implies that a 
one percent change in ethnic tensions brings about a less than one percent change 
in economic growth. While its coefficient measuring the elasticity is greater than 
one in absolute value in the MOOC result and elastic (exactly one) in the MIOC 
result: this implies that a one percent change in ethnic tensions brings about a 
greater than one percent change in economic growth in MOOC and a one percent 
change in Ethsion brings about a proportionate change in economic growth in 
MIOC. Ethsion is statistically significant at 5 percent in the overall, MIOC and 
MOOC. In terms of the natural resource endowment (Nare), the results reveal that 
it is statistically significant at 5 percent in MIOC and MOOC results. In addition, 
the coefficients of natural resource endowment measuring the elasticities are less 
than one in absolute values in both the overall and the three sub-groups of 
countries. This implies that a one percent change in natural resource endowment 
brings about a less than one percent change in economic growth. As regards the 
coefficient estimates, the value is higher in MOOC than in MIOC and SIOC.  
   
5.6 Tests of Hypotheses 
Based on the results presented in Tables 5.11, 5.12 and 5.15, we can test the 
hypotheses formulated in chapter one. The hypotheses are stated in their null 
forms. 
Hypothesis One:  
H0: There is no significant relationship between trade liberalization and economic 
growth in the selected SSA countries. 
In Table 5.11, the results show that the measure of trade liberalization – degree of 
openness is not statistically significant, the study accepts the null hypothesis and 
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concludes that trade liberalization has no significant relationship with economic 
growth in the selected SSA countries. The result shows that the measure of trade 
liberalization (degree of openness) is statistically significant at 10 percent, but 
since in this study, the researcher only considered 1 and 5 percent levels of 
significance, this made the researcher to conclude that the degree of openness is 
not significant.   
Hypothesis Two:  
H0: There is no significant relationship between economic, political and cultural 
institutions and economic growth in the selected SSA countries. 
Based on the results presented in Table 5.11, it is observed that the economic 
institutions indicator – repudiation risk is not statistically significant since it is 
statistically significant at 10 percent which this study did not consider;  
Furthermore, it is observed from Table 5.11 that the political institutions indicator 
– political rights is statistically significant at 1 percent; and the cultural 
institutions variable – ethnic tensions is statistically significant at 5 percent, 
therefore, the researcher rejects the null hypothesis and conclude that political and 
cultural institutions have significant relationship with economic growth in the 
selected SSA countries. Since two out of the three types of institutions considered 
in this study are significant, the null hypothesis is rejected and the study 
concludes that institutions have significant relationship with economic growth in 
the selected SSA countries. 
Hypothesis Three:  
H0: There is no significant relationship between the interaction effect of trade 
liberalization and institutions on economic growth in the selected SSA countries. 
From the results in Table 5.12, it was observed that the coefficient of the variable 
that was used to measure if there is an interaction effect between trade 
liberalization and economic institutions was negative, that is, less than 0, but the 
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coefficients of the variables that measured the interaction effect of trade 
liberalization and political and cultural institutions were positive, that is, greater 
than 0. This implies that the impact of trade liberalization on economic growth is 
more significant when political and cultural institutions are involved than when 
economic institutions are involved. Therefore, the study rejects the null 
hypothesis and concludes that there is a significant relationship between the 
interaction effect of trade liberalization and institutions and economic growth in 
the selected SSA countries. Although, trade liberalization seem to affect economic 
growth higher when political and cultural institutions are considered than when 
economic institutions are considered. 
Hypothesis Four:  
H0: There is no significant influence of the quality of institutions on economic 
growth in the sub-regions of SSA. 
In Table 5.15, the results of the sub-regional classification of countries were 
presented. The results revealed that the economic institutions indicator – 
repudiation risk is not statistically significant in all the three sub-regions viz; 
Central Africa, East/Southern Africa and West Africa (since the study did not 
extend the significance level to 10 percent which this variable is significant at). 
Similarly, the political institutions indicator – political rights is statistically 
significant at 1 percent in Central Africa and East/Southern Africa while it is 
significant at 5 percent in West Africa. In addition, the results of the cultural 
institutions indicator – ethnic tensions revealed that it is statistically significant at 
5 percent in Central Africa and East/Southern Africa while it is not significant in 
West Africa. Recall that in chapter three, the performance of institutions in these 
three sub-regions were descriptively analyzed, it was discovered that the quality 
of institutions play a significant role in influencing economic growth. Therefore, 
the study rejects the null hypothesis and concludes that the quality of institutions 
significantly influence economic growth in the sub-regions of SSA. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter contains the summary of the major findings in the study, policy 
recommendations and the conclusion. In addition, the limitations of the study and 
suggestions for further research are also contained in this chapter. 
 
6.2 Summary of Major Findings and Policy Implications  
From the results presented and discussed in chapter five, this section provides a 
summary of the major findings and the policy implications. The main findings of 
the study are enumerated below: 
1.  In terms of the influence of trade liberalization on economic growth, the study 
found that the measure of trade liberalization – degree of openness does not have 
a significant impact on economic growth in the selected SSA countries. The 
implication of this is that, though international trade can be positively beneficial 
to a country especially if the country is an exporter of goods and services rather 
than being just an importer of goods and services. But the question is has these 
countries in SSA benefited from trade liberalization? The answer is not a total 
yes, because these countries are still tied to the ‘apron strings’ of the developed 
countries. This explains why the empirical result from this study shows that trade 
liberalization has not had a significant impact on economic growth in the selected 
SSA countries, although there exists a positive impact of trade liberalization on 
economic growth. Thus, the governments of these countries should embark on 
policies that will boost industrialization so as to increase the level of output and 
then increase their levels of exports.   
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2.  Taking into consideration the impact of institutions on economic growth, the 
results reveal that cultural institutions have significant negative impact on 
economic growth. Political institutions have a positive impact (instead of a 
negative impact as postulated by theory) on economic growth. But economic 
institutions did not have a significant impact on growth. The results also show that 
out of the three forms of institutions focused on in this study, the political and 
cultural institutions exert a better influence on economic growth than economic 
institutions. The implication of this is that a politically stable country would 
experience better growth rate than a politically unstable one; and it is when there 
are no political catastrophes in a country that trading activities can take place and 
economic/cultural institutions can strive well. The results also imply that ethnic 
tensions in a country have negative influence on the level of economic growth in a 
country, since no country can claim to grow when there are ethnic unrests in the 
country, international trade is also hindered as no country would want to trade 
with such a country coupled with the fact that foreigners would not want to invest 
in such a country.     
3. The result of the measure of stock of capital – gross fixed capital formation 
shows that it has a statistically significant impact on economic growth in the 
selected SSA countries in this study. This supports theoretical expectation which 
postulates a significant and positive influence of capital on economic growth. The 
implication of this result is that when there is a fall in capital which results in a 
fall in investment in some of these SSA countries and this has resulted in the slow 
rate of growth in these countries over the years. One major cause of this fall in 
investment can be due to financial misappropriation evident in most of these 
countries; monies that could have been used for viable economic projects end up 
in private accounts and pockets. Another hindrance is the fact that foreign 
investments are falling due to the political and economic instability experienced 
in some of these SSA countries. 
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4. Education which is a measure of human capital development is found to exhibit 
positive influence on economic growth in SSA countries. This supports 
theoretical assertion of a positive relationship between education and economic 
growth. Also, human capital growth is believed to be important in the 
determination of the quality of institutions (Siba, 2008). The implication of this 
finding is that though human capital plays a vital role in improving the level of 
economic growth; the story among the sampled SSA countries used in this study 
seems to be different empirically; human capital has not had a great impact on 
institutional quality. This is the aftermath effect of the fall in the education 
standards experienced in some of these countries. An example is Nigeria where 
the present university graduate is not as sound academically as the graduate of the 
1970s and 1980s. 
 
5. In terms of the influence of natural resource endowment on economic growth, 
the results revealed that the variable did not have a significant impact on 
economic growth. Theoretically, natural resource endowment has a negative 
impact on economic growth (Alonso and Garcimartin, 2009). But from the result 
of this study, the variable had a positive impact on economic growth. The 
implication of the positive sign of this variable could be due to the fact that 
natural resource endowment is supposed to be a ‘blessing’ to a country but in 
these selected SSA countries, ‘resource curse’ seem to be what is happening. 
Besides, the revenue generated from the exports of the natural resources in these 
selected SSA countries is not properly utilized efficiently to boost economic 
growth. 
 
6. The result of the taxes variable revealed that it does not have a statistically 
significant impact on economic growth in the sampled SSA countries (it was 
significant at 10 percent which this study did not consider). This implies that taxes 
do not affect economic growth in the selected SSA countries. From the literature 
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it is observed that, a sound tax system not only provides the necessary resources 
to build high quality institutions, but also enables the consolidation of a social 
contract that gives rise to a more demanding relationship between state and 
citizens (Tilly, 1992; Moore, 2002). This study found that taxes have a positive 
relationship with economic growth. In the light of this, the implication of this is 
that the revenues generated from taxes in the selected SSA countries should be 
utilized properly towards the growth of the country, rather than embezzling the 
revenues from taxes. 
 
7. Another finding from this study is that the initial level of GDP (Gdpini), the 
proxy for initial level of growth has a negative relationship with economic growth 
which supports what theory asserts (Lucas, 1988; Durlauf et al. 2005). The 
implication of this is that the current level of growth must surpass the preceding    
year’s level of growth. But this is not totally true of the sampled SSA countries 
because if this was to be true, then these SSA countries should have experienced 
more growth than where they are now.  
 
8. Also, the study found that in terms of the classification of the sampled SSA 
countries into Central, West and East/Southern African sub-regions, trade 
liberalization, economic and political institutions had a greater impact on 
economic growth in Central Africa than in West and East / Southern Africa sub-
regions while cultural institutions had a greater impact on economic growth in 
West Africa than in Central and East / Southern Africa sub-regions. In terms of 
the World Bank’s classification of the sampled countries into moderately inward-
oriented countries (MIOC), strongly inward-oriented countries (SIOC) and 
moderately outward-oriented countries (MOOC), trade liberalization had a greater 
impact on economic growth in MIOC than in SIOC and MOOC. Economic and 
political institutions had a greater impact on economic growth in MOOC than in 
SIOC and MIOC. While cultural institutions had a greater impact on economic 
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growth in SIOC than in MIOC and MOOC. This implies that the impacts of trade 
liberalization, economic and political institutions on growth was more visible in 
Central Africa while cultural institutions impacted more on growth in East / 
Southern Africa. 
 
9. Finally, the study found that trade liberalization is encouraged more when 
strong political and cultural institutions are in place than strong economic 
institutions. The implication of this interaction effects between trade liberalization 
and institutions is that international trade among countries seem to be affected 
more by strong political and cultural institutions than strong economic 
institutions. The relative peace and political stability of the SSA countries 
encourage trading activities to take place among the countries and with other 
countries of the world. 
 
6.3 Policy Recommendations  
Based on the findings noted in the previous section, a number of policy issues 
naturally arise from this study. Hence, the following recommendations will be 
useful for policy consideration. 
1. Since human capital plays a crucial role in boosting economic growth in SSA 
countries, the study strongly recommends that the government should find ways 
that will be geared towards improving the stock of human capital in the SSA 
region. Some of these include the training and retraining of experts such as 
lawyers, economists, accountants, among others, in SSA countries and their 
respective ministries such as trade, justice, commerce and industry. This is 
because a well-informed and trained crop of persons that control policy 
formulation and implementation in these institutions are essential. This is most 
crucial in this 21
st
 century era which is mostly knowledge-driven. Hence, having 
and engaging individuals in the region that are conversant with the rapidly 
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changing policy environments and the global issues would be very needful for the 
region’s trade relations. Coupled with this is the fact that human capital also has a 
significant impact on the quality of institutions, and once the institutions in these 
countries are very strong, then economic growth would be further enhanced. 
2. The study also recommends the provision of a peaceful economic and political 
environment needed for local and foreign investment. The governments of these 
SSA countries should provide financial backing in form of easy accessibility to 
loans (credit facilities to investors) so as to boost local investment coupled with 
the fact that foreign investors should also be attracted to invest in the country via 
improving on the state of security and embarking on conducive policies that 
supports investments. It is when there is huge investment in the economy that the 
country can experience growth which will improve on the quality of institutions in 
the SSA countries. 
3. Furthermore, it is also recommended that there is a need to ensure that contracts 
are made easily enforceable. This is a very important tool that can be used to 
improve trade liberalization in SSA countries. The reason for this is that it will 
make the economic agents involved in international trade to be optimistic as they 
are sure that the moral hazards and adverse selection challenges are reduced. 
Coupled with this is the fact that the rest of the world will find it easier to trade 
with countries that are reputed for adequate contract enforcement more than 
others that are not so reputable. If effective contract enforcement procedures are 
in place, transaction costs will be reduced and this will eventually improve the 
level of trade liberalization in the region. Moreover, the governments of the 
selected SSA countries should encourage exports so as to harness maximum gains 
from trade liberalization.  
4. Another recommendation the study made is the need to reduce if not totally 
eradicate ethnic crises in the SSA region. Over the years, some countries in the 
SSA region have been faced with some ethnic crises which have discouraged 
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foreign investors and hindered trade liberalization. In order to build strong 
institutions and foster economic growth, there is need to curb ethnic crisis by 
encouraging peaceful co-existence among the various ethnic groups. 
5. In order to efficiently utilize the revenues from taxes and the exports of natural 
resources and further boost economic growth, corruption among public officials 
has to be eradicated. Corruption in public offices has become one major obstacle 
militating against growth in the SSA region. It is in the light of this that the study 
recommends that the revenues generated from taxes should be judiciously spent 
on economic projects that will be beneficial to the country and have a noticeable 
impact on economic growth. To achieve this, corruption and financial 
misappropriation should be eradicated, the policies to eradicate corruption should 
be taken seriously by the governments of these countries and anyone found liable 
should be prosecuted no matter his/her position in the society.  
6. Moreover, the study also recommends that attention should be paid on the 
development of political institutions. This is achievable when the relevant 
authorities in a country develop an environment in which fair and predictable 
rules form the basis for economic and social interactions. This in turn would 
measure the quality of contract enforcement, the police and the courts. It also 
entails the government’s administrative capacity in enforcing the law in order to 
forestall strong legal systems. In addition to this, is the provision of a conducive 
peaceful political atmosphere needed for investment, trade and economic growth. 
7. Yet another recommendation the study made is the need for the governments of 
these SSA countries to make extractable rents paid on natural resources to be less 
cumbersome to pay; if this is done, the exports of these resources will be 
encouraged, thereby generating revenue needed for the growth of these SSA 
countries. If the governments do not do this, the outcome could be that these 
extractable rents sometimes appear to make the development of institutions of 
private property more difficult, thus giving rise to ‘resource curse’ (Straub, 2000). 
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To make matters worse, corrupt public officials are likely to capitalize on this and 
divert revenue that ought to go into government coffers into their private pockets. 
8. Finally, the study recommends that there is a need for the selected SSA 
countries to keep improving on their level of growth by ensuring that they surpass 
the growth level of the preceding year. If this is maintained, these countries will 
keep experiencing more growth and not have stagnant or retarded growth. One of 
the ways this can be done is for these countries to encourage export promotion 
that will make them exporting countries rather just being importing countries. 
When this is done, they will earn foreign exchange that will be used for 
investment purposes. Another measure that the governments of these SSA 
countries can take in order to experience an improvement in the growth rates of 
the selected SSA countries, they should embark on viable economic policies that 
will, ceteris paribus, help contribute to economic growth annually in a 
progressive manner.  
 
6.4 Conclusion 
In the recent era especially in the wake of the 1990s, there has been an increased 
interest on trade liberalization, institutions and their influence on economic 
growth. As was elucidated in the study, though there have been increased research 
efforts on trade liberalization, most of the studies relate trade liberalization to 
economic growth, manufacturing and output growth among others. But just a few 
studies focused on the impact of trade liberalization and institutions on economic 
growth especially in SSA; other studies have used countries in Asia, Europe and 
the Americas as case studies. In addition, this study examined the influence of 
economic, political and cultural institutions on economic growth. 
In view of the above and poised with the need for knowledge contribution, this 
study used a sample of thirty (30) countries in SSA for the period 1985-2012 to 
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empirically evaluate the impact of trade liberalization and institutions on 
economic growth. In achieving the empirical expectation, the study engaged the 
use of time series and cross-sectional data sourced from international databases. 
The study made use of two estimation techniques. The first aspect of the 
econometric estimation process involved the use of the Least Squares Dummy 
Variable (LSDV) technique. While the second aspect of the estimation process in 
this study employed the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) technique. The 
major findings from this study revealed that trade liberalization and institutions 
have significant impacts on economic growth. For these SSA countries to harness 
maximum gains from international trade, there has to be the presence of strong 
institutions. 
Conclusively, the study has made contribution by increasing the level of empirical 
researches that have been carried out on the link between trade liberalization, 
institutions and economic growth especially in SSA. Therefore, there is a need for 
the governments of SSA countries, especially the sampled countries to wake up 
from their slumber and pursue the growth of their economies vigorously so that 
they can compete with the developed countries. 
 
6.5 Limitations of the Study  
Some other similar studies had used gravity model because they examined the 
direction of trade, but this study examined the impact of trade liberalization and 
institutions on economic growth using the LSDV and GMM techniques, totally 
different from these other studies. One major limitation this study encountered 
was the unavailability of data which made the researcher to use some other 
alternative variables instead of the original variables envisaged. For instance, 
efforts were made to use other institutional measures instead of the World 
Governance Indicators (WGI) because the time frame of this study was from 
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1985-2012, but data for WGI were only available for 1997-2010. Therefore, in 
order to avoid distorted results, we had to use other measures which had data for 
the period covered in this study; and could also measure the institutional variables 
used in this study. 
The study attempted embarking on some field visits to some countries like 
Botswana and South Africa which are known to be examples of countries with 
good institutions in SSA, to examine their trade capacity as influenced by their 
institutional quality. However, the exercise became elusive as a result of 
limitations of funds and logistics. Therefore, this aspect can be embarked upon in 
further research when examining a single country or a-two country analysis in a 
comparative manner, to carry out an in-depth case study. This will further help in 
adequately appraising the role of institutions in determining trade liberalization in 
countries. 
Lastly, another limitation encountered during the research work has to do with the 
computer software package used. The author had wanted to initially use Eviews7 
software package to carry out the estimations but had to change to the usage of 
STATA 11.0 software package because of its suitability to do the estimations. It 
took the author some few weeks to learn how to use STATA. This experience has 
really been very beneficial to the author as it had broadened her knowledge about 
the software package.     
 
6.5.1 Suggestions for Further Studies 
This study examined the impact of trade liberalization and institutions (focusing 
on economic, political and cultural institutions) on economic growth. Since there 
are other forms of institutions like financial and legal, the researcher suggests 
further research in this other forms of institutions and trade liberalization on 
economic growth. Closely linked to this is the fact that further research can make 
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use of other econometric techniques like Vector Auto Regression (VAR) and Two 
Stage Least Squares (2SLS) techniques which is different from the LSDV and 
GMM techniques used by this study. 
This study used both cross-sectional and time series data and it focused on thirty 
(30) SSA countries. Further research can be done using the case of a single 
country like Nigeria, Ghana, South Africa or any other country of interest or 
examining two countries in a comparative manner to carry out an in-depth case 
study. This will enable the researcher see what the result would look like and will 
entail using only time series data. The one-country or two-country study would be 
country specific unlike the results that borders on the combination of countries.  
Another suggested area in which further research can be carried out is in the area 
of examining the influence of institutions on trade liberalization. This is 
imperative in order to find out empirically whether the quality of institutions in a 
country has any significant effect on international trade performance. This will 
help in complementing the findings of this study. This study did not focus on this 
because it was not part of the objectives. 
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CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE 
1. Generally, it is assumed from the literature that time series data are 
stationary in nature. This prompted this study to carry out panel unit root 
tests to verify if the variables used in the model specified in this study are 
stationary or non-stationary. The results showed that the variables were 
stationary which means that the results of this study are not only relevant 
in the present time but it can also be generalized in the future time period. 
Invariably, the results obtained from this study are not spurious. This is 
one of the major contributions of this study to knowledge as the other 
studies did not carry out panel unit root tests. 
2. This study helped us to understand the divergence/similarity across SSA 
countries in institutions and trade. The study examined the selected SSA 
countries in terms of their sub-regional classification, that is, Central, 
West and East/Southern Africa sub-regions; and the World Bank’s 
classification of countries into moderately inward-oriented (MIOC), 
strongly inward-oriented (SIOC) and moderately outward-oriented 
countries (MOOC). Coupled with this is the fact that, the study made a 
departure from some other similar studies (in terms of scope and 
methodology) in that it made use of pooled data (a combination of time 
series and cross-sectional data) to find out the impact of trade 
liberalization and institutions on economic growth in selected SSA 
countries using the LSDV and GMM techniques. Some of the other 
studies have used such econometric techniques like gravity models, panel 
data to analyze their data. 
3. This study also looked at the interaction effect of trade liberalization and 
economic, political and cultural institutions individually in order to find 
out under which type of institutional framework will trade liberalization 
have a better significant impact on economic growth. The study found 
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from empirical analysis that trade liberalization affects economic growth 
more significantly when strong political and cultural institutions are 
involved than when strong economic institutions are involved. This study 
makes its contribution in this area. 
4. The discourse in literature is that institutions are important in determining 
the impact of trade liberalization on economic growth. In other words, the 
extent of the impact of trade liberalization on economic growth depends 
on the quality of institutions in the country. Therefore, by examining the 
link between trade liberalization, institutions and economic growth, this 
study had been able to validate this theoretical assertion because using 
empirical data from the sampled SSA countries, it was seen that the 
quality of institutions affect the effect of trade liberalization on economic 
growth. 
5. The results of this study would assist in policy formulations in respect of 
trade liberalization, institutions (economic, political, cultural) and 
economic growth. This is crucial for investment and savings-output 
growth in these selected SSA countries. This means that these SSA 
countries have to see to the effective implementation of reasonable 
policies that will help boost exports and reduce their reliance on imports. 
This has not been extensively researched into, especially, in Sub-saharan 
Africa, so this study is making a contribution in this aspect, in order for 
the government authorities in these selected SSA countries to put in place 
measures that will help improve the quality of their institutions as well as 
measures that will boost social infrastructures which will further improve 
trade among the selected SSA countries. This definitely will boost 
economic growth in these SSA countries.  
6. The quality of institutions goes a long way in affecting the economic 
growth of any country. It is in this light that this study looked at how the 
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quality of economic, political and cultural institutions has impacted 
economic growth in our selected SSA countries. One interesting thing is 
that the analysis of the impact of these institutions on economic growth 
was done one by one (that is, the analysis of the impact of economic, 
political and cultural institutions on economic growth was done 
individually). The study made its contribution to knowledge in this area as 
just a few studies have attempted to examine this combination in Nigeria.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix I: Panel Data Structure and List of Countries 
Table A1.1: Panel Data Structure 
   i                                          t                         y                             x                 
 1                                          t1                    y11                         x11       
   1                                          t2                    y12                         x12                                                     
   1                                          t3                    y13                         x13   
    .                                          .                       .                            .           
    .                                          .                       .                            .      
    .                                          .                       .                            .     
   1                                          tT                     yT1                         xT1          
   2                                          t1                     y21                          x21   
   2                                          t2                     y22                          x22 
   2                                          t3                     y23                          x23      
    .                                               .                   .                              . 
    .                                               .                   .                              . 
    .                                               .                   .                              . 
   2                                              tT                       yT2                                xT2 
   .                                               .                     .                            .          
   .                                               .                     .                            .  
   .                                               .                    .                             . 
   N                                             tN                  yTN                               xTN 
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Table A1.2: List of Countries and their Identifier (id) 
id       Central Africa                       id  East and Southern Africa                        id       West  Africa 
 1       Angola                                   3   Botswana                                                 2     Benin Republic 
4       Burundi                                  10  Djibouti                                                   6      Cape Verde 
5       Cameroon                              12   Ethiopia                                                   9      Cote d’Ivoire 
7       Chad                                      16   Kenya                                                      14     Gambia 
8       Congo                                    17   Lesotho                                                   15      Ghana             
11    Equatorial Guinea                  18   Madagascar                                             21      Niger        
13   Gabon                                     19   Malawi                                                     22     Nigeria 
23   Rwanda                                  20   Mozambique                                             24    Senegal 
                                                      25   South Africa 
                                                      26   Sudan 
                                                      27  Swaziland 
                                                      28  Tanzania 
                                                      29  Uganda 
                                                      30  Zambia        
Source: UNCTAD (2009) Handbook of Statistics; WTO (2009) International Trade Statistics 
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Table A1.3: List of selected SSA countries based on trade-oriented Classification 
Moderately Inward-
Oriented Countries 
Strongly Inward-Oriented 
Countries 
Moderately Outward-
Oriented Countries 
Botswana Angola Benin Republic 
Cameroon Burundi Chad 
Cape Verde Ethiopia Congo Republic 
Cote d’Ivoire Ghana Equatorial Guinea 
Djibouti Madagascar Gabon 
Gambia Nigeria Mozambique 
Kenya South Africa Niger 
Lesotho Sudan Rwanda 
Malawi Tanzania Swaziland 
Senegal Zambia Uganda 
 Source: World Bank, 2007. 
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APPENDIX II: Hausman Test 
Table A2.1: Hausman Test between FE and RE 
hausman fe re 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |              (b)               (B)                 (b-B)        sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
             |              fe                 re              Difference             S.E. 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     lgdpini |   -.3432096    -.3287435       -.0144661        .0064746 
       lgkap |    .3581586     .3630029       -.0048443        .0107187 
      lssenr |   -.1031496    -.0765512       -.0265984        .0208099 
      lpsenr |    .2130704     .2293822       -.0163118        .0089972 
        llab |      .0479995     .1783024       -.1303029        .0866996 
       lopen |   -.1290892    -.1018618       -.0272273        .0085452 
    lethsion |   -.3481124   -.3592369        .0111246        .0136384 
    lreprisk |    .0879661     .1198021        -.031836        .0232223 
     lpolrig |   -.1203411    -.1522454        .0319043        .0146906 
      ltaxes |   -.1139865    -.1117163       -.0022702        .0123415 
       lnare |   -.0422849    -.0430707        .0007858        .0011651 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
                 chi2(11) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =    5.63     
                 Prob>chi2 =      0.0008 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 
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APPENDIX III: Unit Root Tests 
Table A3.1: Sample of Panel Unit Root Tests’ Results 
xtunitroot fisher Lngrgdp, dfuller lags(0) 
Fisher-type unit-root test for Lngrgdp 
Based on augmented Dickey-Fuller tests 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels       =       30 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Avg. number of periods =  26 
AR parameter: Panel-specific                Asymptotics: T -> Infinity 
Panel means:  Included 
Time trend:   Not included 
Drift term:   Not included                                        ADF regressions: 0 lags 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                                            Statistic                p-value 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Inverse chi-squared(34)         P           206.0207              0.0000 
 Inverse normal                     Z            -10.1510               0.0000 
 Inverse logit t(89)                 L*         -13.6912               0.0000 
 Modified inv. chi-squared    Pm          20.8606              0.0000 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 P statistic requires number of panels to be finite. 
 Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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xtunitroot fisher Lngkap, dfuller lags(0) 
Fisher-type unit-root test for Lngkap 
Based on augmented Dickey-Fuller tests 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels  =       30 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Number of periods =     26 
AR parameter: Panel-specific                Asymptotics: T -> Infinity 
Panel means:  Included 
Time trend:   Not included 
Drift term:   Not included                         ADF regressions: 0 lags 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                                           Statistic      p-value 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Inverse chi-squared(34)         P         142.8909       0.0034 
 Inverse normal                       Z          3.8298          0.0023 
 Inverse logit t(89)                  L*        3.8968          0.0036 
 Modified inv. chi-squared     Pm       -1.5618         0.0043 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 P statistic requires number of panels to be finite. 
 Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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xtunitroot fisher Lnethsion, dfuller lags(0) 
Fisher-type unit-root test for Lnethsion 
Based on augmented Dickey-Fuller tests 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots             Number of panels  =     30 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Number of periods =     26 
AR parameter: Panel-specific                 Asymptotics: T -> Infinity 
Panel means:  Included 
Time trend:   Not included 
Drift term:   Not included                        ADF regressions: 0 lags 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                                         Statistic      p-value 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Inverse chi-squared(60)        P        244.4732       0.0000 
 Inverse normal                     Z        -8.9857          0.0000 
 Inverse logit t(154)             L*       -10.9129        0.0000 
 Modified inv. chi-squared  Pm       16.8400        0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 P statistic requires number of panels to be finite. 
 Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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xtunitroot fisher Lnopen, dfuller lags(0) 
Fisher-type unit-root test for Lnopen 
Based on augmented Dickey-Fuller tests 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots             Number of panels  =     30 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Number of periods =     26 
AR parameter: Panel-specific                  Asymptotics: T -> Infinity 
Panel means:  Included 
Time trend:   Not included 
Drift term:   Not included                         ADF regressions: 0 lags 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                                       Statistic         p-value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Inverse chi-squared(34)          P       181.0937       0.0002 
 Inverse normal                       Z         -8.4681        0.0019 
 Inverse logit t(89)                  L*       -7.9269        0.0017 
 Modified inv. chi-squared      Pm        1.9256       0.0021 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 P statistic requires number of panels to be finite. 
 Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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APPENDIX IV: Sample of Results of the Growth Model 
Table A4.1: LSDV Result for Growth Model  
reg lgrgdp lgdpini lgkap lssenr lpsenr llab lopen lethsion lreprisk lpolrig ltaxes lnare 
icountry* 
note: icountry28 omitted because of collinearity. 
      Source |       SS       df       MS                                  Number of obs =     713 
-------------+-----------------------------------                        F( 40,   672) =    5.02 
       Model |  135.113944    403.3778486                           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  452.274621   672.67302771                          R-squared    =  0.2300 
-------------+-----------------------------------                       Adj R-squared =  0.1842 
       Total |  587.388565   712.824983939                         Root MSE      =  .82038 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      lgrgdp |       Coef.      Std. Err.        t    P>|t|        [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     lgdpini |  -.4148712   .1106929    -3.75   0.000    -.6322167   -.1975257 
       lgkap |   .4761802    .0705585     6.75   0.000     .3376386    .6147218 
      lssenr |   .3041398    .1610337      1.99   0.059     .6203296        .01205 
      lpsenr |   .4611186   .2228887      2.07    0.039     .0234766     .8987606 
        llab |     .6114035   .3505111     1.75    0.080      2.781289     1.558482 
       lopen |   .0229637   .0173809      1.97    0.067      .2927111    .2467837 
    lethsion |  -.7442852   .3684059    -2.07    0.044       -.509225   -1.997795 
    lreprisk |   .0920866    .0683449     1.92    0.073      .1599187     .3440919 
     lpolrig |     .341813     .1039033    3.29    0.001     .5458273     .1377988 
      ltaxes |   .1977974     .1054677     1.86   0.074      .4834232     .0878285 
       lnare |     .0327056   .0160915     1.91   0.087      .0701918    .0047806 
   icountry1 |   .5273634   .3371118     1.56   0.118    -.1345556    1.189283 
   icountry2 |  -.0268298   .4233578    -0.06   0.949     -.858093    .8044334 
   icountry3 |  -.0269343   .8273293    -0.03   0.974    -1.651396    1.597527 
   icountry4 |   -.143129   .3914021    -0.37   0.715    -.9116472    .6253891 
   icountry5 |   .1650519   .5139374     0.32   0.748    -.8440644    1.174168 
   icountry6 |   .4746588   .7542866     0.63   0.529    -1.006383    1.955701 
   icountry7 |   .3143345   .4136605     0.76   0.448    -.4978881    1.126557 
   icountry8 |  -.1375767    .558755    -0.25   0.806    -1.234692     .959539 
   icountry9 |   .1355002   .5036818     0.27   0.788    -.8534792     1.12448 
  icountry10 |   .7519998   .5945477     1.26   0.206    -.4153949    1.919394 
  icountry11 |   1.783471   .6341122     2.81   0.005     .5383915    3.028551 
  icountry12 |   .9846446    .362228     2.72   0.007     .2734097    1.695879 
  icountry13 |   .0561879   .6136292     0.09   0.927    -1.148673    1.261049 
  icountry14 |    .206633    .6627676     0.31   0.755    -1.094711    1.507977 
  icountry15 |   .1649837   .5222536     0.32   0.752    -.8604615    1.190429 
  icountry16 |  -.1706129   .4622735    -0.37   0.712    -1.078287    .7370613 
  icountry17 |  -.5302945   .8149181    -0.65   0.515    -2.130386    1.069797 
  icountry18 |  -.5122939   .4466417    -1.15   0.252    -1.389275    .3646873 
  icountry19 |   .1513918   .4586873     0.33   0.741    -.7492409    1.052024 
  icountry20 |   .3471121   .3471823     1.00   0.318    -.3345804    1.028805 
  icountry21 |  -.0084128   .5180548    -0.02   0.987    -1.025614    1.008788 
  icountry22 |   .6937846   .6695344     1.04   0.300    -.6208465    2.008416 
  icountry23 |   .2162839    .453605      0.48   0.634    -.6743697    1.106937 
  icountry24 |  -.0730313   .4569274    -0.16   0.873    -.9702085    .8241459 
  icountry25 |  -.5332762   .9229837    -0.58   0.564    -2.345555    1.279003 
  icountry26 |   .8615305   .7388836     1.17   0.244    -.5892678    2.312329 
  icountry27 |   .0675902   .7431856     0.09   0.928    -1.391655    1.526835 
  icountry28 |  (omitted) 
  icountry29 |   .3197738   .3166972     1.01   0.313    -.3020612    .9416088 
  icountry30 |   .0633199   .5212374     0.12   0.903    -.9601299     1.08677 
       _cons |     2.068695   5.335903       1.79   0.098    -8.408351    12.54574 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Table A4.2: Step-wise Regression Results of Growth Model 
reg lgrgdp lgdpini lgkap lssenr lpsenr llab lopen ltaxes lnare icountry* 
note: icountry10 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Growth / Trade Liberalization  
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS                         Number of obs = 713 
-------------+------------------------------------            F( 37,   675) =  4.99 
       Model |  126.128041    373.40886597              Prob > F  =  0.0000 
    Residual |  461.260524   675.683348924             R-squared  =  0.2154 
-------------+-----------------------------------            Adj R-squared = 0.1722 
       Total |  587.388565   712.824983939               Root MSE      =  .82665 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      lgrgdp |      Coef.       Std. Err.      t    P>|t|         [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     lgdpini |   -.406616   .1113258     -3.65   0.000    -.6252025   -.1880296 
       lgkap |   .4527375   .0695055      6.51   0.000     .3162644    .5892105 
      lssenr |   .1924838   .0980682       2.07   0.024     .5028484    .1178807 
      lpsenr |   .4397776   .2242079      1.99   0.050     .0004511    .8800064 
        llab |   .7194699    .3512835       2.25   0.018     2.904505    1.465566 
       lopen |    .093544   .0537967      1.79   0.085     .1691637    .3562518 
      ltaxes |   .0765706    .041418       1.74   0.089     .3550712      .20193 
       lnare |   .0364724   .0241202      1.98   0.057     .0740147    .0010699 
   icountry1 |   -.105071    .533569    -0.20   0.844    -1.152726    .9425834 
   icountry2 |  -.1978111    .404198    -0.49   0.625    -.9914477    .5958255 
   icountry3 |   -.415223   .7557625    -0.55   0.583    -1.899151    1.068705 
   icountry4 |  -.3551888    .444491    -0.80   0.425     -1.22794    .5175626 
   icountry5 |  -.4558206   .6212522    -0.73   0.463     -1.67564    .7639986 
   icountry6 |  -.3813768   .5238099    -0.73   0.467     -1.40987     .647116 
   icountry7 |   -.229786   .4441759    -0.52   0.605    -1.101918    .6423465 
   icountry8 |  -.5962839    .471997    -1.26   0.207    -1.523043    .3304749 
   icountry9 |  -.6233607   .5336982    -1.17   0.243    -1.671269    .4245475 
  icountry10 |  (omitted) 
  icountry11 |   .6720915   .4548889     1.48   0.140    -.2210758    1.565259 
  icountry12 |   .4524753   .4646358     0.97   0.330    -.4598299    1.364781 
  icountry13 |  -.3301593   .5630773    -0.59   0.558    -1.435753    .7754343 
  icountry14 |  -.0580962   .3183357    -0.18   0.855    -.6831434     .566951 
  icountry15 |  -.0399964   .4612486    -0.09   0.931     -.945651    .8656582 
  icountry16 |  -.4570551   .4508073    -1.01   0.311    -1.342208    .4280982 
  icountry17 |  -1.001464   .6234828    -1.61   0.109    -2.225663     .222735 
  icountry18 |   -.716826   .4117143    -1.74   0.082    -1.525221    .0915687 
  icountry19 |  -.2747091   .4027873    -0.68   0.495    -1.065576    .5161576 
  icountry20 |   .0805594   .4454335     0.18   0.857    -.7940424    .9551612 
  icountry21 |  -.4849034   .5133291    -0.94   0.345    -1.492817    .5230105 
  icountry22 |    -.21548   .7521711       1.79   0.075     1.692356    1.261396 
  icountry23 |  -.0004536   .4283557     1.70   0.099     .8415234    .8406161 
  icountry24 |  -.3265639   .4578297     1.91   0.076    -1.225505    .5723778 
  icountry25 |  -1.026358   1.015511     2.21   0.013     3.020297     .967582 
  icountry26 |  .5057745   .8117125      0.62   0.533     -1.08801      2.09956 
  icountry27 |  -.8938846   .5746077    -1.56   0.120    -2.022118    .2343489 
  icountry28 |  -.3710851   .5847243    -0.63   0.526    -1.519182     .777012 
  icountry29 |   .0259133   .4729886     0.05   0.956    -.9027926    .9546191 
  icountry30 |  -.2679946   .5626952    -0.48   0.634    -1.372838    .8368488 
       _cons   |   3.361798   5.150849     2.65   0.014    -6.751814    13.47541 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Growth / Economic Institutions 
reg lgrgdp lgdpini lgkap lssenr lpsenr llab lopen lreprisk ltaxes lnare icountry* 
note: icountry10 omitted because of collinearity 
    Source |       SS       df       MS                              Number of obs =     713 
-------------+--------------------------------------               F( 38,   674) =    4.88 
       Model |  126.690722    38  3.33396636               Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  460.697843   674  .683527957             R-squared     =  0.2163 
-------------+--------------------------------------               Adj R-squared =  0.1724 
       Total |  587.388565   712  .824983939                Root MSE      =  .82676 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      lgrgdp |      Coef.       Std. Err.       t       P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     lgdpini |  -.4057247   .1113447    -3.64   0.000    -.6243489   -.1871006 
       lgkap |   .4455592   .0699634      6.37   0.000     .3081868    .5829317 
      lssenr |    .1820431   .1058507      1.99   0.051     .4932704    .1291842 
      lpsenr |   .4344218   .2243149       1.94   0.053     .0060183    .8748619 
        llab |   .6893859    .3313475       2.02   0.036     2.875683    1.496911 
       lopen |   .0994784    .133974       1.98   0.058     .1635781     .362535 
    lreprisk |    .117173   .0921442       1.91   0.065     .1364002    .3707463 
      ltaxes |   .0705138    .0340155      2.09   0.020     .3493599    .2083323 
       lnare |   .0363668    .0291231      1.98   0.058     .0739148    .0011812 
   icountry1 |  -.0965593   .5337213    -0.18   0.856    -1.144516    .9513971 
   icountry2 |  -.1947086   .4042654    -0.48   0.630    -.9884797    .5990624 
   icountry3 |  -.3969635   .7561294    -0.52   0.600    -1.881616    1.087689 
   icountry4 |  -.3333866   .4451982    -0.75   0.454    -1.207529    .5407557 
   icountry5 |  -.4215428   .6224812    -0.68   0.499    -1.643778    .8006926 
   icountry6 |  -.3729292   .5239613    -0.71   0.477    -1.401722    .6558635 
   icountry7 |   -.241672   .4444272    -0.54   0.587      -1.1143    .6309563 
   icountry8 |  -.6362921   .4741138    -1.34   0.180     -1.56721    .2946256 
   icountry9 |  -.6387462   .5340374    -1.20   0.232    -1.687323    .4098309 
  icountry10 |  (omitted) 
  icountry11 |   .6897946   .4553667     1.51   0.130    -.2043133    1.583902 
  icountry12 |   .4456036   .4647583     0.96   0.338    -.4669447    1.358152 
  icountry13 |  -.3275801   .5631582    -0.58   0.561    -1.433336    .7781753 
  icountry14 |  -.0784424   .3191661    -0.25   0.806    -.7051219     .548237 
  icountry15 |   -.026685   .4615423    -0.06   0.954    -.9329186    .8795487 
  icountry16 |  -.4540906   .4508782    -1.01   0.314    -1.339385    .4312042 
  icountry17 |   -.989645   .6237005    -1.59   0.113    -2.214275    .2349847 
  icountry18 |  -.7149946   .4117732    -1.74   0.083    -1.523507    .0935179 
  icountry19 |  -.2642883   .4030038    -0.66   0.512    -1.055582    .5270055 
  icountry20 |   .0901548   .4456173     0.20   0.840    -.7848104    .9651199 
  icountry21 |  -.4597313   .5141455    -0.89   0.372    -1.469251    .5497882 
  icountry22 |  -.2243243   .7523328    -0.30   0.766    -1.701522    1.252874 
  icountry23 |   .0193558   .4289677     0.05   0.964     -.822918    .8616296 
  icountry24 |  -.3003022   .4588036    -0.65   0.513    -1.201159     .600554 
  icountry25 |  -1.035666   1.015696    -1.02   0.308    -3.029974    .9586416 
  icountry26 |   .4928964   .8119429     0.61   0.544    -1.101345    2.087138 
  icountry27 |  -.8763558   .5750077    -1.52   0.128    -2.005378    .2526659 
  icountry28 |   -.334788   .5861676    -0.57   0.568    -1.485722    .8161462 
  icountry29 |   .0385187   .4732545     0.08   0.935    -.8907118    .9677492 
  icountry30 |  -.2447231   .5633531    -0.43   0.664    -1.350861    .8614151 
       _cons |   3.198468   5.154668        2.02   0.035    -6.922671    13.31961 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Growth/Political Institutions 
 
reg lgrgdp lgdpini lgkap lssenr lpsenr llab lopen lpolrig ltaxes lnare icountry* 
note: icountry10 omitted because of collinearity 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS                        Number of obs = 713 
-------------+------------------------------------            F( 38,   674) = 5.23 
       Model |   133.82866    383.52180684            Prob > F  =  0.0000 
    Residual |  453.559905   674.672937545          R-squared  =  0.2281 
-------------+------------------------------------            Adj R-squared =  0.1843 
       Total |  587.388565   712  .824983939            Root MSE  =  .82033 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      lgrgdp |      Coef.      Std. Err.         t         P>|t|      [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     lgdpini |   -.407737    .110475    -3.69   0.000    -.6246535   -.1908206 
       lgkap |   .4891793   .0698102     7.01   0.000     .3521077     .626251 
      lssenr |    .298944    .1599854     1.87   0.062    -.6130736    .0151856 
      lpsenr |   .4726743   .2227058     2.12   0.034     .0353938    .9099548 
        llab |   .6453907    .4110454     1.88   0.059    -2.814149    1.523367 
       lopen |   .2140204    .106528     2.10   0.018    -.2820917    .2540509 
     lpolrig |   .3507054   .1036733     3.38   0.001     -.554267   -.1471439 
      ltaxes |   .1870721     .114496     1.79   0.096    -.4707887    .0966444 
       lnare |    .031117        .01904     2.63   0.003    -.0685018    .0062677 
   icountry1 |  -.3027934    .532705    -0.57   0.570    -1.348754    .7431675 
   icountry2 |  -.6101411   .4192185    -1.46   0.146    -1.433272    .2129901 
   icountry3 |   -.659353   .7534474    -0.88   0.382    -2.138739    .8200333 
   icountry4 |  -.6894553   .4520246    -1.53   0.128    -1.577001    .1980905 
   icountry5 |  -.6663462   .6196347    -1.08   0.083    -1.882993    .5503002 
   icountry6 |  -.6261725   .5248173    -1.19   0.233    -1.656646    .4043009 
   icountry7 |  -.4459104   .4453854    -1.00   0.317     -1.32042    .4285993 
   icountry8 |  -.7122809    .469641    -1.52   0.130    -1.634416    .2098545 
   icountry9 |  -.6773681   .5298575    -1.28   0.202    -1.717738    .3630018 
  icountry10 |  (omitted) 
  icountry11 |   .6923507     .45145     1.53   0.126    -.1940668    1.578768 
  icountry12 |   .2033329   .4669277     0.44   0.663     -.713475    1.120141 
  icountry13 |  -.4140977    .559322    -0.74   0.459    -1.512321    .6841254 
  icountry14 |  -.1587481   .3172994    -0.50   0.617    -.7817623    .4642661 
  icountry15 |   -.293543   .4638175    -0.63   0.527    -1.204244    .6171579 
  icountry16 |  -.6397217   .4506071    -1.42   0.056    -1.524484    .2450408 
  icountry17 |  -1.000372    .618715    -1.62   0.106    -2.215213    .2144687 
  icountry18 |  -.9483918   .4142608    -2.29   0.022    -1.761789   -.1349949 
  icountry19 |  -.4333775   .4024498    -1.08   0.282    -1.223584    .3568286 
  icountry20 |  -.2157482   .4506223    -0.48   0.632    -1.100541    .6690442 
  icountry21 |  -.7760481   .5166231    -1.50   0.134    -1.790432    .2383362 
  icountry22 |  -.3540633   .7475425    -0.47   0.636    -1.821855    1.113729 
  icountry23 |  -.1909906   .4287954    -0.45   0.656    -1.032926    .6509449 
  icountry24 |  -.6657283     .46526    -1.43   0.153    -1.579262    .2478051 
  icountry25 |   -1.36266   1.012637    -1.35   0.179    -3.350962    .6256422 
  icountry26 |   .2601547    .808771     0.32   0.748    -1.327859    1.848168 
  icountry27 |  -.7180885   .5725768    -1.25   0.210    -1.842337    .4061603 
  icountry28 |  -.7799266   .5927059    -1.32   0.189    -1.943699    .3838454 
  icountry29 |  -.2604181   .4769426    -0.55   0.585     -1.19689    .6760538 
  icountry30 |  -.5196627   .5633264    -0.92   0.357    -1.625748    .5864231 
       _cons |   .3146678   .1711554     1.88   0.098    -6.569697    13.50327 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Growth/Cultural Institutions 
 
reg lgrgdp lgdpini lgkap lssenr lpsenr llab lopen lethsion ltaxes lnare icountry* 
note: icountry17 omitted because of collinearity 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS                             Number of obs = 713 
-------------+-------------------------------------                F( 38,   674) = 4.91 
       Model |  127.304013    383.35010559                  Prob > F =  0.0000 
    Residual |  460.084552   674.68261803                  R-squared  =  0.2171 
-------------+-------------------------------------               Adj R-squared = 0.1733 
       Total |  587.388565   712.824983939                  Root MSE  = .82621 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      lgrgdp |      Coef.       Std. Err.       t      P>|t|        [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     lgdpini |  -.4155215   .1114729    -3.73   0.000    -.6343974   -.1966455 
       lgkap |   .4454509    .0696898     6.39   0.000     .3086156    .5822861 
      lssenr |   .2107188    .1285934     1.73    0.084     .5221152    .1006777 
      lpsenr |   .4324019   .2241584     1.93    0.054     .0077309    .8725346 
        llab |   .7056272      .311122      2.03   0.026     2.889598    1.478343 
       lopen |   .0750441   .0444659      1.96   0.077     .1889783    .3390665 
    lethsion |  -.8429511   .5422333    -1.91   0.090     .4180676     2.10397 
      ltaxes |   .0972819    .1426396     1.88   0.095     .3773534    .1827895 
       lnare |   .0382118    .0191559     1.99   0.046     .0758242   -.0005994 
   icountry1 |    1.30144   .7391116     1.76   0.079    -.1497979    2.752678 
   icountry2 |   .9277836   .5244888     1.77   0.077    -.1020449    1.957612 
   icountry3 |   .7573282   .3884073     1.95   0.052    -.0053056    1.519962 
   icountry4 |   .7141153   .7045556     1.01   0.311    -.6692724    2.097503 
   icountry5 |    .928795    .6103377     1.52   0.129     -.269597    2.127187 
   icountry6 |   1.330396   .6076492     2.19   0.029     .1372831    2.523509 
   icountry7 |   1.115173   .5830701     1.91   0.056    -.0296794    2.260025 
   icountry8 |   .5664447    .480045     1.18   0.238    -.3761188    1.509008 
   icountry9 |    .788968   .5702801     1.38   0.167    -.3307713    1.908707 
  icountry10 |   1.331248    .671897     1.98   0.048     .0119847    2.650511 
  icountry11 |    2.37224   .6434051     3.69   0.000      1.10892    3.635559 
  icountry12 |   1.815882   .7052551     2.57   0.010     .4311211    3.200644 
  icountry13 |   .6773228   .4046882     1.67   0.095    -.1172784    1.471924 
  icountry14 |   .8505002   .5048814     1.68   0.093    -.1408293     1.84183 
  icountry15 |   .9397446   .5009525     1.88   0.061    -.0438705     1.92336 
  icountry16 |    .545916   .5739553     0.95   0.342    -.5810394    1.672871 
  icountry17 |  (omitted) 
  icountry18 |   .2483624   .6298065     0.39   0.693    -.9882563    1.484981 
  icountry19 |   .8533074   .5077735     1.68   0.093    -.1437008    1.850316 
  icountry20 |   1.180545   .6322546     1.87   0.062    -.0608809     2.42197 
  icountry21 |   .8332863   .5043442     1.65   0.099    -.1569885    1.823561 
  icountry22 |   1.454727   .7428235     1.96   0.051    -.0037993    2.913254 
  icountry23 |   .9172667   .6673088     1.37   0.170    -.3929874    2.227521 
  icountry24 |   .7911483   .4958351     1.60   0.111     -.182419    1.764716 
  icountry25 |   .3911602   .7398873     0.53   0.597    -1.061601    1.843921 
  icountry26 |    1.67084   .5800864     2.88   0.004     .5318463    2.809834 
  icountry27 |   .4649529   .3764753     1.24   0.217    -.2742525    1.204158 
  icountry28 |   .9477432   .8094809     1.17   0.242    -.6416644    2.537151 
  icountry29 |   1.143135   .6949361     1.64   0.100    -.2213651    2.507635 
  icountry30 |   .8438893   .4600389     1.83   0.067    -.0593925    1.747171 
       _cons |   .1447203     .0847371     1.91   0.060    -7.854226    10.74863 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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APPENDIX V: Robustness Check  
Table A5.1: Robustness Check Results  
reg lgrgdp lgdpini lgkap lssenr lpsenr llab lopen lethsion lreprisk lpolrig ltaxes lnare lcim lfdi 
lecofre icountry*   note: icountry6 omitted because of collinearity 
note: icountry21 omitted because of collinearity 
     Source |       SS       df       MS                                   Number of obs =   626 
-------------+-------------------------------------------             F( 42,   583) =    4.46 
       Model |  114.608014    42  .72876225                        Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  356.732416   583.611890936                       R-squared     =  0.2332 
-------------+-------------------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1846 
       Total |   471.34043   625 .754144688                          Root MSE   =  .78223 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      lgrgdp |      Coef.          Std. Err.      t         P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     lgdpini |   -.450056   .1111431    -4.05   0.000    -.6683457   -.2317662 
       lgkap |   .4587062   .0733211     6.26   0.000     .3147006    .6027118 
      lssenr |   .2730878    .127104       2.63   0.003      .601287    .0551114 
      lpsenr |   .2660575   .2463512     1.88   0.081     .2177864    .7499014 
        llab |   .3503199      .261125      1.99   0.053     2.535375    1.834735 
       lopen |     .05218     .0230231      2.36   0.015     .3330833    .2287233 
    lethsion |   -.024565   .0192115    -1.94   0.070    -1.270154    1.319284 
    lreprisk |   .0817099   .0372258     2.22   0.037     .1780505    .3414704 
     lpolrig |   .2597552   .1097736      2.37   0.018      .475355     .0441553 
      ltaxes |   .0120941   .0061333      2.08   0.036     .3093195    .2851313 
       lnare |    .033138      .020082        1.65   0.099       .07258      .0063039 
        lcim |   .0328907   .0591853       1.96    0.079     .0833516    .1491331 
        lfdi |     .021699      .0255705      1.85   0.096     .0285226    .0719206 
     lecofre |  .1411445   .1189945       2.19   0.036     .3748547    .0925656 
   icountry1 |   .2682722   .6657981     0.40   0.687    -1.039383    1.575927 
   icountry2 |  -.0952886   .6268808    -0.15  0.879    -1.326508    1.135931 
   icountry3 |   .1819388   .5828357     0.31   0.755    -.9627746    1.326652 
   icountry4 |  -.1130302   .7924277    -0.14  0.887    -1.669391    1.443331 
   icountry5 |   .1863797   .5516552     0.34   0.736    -.8970938    1.269853 
   icountry6 |  (omitted) 
   icountry7 |   .5385279   .5333712     1.01   0.313    -.5090351    1.586091 
   icountry8 |   .1064343   .5926725      0.18   0.858    -1.057599    1.270468 
   icountry9 |  -.0873619   .4945729    -0.18   0.860    -1.058723    .8839997 
  icountry10 |   .3328871   .6004402     0.55   0.580    -.8464023    1.512176 
  icountry11 |   1.301777   .3164839     4.11   0.000     .6801892    1.923364 
  icountry12 |   .6570792   .6129296     1.07   0.284    -.5467399    1.860898 
  icountry13 |   .3986573   .6926739     0.58   0.565    -.9617829    1.759097 
  icountry14 |   .1908617   .7284373     0.26   0.793    -1.239819    1.621543 
  icountry15 |   .3452177   .7076349     0.49   0.626    -1.044607    1.735042 
  icountry16 |  -.0082403   .7464322    -0.01   0.991    -1.474264    1.457783 
  icountry17 |   -.471046    .628106        -0.75   0.454    -1.704672    .7625802 
  icountry18 |  -.2642804   .7943915     -0.33   0.739    -1.824498    1.295937 
  icountry19 |   .1405572   .6141931     0.23   0.819    -1.065744    1.346858 
  icountry20 |   .2570793   .7337908     0.35   0.726    -1.184116    1.698275 
  icountry21 |  (omitted) 
  icountry22 |   .3941086   .5626805     0.70   0.484    -.7110191    1.499236 
  icountry23 |   .3699169   .8477304     0.44   0.663    -1.295061    2.034894 
  icountry24 |  -.0843253   .6248933    -0.13   0.893    -1.311642    1.142991 
  icountry25 |  -.2502873   .7448919    -0.34   0.737    -1.713286    1.212711 
  icountry26 |   .8415805   .6949686     1.21   0.226    -.5233667    2.206528 
  icountry27 |  -.2367987   .4049643    -0.58   0.559    -1.032165     .558568 
  icountry28 |  -.2101601   .7815953    -0.27   0.788    -1.745246    1.324925 
  icountry29 |   .2890851   .7619279     0.38   0.705    -1.207373    1.785543 
  icountry30 |   .0638887   .6053886     0.11   0.916     -1.12512     1.252897 
       _cons |       3.118823   4.927159     2.43   0.027     -6.55832    12.79597 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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APPENDIX VI: Sample of GMM Results 
Table A6.1: GMM Results 
xtabond2 lgrgdp l.lgrgdp lgkap llab lssenr lpsenr lpolrig lreprisk lethsion lopen ltaxes lnare, gmm( lgrgdp 
l.lgrgdp lgkap llab > lssenr lpsenr lopen ltaxes lnare, collapse equation(both) lag(2 3)) iv(lpolrig lreprisk 
lethsion) ar(2) 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Group variable: id                                    Number of obs  = 605 
Time variable: year                                  Number of groups   = 30 
Number of instruments = 30                   Obs per group: min = 11 
Wald chi2(11) =  66.41                            avg = 20.17 
Prob > chi2   = 0.000                               max = 27 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      lgrgdp |      Coef.     Std. Err.       z       P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      lgrgdp | 
         L1. |   .2651947   .0534995      4.96   0.000     .1603376    .3700517 
       lgkap |   .1591261   .1194258     1.63   0.083     .0749442    .3931964 
        llab |   .4361025    .3340272     1.83    0.045     2.190783    3.062988 
      lssenr |   .0731818   .0574588     1.83    0.045     .8073617      .660998 
      lpsenr |   .2793413   .1502532    1.73    0.067     .9951316     1.553814 
     lpolrig |   .2908276   .1309085    2.22    0.026     .5474035    -.0342517 
    lreprisk |   .0467775   .0315139    1.92    0.028     .4684424     .3748873 
    lethsion |  -.3753837   .2530607   1.48    0.038    -.8713736     .1206062 
       lopen |   .0568453   .4455268    1.95    0.011    1.430062      .3163711 
      ltaxes |     .21941   .4717156      1.77    0.042     1.143955     .7051355 
       lnare |   .0235136   .0754146     1.61    0.055     .1713235    .1242963 
       _cons |  -3.715646   5.592349   -2.66    0.006    -14.67645     7.245157 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(lpolrig lreprisk lethsion) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).(lgrgdp L.lgrgdp lgkap llab lssenr lpsenr lopen ltaxes lnare) 
    collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    lpolrig lreprisk lethsion 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.(lgrgdp L.lgrgdp lgkap llab lssenr lpsenr lopen ltaxes lnare) collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -11.24  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.05  Pr > z =   0.957 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(18)   =  31.91  Prob > chi2 =   0.023 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Sargan tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Sargan test excluding group:     chi2(9)    =  17.18  Prob > chi2 =     0.046 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(9)    =  14.73  Prob > chi2 =  0.099 
  iv(lpolrig lreprisk lethsion) 
    Sargan test excluding group:     chi2(15)   =  28.38  Prob > chi2 =  0.019 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   3.54  Prob > chi2 =  0.316 
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xtabond2 lgrgdp l.lgrgdp lgkap llab lssenr lpsenr lpolrig lreprisk lethsion lopen ltaxes lnare, gmm( lgrgdp 
l.lgrgdp lgkap llab > lssenr lpsenr lopen ltaxes lnare, collapse equation(both) lag(2 3)) iv(lpolrig lreprisk 
lethsion) ar(3) h(3) twostep 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Group variable: id                                   Number of obs   = 605 
Time variable : year                                Number of groups   = 30 
Number of instruments = 30                    Obs per group: min = 11 
Wald chi2(11) = 1849.28                        avg = 20.17 
Prob > chi2   =  0.000                             max = 27 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      lgrgdp |      Coef.   Std. Err.        z       P>|z|           [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      lgrgdp | 
         L1. |    .196634   .0504953      3.89   0.000      .097665     .295603 
       lgkap |   .1399097 .0940349     1.79    0.037     .0443952   .3242147 
        llab |   1.379547   .7663165     1.80    0.072     .1224058       2.8815 
      lssenr |   .1603888   .2619473     1.71   0.040     .3530184    .6737961 
      lpsenr |   .1181726   .3681111     1.62   0.048     .6033119    .8396572 
     lpolrig |   .2354001   .1077555     2.18   0.029      .446597     .0242032 
    lreprisk |   .0875839   .1212756     1.72   0.070     .1501119    .3252797 
    lethsion |  -.4829619   .1612682    -2.99   0.003    -.7990418    -.166882 
       lopen |   .0764617   .3610693      2.12   0.034       -1.4733    .0579345 
      ltaxes |   .0978641   .2090515      1.87   0.040     .3118693    .5075974 
       lnare |   .0399314    .053516       1.75   0.056     .1448208    .0649581 
       _cons |  -8.260643   3.010224   -2.74   0.006    -14.16057   -2.360711 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Warning: Uncorrected two-step standard errors are unreliable. 
 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(lpolrig lreprisk lethsion) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).(lgrgdp L.lgrgdp lgkap llab lssenr lpsenr lopen ltaxes lnare) 
    collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    lpolrig lreprisk lethsion 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.(lgrgdp L.lgrgdp lgkap llab lssenr lpsenr lopen ltaxes lnare) collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.30  Pr > z =  0.001 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.30  Pr > z =  0.761 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) in first differences: z =   0.63  Pr > z =  0.531 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(18)   =  31.91  Prob > chi2 =  0.023 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(18)   =  16.93  Prob > chi2 =  0.528 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:       chi2(9)    =   9.40  Prob > chi2 =  0.401 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(9)    =   7.53  Prob > chi2 =  0.582 
  iv(lpolrig lreprisk lethsion) 
    Hansen test excluding group:      chi2(15)   =  16.62  Prob > chi2 =  0.342 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.31  Prob > chi2 =  0.959 
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APPENDIX VII: Sample of Sensitivity Checks Results 
 
reg lngrgdp lgdpini lngkap lnssenr lnpsenr lnlab lnopen lnethsion lnreprisk lnpolrig lntaxes lnnare 
icountry* 
note: icountry4 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Table A7.1: Results for West Africa sub-region 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS                           Number of obs = 195 
-------------+--------------------------------------             F( 18,   176) =   2.42 
       Model |  26.2424358    181.4579131                  Prob > F  =  0.0017 
    Residual |  106.090408   176.60278641                 R-squared  =  0.1983 
-------------+--------------------------------------            Adj R-squared = 0.176 
       Total |  132.332844   194.682128062                Root MSE   =  .77639 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     lngrgdp |      Coef.      Std. Err.       t        P>|t|       [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     lgdpini |  -.4301856   .2866229    -2.00   0.035    -.9958457    .1354745 
      lngkap |   .5515527   .1943608     2.84   0.005     .1679751    .9351304 
     lnssenr |   .1860259   .2769491      2.67   0.003     .7325945    .3605428 
     lnpsenr |   .4194866   .4608303     1.91   0.064      .4899779    1.328951 
       lnlab |    2.928008    1.885002     1.95   0.052      10.59519   4.739177 
      lnopen |   .4092848   .2817494     1.77   0.085     .3441107     1.16268 
   lnethsion |  -.8107068  .5172687      1.69   0.090    -1.503632    3.125046 
    lreprisk |   .2207822   .2432995      1.98   0.065     .2593779    .7009422 
     lpolrig |    .097792   .1589843       2.12   0.039      .411553      .215969 
      ltaxes |   .4918861   .2323986       2.15   0.031     1.131285    .1475127 
       lnare |   .0430941    .0264706       2.14   0.039     .0288818       .11507 
   icountry1 |  -.2923703  .7546602    -0.39   0.699    -1.781718    1.196978 
   icountry2 |   -.473558   1.415407    -0.33   0.738    -3.266912    2.319796 
   icountry3 |  -1.127776   1.374766    -0.82   0.413    -3.840923    1.585371 
   icountry4 |  (omitted) 
   icountry5 |  -.7290126   .8924073    -0.82   0.415    -2.490209    1.032184 
   icountry6 |  -.7174566    1.26358    -0.57   0.571    -3.211175    1.776262 
   icountry7 |  -1.039379   2.111709    -0.49   0.623     -5.20691    3.128152 
   icountry8 |  -1.087963   1.021297    -1.07   0.288    -3.103528     .927602 
       _cons |   11.58521   17.00723     0.68   0.497    -21.97915    45.14956 
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Table A7.2: Results for Central Africa sub-region 
 
reg lngrgdp lngdpini lngkap lnssenr lnpsenr lnlab lnopen lnethsion lnreprisk lnpolrig lntaxes 
lnnare icountry* 
note: icountry3 omitted because of collinearity 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS                             Number of obs = 171 
-------------+-------------------------------------                 F( 18,   152) =  4.44 
       Model |  74.1689558    184.12049755                  Prob > F   =  0.0000 
    Residual |  141.172369   152.928765587                R-squared  =  0.3444 
-------------+------------------------------------                  Adj R-squared = 0.2668 
       Total |  215.341325   1701.26671368                   Root MSE  =  .96372 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     lngrgdp |      Coef.       Std. Err.         t       P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    lngdpini |  -.1496839   .1883404    -2.19   0.028    -.5217868    .2224191 
      lngkap |   .5714237   .1720095     3.32   0.001     .2315856    .9112618 
     lnssenr |   .6657585   .4746626      1.95   0.063     1.603547    .2720295 
     lnpsenr |   .2560379   .6662688      2.38   0.001     1.060305    1.572381 
       lnlab |    15.5361       6.67844     2.74   0.007     26.75496   -4.317242 
      lnopen |   .4777964   .2383885     2.24   0.015     .2806445    1.236237 
   lnethsion |  -1.329897  .6679458      2.13   0.027    -2.815001    5.474795 
    lreprisk |   .4251791   .3210681      1.62   0.087     .2091531    1.059511 
    lnpolrig |   1.768398   .4442339     3.98   0.000     2.646068   -.8907274 
     lntaxes |   .1808188   .3382595      1.73   0.094     .8491161    .4874785 
      lnnare |   .1604269   .0718049      2.60   0.010     .2825345   -.0383193 
   icountry1 |   3.312211    1.43335     2.31   0.022     .4803508    6.144072 
   icountry2 |   4.405582   2.150135     2.05   0.042     .1575745     8.65359 
   icountry3 |  (omitted) 
   icountry4 |   1.446696   .9056793     1.60   0.112    -.3426488    3.236042 
   icountry5 |    .463351   .8377048     0.55   0.581    -1.191697    2.118399 
   icountry6 |   2.309183   1.183043     1.95   0.053    -.0281468    4.646514 
   icountry7 |  -.9229175   1.152412    -0.80   0.424    -3.199732    1.353897 
   icountry8 |   4.166684   2.123659     1.96   0.052    -.0290169    8.362385 
       _cons |   59.60578   23.97816     2.49   0.014        12.23227    106.9793 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table A7.3: Results for East/Southern Africa sub-region 
 
reg lngrgdp lgdpini lngkap lnssenr lnpsenr lnlab lnopen lnethsion lreprisk lpolrig ltaxes lnare 
icountry* 
note: icountry9 omitted because of collinearity 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS                              Number of obs =     347 
-------------+------------------------------------------      F( 24,   322) =  5.33 
       Model |  67.0429151    242.7934548                    Prob > F    =  0.0000 
    Residual |  168.899141   322.524531494                R-squared   =  0.2841 
-------------+-------------------------------------------    Adj R-squared = 0.2308 
       Total |  235.942056   346.681913457                  Root MSE      =  .72425 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     lngrgdp |      Coef.       Std. Err.        t      P>|t|      [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     lgdpini |  -.6970376   .2421331    -2.88   0.004      -1.1734   -.2206749 
      lngkap |   .4201844   .0919078     4.57   0.000     .2393687   .6011205 
     lnssenr |   .0325849   .2707358      2.72   0.004     .5652193    .5000496 
     lnpsenr |   .4951368   .2912388     1.70   0.090     .0778343    1.068108 
       lnlab |    .7221608    .3408592     2.67   0.007     1.414237    2.858559 
      lnopen |   .0776668   .0551279     1.84   0.058     .4222062    .2668725 
   lnethsion |  -1.145356   .7843136   -2.06   0.045    -.3976702    2.688382 
    lreprisk |   .1464816   .1634773       1.98   0.071    .4681001    .1751369 
     lpolrig |   .4364623   .1485763        2.94   0.004    .7287652    .1441594 
      ltaxes |   .1497562   .2103157        1.95   0.077     .5635226    .2640101 
       lnare |   .0306909   .0236518        1.70   0.095     .0772225    .0158407 
   icountry1 |  -.8620858   .8430806    -1.02   0.307    -2.520728    .7965562 
   icountry2 |  -1.053241   1.334177    -0.79   0.430    -3.678045    1.571563 
   icountry3 |   .1603848    .850846     0.19   0.851    -1.513534    1.834304 
   icountry4 |  -1.316045   .9575437    -1.37   0.170    -3.199876    .5677873 
   icountry5 |  -1.995206   1.266571    -1.58   0.116    -4.487006    .4965935 
   icountry6 |  -1.976521   1.187653    -1.66   0.097    -4.313061    .3600189 
   icountry7 |  -1.341751    1.10277    -1.22   0.225    -3.511294    .8277929 
   icountry8 |  -.8397981   1.096579    -0.77   0.444    -2.997163    1.317567 
   icountry9 |  (omitted) 
  icountry10 |   .7438276   .4762014     1.56   0.119    -.1930314    1.680687 
  icountry11 |  -1.111523   1.053052    -1.06   0.292    -3.183253     .960207 
  icountry12 |  -.7463569   1.025361    -0.73   0.467     -2.76361    1.270896 
  icountry13 |   -.883859   1.054353    -0.84   0.402     -2.95815     1.190432 
  icountry14 |  -.9692739   .8443465    -1.15   0.252    -2.630406  .6918586 
       _cons |   3.724949   6.409989     0.58   0.562    -8.885798       16.3357 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
